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CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

Volume XLIII JANUARY 1948 *Number 1*

THE CONCEPT OF *SOPHROSYNE* IN GREEK LITERARY CRITICISM[1]

HELEN F. NORTH

Many terms popular with literary critics of Hellenistic and Greco-Roman times derive from spheres totally unconnected with literature. Some, like ἀστεῖος and ἄγροικος, have their origin in social distinctions.[2] Some, like ὕψος, βάθος, ὄγκος, and βάρος, originally indicated physical dimensions—height, depth, bulk, and weight. Many were first used to describe characteristics of living things; among these are ῥώμη, τόνος, and ὥρα. Others have gone through several stages: αὐστηρός, for example, began by describing the rough and bitter taste of dry wine and was then transferred to the realm of music, where it characterized severe and unadorned melodies. By an easy and apparently not uncommon transference, it was then applied to literary, and especially to prose, style.[3] Metaphorical terminology was also borrowed from the sphere of ethics, notably in the application to style of such concepts as "moderation" and "propriety." It was Aristotle who set the precedent for using the word "virtue" in literary criticism. Earlier rhetoricians may have discussed qualities of style, but there is no reason to suppose that anyone spoke of an ἀρετὴ λέξεως before Aristotle used the term in the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*[4] and, as Hendrickson and Stroux have demonstrated, applied to literary style precisely the same concept of ἀρετή as that applied to human conduct in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.[5] Aristotle included all the qualities essential to stylistic excellence in a single virtue, which Theophrastus then resolved into four *virtutes dicendi;* and thereafter literary critics did not hesitate to draw analogies between moral and stylistic qualities. Demetrius, for example, prefaces his discussion of the vice adjacent to the elevated style with the explicit reminder: "As in the sphere of morals certain bad qualities exist side by side

[1] This article originally formed a chapter of the writer's doctoral dissertation on the concept of *sophrosyne* in Greek literature from Homer to Aristotle. It was revised for publication during her tenure of the Mary Isabel Sibley Fellowship awarded by the Phi Beta Kappa Foundation, under the terms of which she gathered additional material for a book on the subject of *sophrosyne*.

[2] For the origin of these and other terms see LaRue Van Hook, *The Metaphorical Terminology of Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism* (Chicago, 1905).

[3] See Wilhelm Kroll, "Randbemerkungen," *Rh. Mus.*, LXII (1907), 100–101.

[4] *Rhet.* 1404 b 1; *Poet.* 1458 a 18.

[5] G. L. Hendrickson, "The Peripatetic Mean of Style and the Three Stylistic Characters," *AJP*, XXV (1904), 132–42; Johannes Stroux, *De Theophrasti virtutibus dicendi* (Leipzig, 1912), pp. 30–31. See chap. iv, pp. 43–54, for evidence that the Isocratean *virtutes narrationis*, while they no doubt influenced Hellenistic theories of stylistic virtue, originally dealt not with style but with content and were not called "virtues" until after Aristotle and Theophrastus had made this term popular in criticism.

with certain attractive qualities, . . . so also the leading types of style are matched by distorted varieties."[6]

Of the four Peripatetic virtues of style, only one—*τὸ πρέπον*—borrows its name from the ethical vocabulary. The other three—Ἑλληνισμός, *σαφήνεια*, and *κατασκευή*—are called "virtues" only by reason of the Aristotelian metaphor. On the other hand, several words which entered into critical terminology at first carried an ethical connotation but never achieved the technical status of stylistic "virtues." A few of these gained considerable importance in Peripatetic criticism, especially *μέτριος* and *μέσος*, both of which had been significant in Aristotelian ethics.[7] Akin to these ethical concepts which formed the backbone of Hellenistic criticism—*μετριότης*, *μεσότης*, and *τὸ πρέπον*—is yet a fourth ethical concept, that of *sophrosyne*. Although the ideas implicit in the words *μετριότης* and *τὸ πρέπον* are not closely related to each other, both are intimately allied with *sophrosyne*, which, like *μετριότης*, embodies the traditional Greek instinct for moderation, restraint of impulse, and measure in all things and, like *τὸ πρέπον*, reflects the equally Greek demand for fitness and propriety in speech and action.[8] But, whereas *μετριότης* and *τὸ πρέπον* were both absorbed into the critical vocabulary and became technical terms whose meaning was fixed, *sophrosyne* was never completely naturalized in the new realm, and its significance varied with its context. Still *sophrosyne* and its cognate forms were so closely identified with the feeling for harmony and restraint which governed every phase of Greek life that they were bound to appear occasionally in literary criticism. Their use serves to illustrate the constant interchange between ethical and aesthetic spheres in ancient civilization, for the process by which *sophrosyne* found its way into criticism is typical of the development of many such terms. It may therefore be helpful to examine the connotation of the word in a number of passages brought to light by a search which does not pretend to be exhaustive.[9]

The connection of *sophrosyne* with style in oratory and other forms of literature did not interest the Greeks until near the end of the classical period, when criticism first engaged their attention. In the beginning, the word *σώφρων* or its cognate forms, when applied to oratory or poetry, referred either to the mental or moral condition of the author or to the moral effect which his work had on the audience. Throughout the history of ancient rhetoric, the Greeks and Romans tended to believe that style reflects character and that *sophrosyne*, together with the other virtues, is essential to the good orator.[10]

[6] *De eloq.* 114 (Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, III, 287, ll. 21 ff.; trans. Rhys Roberts, who compares *Rhet. ad Her.* iv. 10, *finitima et propinqua vitia*). Cf. also 119 (Spengel, III, 288, ll. 22 ff.) and see Dionysius *De comp.* 24 (Usener-Radermacher, II, 1, 120, ll. 16 ff.) on *μεσότης*, and the fragment on brevity in the *Ars Cornuti* 102 (Spengel, I, 2, 370, ll. 9 ff.).

[7] Although *μέτριοι* ("measurable, within measure") and *μέσοι* ("middle") with their derivatives *μετριότης* and *μεσότης* are etymologically distinct, both have an obvious bearing on the concept of moderation and thus tended to be used as synonyms. For recent discussions of the importance of these concepts in rhetoric see, on *μετριότης* and *μεσότης*, S. F. Bonner, "Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the Peripatetic Mean of Style," *Class. Phil.*, XXXIII (1938), 257–66; and, on *τὸ πρέπον*, Max Pohlenz, *Τὸ πρέπον* (Berlin, 1933).

[8] On the connection between *sophrosyne* and *τὸ πρέπον* see Cicero *De off.* i. 27. 93–94; Pohlenz, *op. cit.*; and Lotte Labowsky, *Die Ethik des Panaetius* (Leipzig, 1934), pp. 6 ff.

[9] No attempt is made here to investigate the use of the topic of *sophrosyne* in epideictic oratory, a subject extensive in itself and unrelated to the problem of style, nor is there room in this paper to consider at length the relation of the general concept of self-restraint to the process of composition. Only specific allusions to *sophrosyne* in matters of style are here dealt with.

[10] On style as the mirror of character in every form of art, see Plato *Repub.* 401 A; in literature, see Seneca *Epp.* 114 and 115. Too numerous for listing here are the ancient demands that the orator be morally good, from Plato's *Gorgias* to Cato's *vir bonus, dicendi peritus*. When the cardinal virtues had been canonized,

Generally, the moral excellence of the speaker is felt to be important less because it affects his style than because it enhances his use of ethical persuasion.[11] Yet occasionally we find that the *sophrosyne* of an author is expected to have some influence, other than the purely ethical, upon his work, and here it is that the virtue enters the province of style. Plato was among the first to recognize this possibility. In *Phaedrus* he includes the poet among those who are inspired by the divine madness to greater heights than can be attained with the help of *sophrosyne*, which here means "sanity."[12] It is beside the point that in this passage Plato, for once, treats *sophrosyne* as an undesirable quality.[13] The important facts are that he regards it as a condition of the poet which inevitably affects his work and that this effect is seen not in the moral content but in the literary quality of the poem. Plato's contemporary, Isocrates, in the *Antidosis* names as one of the qualifications of an orator τόλμη μετὰ σωφροσύνης but does not describe the effect of this combination, whether ethical or stylistic, on the discourse.[14] From its association with τόλμη it is clear that in this context *sophrosyne* refers not to sanity, as in *Phaedrus*, but to moderation or modesty. This variation in meaning was destined to persist throughout ancient criticism, for the manifold implications of the word *sophrosyne* in ethics forbade its limitation to any one significance in criticism.

For further references to *sophrosyne* as a quality of the orator we may look to rhetorical works written centuries after the time of Plato and Isocrates. In studying this subject the historical approach is of less value than might be expected, because allusions to *sophrosyne* in style are too infrequent to show a continuous chronological development, and sometimes an author whose views would be of interest is completely silent on this subject. Aristotle is a case in point. Whenever possible, we shall note the influence which a writer's historical background may have had on his interpretation of stylistic *sophrosyne*, but in many cases no such influence will be apparent. The intellectual aspect of the word σώφρων is again uppermost in a rhetorical τέχνη formerly ascribed to Aelius Aristides, which tells us that it is characteristic of the wise and σώφρων to know the value of everything, of the just to give what is due (τὰ πρέποντα) to himself and others, and of the brave to dare to speak the truth.[15] In this context σώφρων means "prudent" or "sensible" and is not distinguished from φρόνιμος, nor are we told whether the *sophrosyne* of the orator is reflected in the style or in the content of the oration. This treatise adheres to the custom of requiring the ideal orator to possess all four of the Stoic virtues. Ps.-Aristides applies them to πολιτικὸς λόγος as distinguished from the λόγος ἀφελής; usually the entire canon is required in every type of oratory. An exception to this rule appears in the twenty-fifth discourse by Maximus of Tyre, who distributes four virtues (again the Stoic canon, with a single difference) among four types of oratory. Wisdom is necessary for

it became customary to require the ideal orator to possess all four. The Stoics gave this idea a new turn. Believing that eloquence is itself a virtue and that the virtues are inseparable, they taught that the orator must automatically possess all the virtues (see Cicero *De orat.* i. 18. 83).

[11] On the relation of the moral character of the orator to ethical persuasion see especially Aristotle *Rhet.* 1356 a 4–13 and 1377 b 25–1378 a 16; Isocrates *Antidosis* 278–80; Cicero *De orat.* i. 19. 87, ii. 43. 182; and Quintilian vi. 2. 18.

[12] 245 A ff.

[13] Usually Plato interprets *sophrosyne* as "moderation" or "self-control," a moral rather than an intellectual quality, and holds it essential for the orator as for all other men.

[14] 190.

[15] Spengel, II, 501, ll. 31 f.—502, ll. 1–5. This passage is quoted from a genuine discourse by Aristides—*Or.* xlix. 399 (Dindorf, II, 539, ll. 21–24). Cf. also *Or.* xlv. 96 (Dindorf, II, 128, ll. 5 ff.).

the deliberative speaker, justice for the juridical, *sophrosyne* for the panegyrist, and knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) for the teacher.[16] The application of three of the virtues to their respective *genera causarum* is clear enough, but the reason for coupling *sophrosyne* with epideictic may not be immediately obvious. The explanation should probably be sought in the preceding passage of the discourse, which deals with the evils of flattering speech. The danger of flattery is greatest in panegyric, which was, moreover, the dominant form of oratory at the time when Maximus wrote.[17] It is therefore natural that he should devote most attention to this type of oratory, and, since he regards dishonest panegyric as ἀκόλαστος λόγος,[18] he would necessarily require *sophrosyne* (here "moderation, restraint") in honest epideictic. The virtue would, no doubt, be reflected more in the subject matter than in the manner of expression, yet σώφρων epideictic might well apply restraint to style as well as to content.

One of the few clear-cut cases in which *sophrosyne* on the part of an orator has a well-defined bearing on the rhetorical excellence of his speech occurs in Aristides' discourse *On Rhetoric*, in a passage which seeks to identify *phronesis* and *sophrosyne* with the rhetorical ἔργα of invention and disposition. *Sophrosyne* is compared to τάξις because it resembles the management and harmonious arrangement of suppositions and probabilities.[19] In his effort to relate rhetoric to the virtues, Aristides also says that rhetoric is invented by *phronesis*, on behalf of justice, and is protected by *sophrosyne* and *andreia*.[20] He further suggests that Hesiod, in the *Theogony* 80–90, regarded *phronesis* and *sophrosyne* as the source of rhetoric,[21] but in neither of these passages does *sophrosyne* have any reference to style.

Throughout antiquity it was thought that speech should have the power to produce *sophrosyne* in an audience. So long as the Greeks believed that virtue was capable of being taught, they naturally regarded precept and exhortation as the obvious instrument of education. Nestor is the first example we have of the wise counselor, renowned for his power to persuade impetuous men to behave with moderation. Plato sums up the Greek tradition about Nestor when he calls him σώφρων and says that blessed are they who hear his σωφρονῶν speech.[22] Greek tragedy supplies other examples of the power of exhortation to produce *sophrosyne*, or at least of the Greek faith in this power. For example, Danaus in the *Suppliants* of Aeschylus calls his counsels to his terrified daughters σωφρονίσματα not alone because of the prudent

[16] *Or.* xxv. 6 (Hobein, p. 304, ll. 10–13). The tradition of four cardinal virtues is so strong that Maximus retains the number even though he has to substitute ἐπιστήμη for ἀνδρεία and add teaching to the customary *tria genera causarum*.

[17] In his demand for an ἀληθὴς ῥήτωρ who will be superior to all forms of passion, Maximus gives a vivid description of the general run of public speakers in his day. The emphasis upon the need for honest, healthful, unflattering oratory reveals the influence of Plato's *Gorgias*. See also Lucian, *A Professor of Public Speaking*, 15, 16 (Jacobitz, III, 91) on the absence of αἰδώς and μετριότης in contemporary sophists.

[18] *Or.* xxv. 5 (Hobein, p. 303, ll. 15–16). Something of the same idea lies behind Plutarch's warning about the proper kind of praise to bestow upon philosophical discourse. To apply ἔπαινος ἑταιρικός to a λόγος σωφρονῶν is like crowning an athlete with roses or lilies instead of laurel or olive (*De rect. rat. aud.* 46 A–B). That is, praise should itself be σώφρων, the opposite of ἑταιρικός.

[19] *Or.* xlv. 96 (Dindorf, II, 128, ll. 13–14).

[20] *Ibid.* (Dindorf, II, 128, ll. 5–7). Cf. *Or.* xlv. 54 (Dindorf, II, 72, ll. 9 ff.), where Aristides also discusses the alliance of rhetoric and the four virtues and says that the *sophrosyne* of those who know rhetoric is the salvation of their city, because they prefer a life of order to ἀταξία.

[21] *Or.* xlv. 99 (Dindorf, II, 133, l. 2). A nineteenth-century commentator on "The Ethical Theory of Rhetoric and Eloquence" observes that all true eloquence springs from integrity and strength of character and that self-control is necessary to prevent an undue poetic tendency. The same kind of moral force is required as for the suppression of bodily passion (William Shedd, *Literary Essays* [New York, 1878], pp. 86–87).

[22] *Laws* 711 E. Cf. Ps.-Plutarch *De vit. Hom.* 165 (Bernardakis, p. 429, l. 26) on Nestor's ability to impart *sophrosyne*.

nature of the advice but even more because of the effect that it is intended to have on the girls.[23] That is, his speech is not only *σώφρων* but *σωφρονίζων* as well. Yet it was the prose-writers of the fourth century, contemporary with the Attic orators, who were most impressed by this method of education, and no one had greater faith than Isocrates in the power of discourse, either spoken or written, to impart *sophrosyne*, justice, and the other virtues. He founded his *paideia* upon the belief not only that rhetorical education (πολιτικοὶ λόγοι) is the best means of stimulating virtue in the student but also that the orator-statesman is responsible for the advance of his city in *sophrosyne* and justice. Many of his discourses testify to this conviction,[24] which was shared by some of his readers. Dionysius, for example, praises Isocrates' speeches as παιδεύματα πρὸς ἀρετήν[25] and, in analyzing certain famous works, finds the *Areopagiticus* particularly suited to inculcate *sophrosyne*.[26] Plato's stand on this question is well known. His condemnation of the greatest Athenian statesmen for failing to make their people better and more self-controlled[27] formed the basis of many subsequent attacks on the moral status of rhetoric. Belief in the ethical influence of oratory reached its climax in the movement known as the "Second Sophistic," when the itinerant professor of public speaking liked nothing better than to harangue a city about its sins and conclude with the pious hope that his words had caused a reformation. An excellent example of this type of discourse, but little removed from the sermon, is Dio's address to the people of Alexandria, in which he reproves them for their vices, especially their frivolous devotion to vulgar theatrical shows, and begs them to heed his *σωφρονίζων λόγος*. He reminds them that discourses like his, which make men better, happier, and *σωφρονέστεροι*, are rare indeed[28] and congratulates himself on having given them, if nothing else, one hour of *sophrosyne*.[29]

But, although it is nothing new to read that oratory should chasten and restrain an audience and impart to it moderation, a further development of the concept of *σώφρων* speech occurred in which the ethical motive ceased to predominate. A parallel may exist in another of the arts, for it is probable that the Greeks at first regarded as *σώφρων* that music which had a calming effect on the hearer and engendered in him temperance and moderation.[30] Plato, however, used the word *σώφρων* to describe

[23] 992. On the protreptic power of poetry in general, the *locus classicus* is Aristophanes *Frogs* 1030 ff., especially 1055.

[24] See *Or.* xii. 138–40; xv. 84 ff.; xiii. 21, and cf. Cicero *De orat.* ii. 9. 35 for a similar view.

[25] *De Isoc.* 4 (Usener-Radermacher, I, 60. 24–61. 1).

[26] *De Isoc.* 8 (Usener-Radermacher, I, 66. 1); cf. also 5 and 10.

[27] *Gorg.* 515 C ff.; cf. also *Alc. i.* 134 B–D. See the attempted rebuttal by Aristides (*Or.* xlv and xlvi [Dindorf]), who contends that Pericles, Cimon, Themistocles, and Miltiades did indeed increase Athenian κοσμιότης and *sophrosyne*, as well as their other virtues.

[28] *Or.* xxxii. 7 (Arnim, I, 269, l. 4).

[29] *Ibid.* 30 (Arnim, I, 275, l. 14). Cf. *Or.* xxxiii (Arnim, I, 276, l. 19). The speeches of Dio and other rhetors who dabbled in philosophy reveal the influence of the Cynic diatribe, one of whose recognized aims was τὸ σωφρονίζειν (see Gustav A. Gerhard, *Phoenix von Kolophon* [Leipzig and Berlin, 1909], pp. 35 ff.). For other eminent examples of the σωφρονίζων λόγος see Julian *Misopogon;* Aristides *Or.* xlii and xliv; and Libanius *Or.* xvi (Foerster). In *Or.* l. 415 (Dindorf, II, 569, ll. 11–13) Aristides ridicules the so-called "Dancing Sophists" and asks how they expect to exhort their hearers to *sophrosyne*, manliness, and endurance, if they cannot even maintain order in their own speeches. The *artes rhetoricae* also recognized the power of the orator to σωφρονίζειν his audience (see Ps.-Aristides [Spengel, II, 502, l. 10] and Troilus the Sophist [Rabe, *Proleg. syl.* 56. 20]). The ability to instil *sophrosyne* was often attributed to lawgivers and wise men. For a late and extravagant use of this topic of epideictic see Iamblichus *Life of Pythagoras* 31 (Deubner).

[30] On the power of a calm and well-regulated type of music to instil *sophrosyne* see Plato *Repub.* 404 E, 410 A; Aristotle *Politics* 1340 a 18 ff.; Ps.-Plutarch *De mus.* 1146 B; Clemens Alex. *Paedagog.* 195; and cf. also Hermann Abert, *Die Lehre vom Ethos in der griechischen Musik* (Leipzig, 1899).

harmonies that were severe and simple rather than vulgar and cloying[31] and to distinguish the Phrygian from the Dorian mode,[32] while Plutarch applied the term to the paean as opposed to the dithyramb.[33] The earlier implications of the word were never wholly lost, it is true; but it became possible to refer by the word *σώφρων* to qualities remote from the moral effect of music on the hearer. It is conceivable that the term *σώφρων* as descriptive of style passed from ethics first to music and then to literature. It is certain, at any rate, that Aristotle's use of other ethical terms in the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics* supplied a precedent for the transfer of the word *σώφρων*.

Owing to the loss of virtually all Greek criticism between Aristotle and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (or Demetrius, for their chronology is still uncertain),[34] we cannot determine how early a *σώφρων* speech ceased to be one whose content was calculated to render its hearers moderate and restrained and became one whose style was itself in some way moderate and restrained. The difference between the ethical and the aesthetic implications is well illustrated by William Michael Rossetti's comment on the use of the parallel term "chaste" in English criticism: "Critics have a habit of calling certain sorts of work 'chaste'; not as indicating any quality of moral continence but as implying the correctest and purest taste, unmixed with any license or audacity."[35]

The first extant use of any derivative of the word *σώφρων* in a purely stylistic sense is probably to be found in a fragment of the essay *On Imitation*, which Bonner regards as the earliest of the *Scripta rhetorica* by Dionysius of Halicarnassus.[36] Here Isocrates is described as "tempering grandeur with simplicity" in his style (*σεμνότητα σωφρονίζων λιτότητι*).[37] The fellow-critic and friend of Dionysius, Caecilius of Calacte, was also familiar with this terminology, if he is rightly credited with the comment that a certain clause in Aeschines' *Oration against Ctesiphon* is phrased with restraint, not with frivolity (*σωφρόνως, οὐ κούφως*).[38] The same conception of *sophrosyne* as a source of stylistic restraint or good taste is shown by Demetrius, who refers to the need for discretion in applying verbal adornment to jests. Graces of style should be used *μετὰ σωφροσύνης*, for to dress up a joke is like beautifying an ape.[39] According to this critic, *sophrosyne* also enters into *ἐκλογή*, the choice of words, and is closely related to a feeling for *τὸ πρέπον*. Even in poetry, Demetrius holds, one endowed with the power of nice discrimination (*τις ἀκριβῶς σωφρονῶν*) would reject inappropriate metaphors and compounds.[40] Hermogenes, in the second century after Christ, recognizes the relation of *sophrosyne* to style but studies this quality chiefly in connection with its effect on the audience. In the treatise *Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος* he distinguishes between epideictic and sophistic figures of speech on the ground that, whereas sophistic figures flatter the ear in an unworthy and empty fashion, the epideictic variety, such as Isocrates used in his paraenetic speeches, contributes to the *ἡδονὴ σώφρων* ("proper pleasure") of the hearer.[41] The twelfth-century Byzantine

[31] *Laws* 802 C.

[32] *Repub.* 399 C.

[33] *De E apud Delphos* 389 B.

[34] See Wilhelm Kroll, *RE*, Suppl. VII, 1079. 28 ff.

[35] *Lives of Famous Poets* (London, 1878), p. 262.

[36] S. F. Bonner, *The Literary Treatises of Dionysius of Halicarnassus* (Cambridge, 1939), p. 38. Rhys Roberts, however, assigns it to fifth place (*Dionysius of Halicarnassus: The Three Literary Letters* [Cambridge, 1901], p. 6).

[37] *De imit.* 31 (Usener-Radermacher, II, 1, 212. 6).

[38] Frag. 161 (Ofenloch).

[39] *De eloq.* 165 (Spengel, III, 299, l. 3).

[40] *Ibid.*, 188 (Spengel, III, 303, l. 13).

[41] *Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος*, 13 (Spengel, II, 437, l. 20). See Eduard Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa* (Leipzig, 1898), I, 383, on the varieties of *σχήματα*.

commentator, Gregory of Corinth, elaborating upon this distinction, explains that a σώφρων ἡδονή is one that does not depend on jokes or jests or witty sayings.[42] He adds that epideictic figures should be used in a forensic speech so that tired ears may be aroused by the beauty of the language, for this would be a σώφρων ἡδονή.[43] The importance of these two passages lies in the fact that, while the effect on the audience is still primary, this effect is attained by the style of the speech rather than by its moral content.

A rather heterogeneous listing of the qualities upon which the σώφρων style depends may be found in the *Art of Rhetoric* by Ps.-Aristides, mentioned above. After suggesting that the orator must both possess *sophrosyne* himself and produce it in his audience, Ps.-Aristides further requires him to demonstrate that his speech, too, has a full share of beauty, intelligence, strength, and *sophrosyne*. Possession of these excellences is reflected in compactness of enthymemes, symmetrical phrases, harmonious composition, subtlety, figures of speech, and the graceful use of commonplaces, of artistry, and of specific questions (hypotheses).[44] We are not told whether all these elements contribute to all the stylistic excellences mentioned or whether each bears on one particular quality. If *sophrosyne* is to be understood as "moderation" or "good taste," presumably symmetry and harmonious composition would be the corresponding elements involved. It will be recalled that Aristides, in his authentic discourse *On Rhetoric*, compared *sophrosyne* to disposition or arrangement.

Philostratus, the historian of the Second Sophistic, also makes *sophrosyne* a criterion of style, this time in the use of rhythm. He criticizes Apollonius of Athens for using verse rhythms, especially the anapestic, in prose passages, and designates his verse and prose rhythms as, respectively, ἀκόλαστοι and σωφρονέστεροι.[45] Verse rhythms in a work of prose are a proof of license and unrestraint on the part of the author, while the rhythms proper to this kind of writing are less poetic and more sober. We should connect Philostratus' choice of epithets with the perennial controversy over Attic versus Asian oratory, for the use of verse rhythms in prose was characteristic of the licentious Asian style rather than of the restrained and σώφρων Attic.[46] Lucian is another writer of this era who connects *sophrosyne* with the style proper to prose, especially historiography. In his essay *On the Way To Write History*, he warns the historian to avoid the rhetorician's δεινότης. His diction must, above all, be clear, and ornamentation unobtrusive. Although a touch of poetry is permissible in scenes of great excitement, the writer must avoid the poetic frenzy and will do

[42] Walz, *Rhetores Graeci*, VII, 2, 1228. 16–17.

[43] *Ibid.*, 1233. 10–13.

[44] Spengel, II, 502, ll. 12–16.

[45] *Vit. soph.* 602 (Kayser, II, 104, ll. 17 ff.). The opposition of ἀκολασία to *sophrosyne*, familiar throughout Greek ethical literature, is frequently carried over into the realm of style. Not only is ἀκολασία the antithesis of *sophrosyne*, but κόλασις is often its synonym. From the fundamental meaning of "pruning" trees and shrubs, κολάζειν easily came to signify "restraint," "correction," or "punishment"; and this term, or its Latin equivalent, *castigare*, frequently appears with the meaning "to keep within bounds, to use a chaste or restrained style"; see, e.g., Philostratus *op. cit.* 505 (Kayser, II, 21, l. 10) and 599 (Kayser, II, 102, ll. 16–17), Ps.-Aristides (Spengel, II, 500, ll. 29 ff.), and Photius *Bibl.* 181 (Bekker, I, 126, l. 15). Synesius (*Dio*, Migne, *Patr. Gr.*, LXVI, 1124A), using the same metaphor as Philostratus, praises the restrained (κεκολασμένοι) rhythms of Dio Chrysostom and finds them suitable for one who played the role of σωφρονιστής (for *castigare* see Horace *Ars poet.* 294 and Quintilian x. 1. 115). *Castigata* in connection with literature in the Renaissance meant "revised, corrected, emended," and from the seventeenth century the verb "to castigate" was used in English with the meaning "to correct or emend" (see *NED*, *s.vv.* "castigate," "castigation," etc.).

[46] See Cicero *Or.* 69. 230 and Norden, *op. cit.*, I, 134–36; cf. also Cicero *Or.* 8. 27 and 17. 57 on the Asian practice of chanting speeches. For the relation of *sophrosyne* to the Attic style see below, pp. 8–10.

well to restrain himself (σωφρονητέον).[47] Lucian further advises the historian to curb his enthusiasm for descriptive passages—the unrestrained ἔκφρασις which is the trade-mark of the Second Sophistic. Let him use moderation (again σωφρονητέον) in portraying mountains, walls, and rivers, lest he make a display of word-painting at the expense of history.[48]

Sophrosyne also had a place in poetry, according to the Emperor Julian, who in Oration vii discusses the composition of hymns. As the style must suit the subject, Julian requires that, when we compose hymns on sacred subjects, the diction must be σώφρων, καλή, and entirely appropriate to the gods.[49] Julian does not define his terms; but σώφρων seems to mean not so much "restrained" or "moderate" as morally pure and decorous, for the Emperor adds that the diction must contain nothing unseemly or blasphemous. All must be solemn (σεμνά), magnificent, godlike, and pure. *Sophrosyne*, then, affects the choice of words, not their rhythm or arrangement. A like correlation between the style and the nature of the subject is the principal requirement in the fragment of a Neo-Platonic προθεωρία, ascribed to the *Life of Isidore* by Damascius.[50] As τὸ σεμνόν, τὸ σῶφρον, τὸ σαφές, and τὸ ἀρχαῖον were characteristic of the philosopher Isidore, it is fitting that the same qualities distinguish the style of his biography.[51] Here, too, the author fails to explain the precise meaning of τὸ σῶφρον.

Thus far the examples cited have shown the concept of *sophrosyne* rather loosely applied to the criticism of style and its elements—figures, rhythms, arrangement, choice of words, metaphors, and descriptive passages. In such cases *sophrosyne* carries the familiar connotation of "moderation," "restraint," or "propriety." The ancient critics were also familiar with a more specific application of the idea, through which *sophrosyne* came to be regarded as a characteristic of one particular style—the Attic as opposed to the Asian. The most significant passage in which this distinction occurs is in the Introduction to Dionysius' treatise *On the Ancient Orators*, where the ancient and philosophic Attic rhetoric is compared to a free and σώφρων wife, while the new Asian style, which has supplanted it, is like an ἄφρων *hetaira*.[52] The ancient and native Attic Muse has been dishonored by her own people, while the barbarian from Mysia, Phrygia, and Caria holds sway over the cities of Greece, having expelled the other, the ignorant driving out the wise and the mad banishing the sane (τὴν σώφρονα).[53] The metaphor unmistakably implies that Dionysius regarded the ancient Attic style as σώφρων ("restrained," "modest," "sane"), and the implication becomes explicit in the following lines, wherein Dionysius says that in his own time the ἀρχαία καὶ σώφρων ῥητορική has regained its rightful honor.[54] The credit for this revival of older and better standards he gives to the cultured Romans, whose influence elevated and purified the taste of the decadent Greeks. The interest felt by

[47] *De hist. conscr.* 45. 58 (Jacobitz, II, 24).

[48] *Ibid.* 57. 65 (Jacobitz, II, 28). Cf. Milton (*Fam. Ep.* 23 [Columbia ed., XII, 95]) on the historian's need of temperance to say much in little.

[49] *Or.* vii. 218 C.

[50] See A. Brinkmann, *Rh. Mus.*, LXV (1910), 616–26.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 618, ll. 5–7; cf. also p. 624. Hermogenes Περὶ ἰδεῶν 6 (Spengel, II, 289, l. 19) also says that σεμνότης should characterize the style in which *sophrosyne* is discussed.

[52] 1 (Usener-Radermacher, I, 4. 7 ff.).

[53] 1 (Usener-Radermacher, I, 4. 11 ff.).

[54] 2 (Usener-Radermacher, I, 5. 1–2). Cf. Roberts (Introduction to *Demetrius on Style* [Cambridge, 1902], p. 46): "It was, above all, in the want of the Attic sense of measure and fitness that Asianism declared itself." See also Quintilian viii. praef. 7 on the Asian want of *iudicium ac modus*. The Attic style was also called the ὑγιαινοῦση Μοῦση (Eunapius, *Vit. soph.*, p. 494, ll. 26–27 [Boissonade]). For a discussion of the characteristics of the Asian style (many of them incompatible with the spirit of *sophrosyne*) see Norden, *op. cit.*, I, 131–49, 263–68, 367–91.

educated Romans in the conflict between the Attic and the Asian styles is well known to us, particularly through Cicero's references to the subject in *Brutus* and the *Orator*, and it is from Latin, rather than from Greek, criticism that we have the most abundant proof that the idea of *sophrosyne* was connected with the Attic style.[55] *Sana eloquentia* was equivalent to the Attic style even down to the time of Symmachus,[56] and when Cicero speaks of the *salubritas Atticae dictionis et quasi sanitas*,[57] it is natural to suppose that he, like Dionysius, saw in the true Attic style an expression of *sophrosyne*.

As we know from *Brutus* and the *Orator*, however, Cicero had scant patience with the one-sided Atticism of Calvus, Brutus, and their school, who confined themselves rigidly to the plain style, rejecting all embellishment and taking as their model Lysias, Hyperides, or even Thucydides. The most immediate results of this policy were meagerness, dryness, and poverty of style;[58] but even in the time of Cicero the Latin imitators of Thucydides had begun to affect that deliberate archaism[59] which later became one of the most striking characteristics of the Atticist movement.[60] This tendency was even more pronounced among the Greeks, and so it is that Greek critics invented the term "hyperattic," whose chief function was to describe the excessive use of archaism. In Latin rhetoric the Atticist style was sometimes identified with the plain style,[61] but the Greeks commonly associated hyperatticism with a style closer to the grand in its departure from ordinary diction and from the mean. For example, in the *Life of Demonax* by Lucian, the adverb ὑπεραττικῶς describes the use of archaic and unusual terms,[62] while in *Lexiphanes* the same author accuses the Sophist of wishing to be "hyperattic" and of finishing off his speech in the most archaistic way possible.[63] Philostratus in the *Life of Apollonius* describes that philosopher's style as neither, on the one hand, dithyrambic and on fire with poetic words nor, on the other, full of rare, farfetched, and hyperattic terms[64] and adds that Apollonius considered unpleasant that which was beyond due measure Atticist. Synesius, too, diagnosed the extravagant use of strange, archaic Attic

[55] Although the scope of this paper does not permit a thorough examination of the many Latin terms in which the concepts of "restraint" and "moderation" are applied to literary criticism, we may note that Cicero, Quintilian, Seneca, Tacitus, and Gellius, among others, often employ Latin equivalents of *sophrosyne* to describe not only the Attic style but also the Rhodian style, certain aspects of the plain style, the middle style, the style appropriate to philosophy, and the Stoic type of oratory. E.g., Cicero, who was the first to classify the Rhodian style as midway between the Attic and the Asian, describes the Rhodians as *saniores*, "more restrained," than the Asians (*Brut.* 13. 51; cf. Quint. xii. 10. 18). Cicero specifies that the practitioner of the plain style be *verecundus* in the use of embellishment (*Or.* 24. 79 and 81). For a modern parallel see the statement of George Norlin that Isocrates is more "continent" than Gorgias in the use of alliteration and assonance (Loeb ed. of Isocrates, I. xiv). The style appropriate to philosophy is, according to Cicero, an *aequabile et temperatum orationis genus* (*De off.* i. 1. 3) and may be compared to a *casta, verecunda virgo incorrupta* (*Or.* 19. 64). According to Seneca, it is *moderata, temperanda, modestior*, and *pressa, non audax* (*Ep.* 40. 8 and 14). In Gellius (vi. 14. 10) Rutilius and Polybius are quoted as terming the speech of Diogenes the Stoic before the Senate in 155 B.C. *modesta et sobria*. For the connection of the word *temperatus* as applied to the middle style with the concept of *sophrosyne* see below, pp. 10–11.

[56] See Norden, *op. cit.*, II, 643.

[57] *Brut.* 13. 51; cf. also 82. 284; *Or.* 26. 90; *Op. gen.* 3. 8.

[58] *Brut.* 82. 285; 84. 289.

[59] *Ibid.* 83. 288; cf. also *Or.* 9. 30–31.

[60] For the connection between archaism and Atticism see Norden, *op. cit.*, I, 151–52, 258–63, 357–67. Latin archaism reached its peak with Fronto (see *ibid.*, I, 362 ff.; and M. D. Brock, *Studies in Fronto and His Age* [Cambridge, 1911], pp. 25–35).

[61] Cicero *Or.* 9. 28–29; 23. 75–76; cf. also Emporius *De Ethopoeia* (Halm, *Rhetores Latini minores*, p. 561, l. 7), where the plain, the middle, and the grand characters of style are matched with the Attic, the Rhodian, and the Asian schools. The exact equation of the three styles and three schools was a postclassical development. Cicero held that the true Attic orator should be a master of every appropriate style (see *Brut.* 82. 284—84. 291).

[62] 26. 385 (Jacobitz, II, 201).

[63] 25. 349 (Jacobitz, II, 181).

[64] i. 17. 21 (Kayser, I, 17, ll. 32 ff.).

words as one cause of an overgrown and swollen style and described the opposite kind of diction as *τὸ σῶφρον*.[65] In the time of Photius the word "hyperattic" signified an excessively unnatural diction, compounded of obsolete, poetic, and metaphorical terms.[66] Three authors win praise in the *Bibliotheca* for avoiding the fault of hyperatticism.[67] Diodorus Siculus, who neither sought hyperatticism and archaic modes of expression nor descended entirely to the level of ordinary speech, is said to rejoice in the *μέσος χαρακτήρ*. Herodian is commended in similar terms for avoiding, on the one hand, hyperatticism and unnatural language and, on the other, utter meanness and disregard for the rules of art; the result in his case is called a *σώφρων λέξις*. In the ninth century, therefore, *sophrosyne* in diction coincided with the middle style; *σώφρων λέξις* and *μέσος χαρακτήρ* are clearly synonymous. Yet they are not the same as the middle style in orthodox Hellenistic criticism, which lay midway between the grand and the plain styles, all three being praiseworthy when used according to the dictates of *τὸ πρέπον*.[68] The *μέσος χαρακτήρ* or *σώφρων λέξις* of Photius, like all the moral virtues and the single stylistic virtue of Aristotle, lies in the mean between vices of excess and defect, between too careful adherence to the archaic Attic dialect and complete neglect thereof.

The relation of the concept of *sophrosyne* to the doctrine of the three characters of style is somewhat obscure, because it was never defined by the ancients. Although certain aspects of the plain style recall the Greek idea of moderation and restraint, the Greeks themselves did not use the word *σώφρων* in a technical sense as a synonym for *ἰσχνός* or *λιτός*; nor do we ever find it used in classical times as the equivalent of the middle style, the *μέσος χαρακτήρ*. The general feeling seems to be that recorded by Gellius in his adaptation of Varro. After discussing the Greek and Latin terminology and traditional exemplars of the three styles, Gellius points out that each style is more brilliant when embellished chastely and modestly (*cum caste pudiceque ornatur*).[69] *Sophrosyne*, we may conclude, should accompany the use of each style; it does not belong exclusively to any one of them.

Yet there is a special connection between *sophrosyne* and the middle style, less evident in Greek than in Latin, where it is partly the result of terminology. In the earliest Latin allusion to the three stylistic characters, the *Auctor ad Herennium* calls the middle style *mediocris*[70] (Greek *μέσος*), and in *De oratore* Cicero, too, uses this terminology (*medium*, iii. 45. 177; *mediocritas*, iii. 52. 199; *mediocris*, iii. 55. 212). But in the *Orator* he introduces a different idea, that of mixture or tempering, and calls the middle style *medius et quasi temperatus* (6. 21) and later *oratio modica ac temperata* (27. 95; cf. also 16. 53; 28. 98; 29. 100, 101). There is every reason to suppose that in such passages Cicero does not mean by *temperatus* "moderate, sober, restrained," as he often does in his philosophical treatises,[71] but that here he reverts to the primary significance of *temperare*, "to mix, mingle, or temper." Thus he must conceive of the middle style not just as a mean, equidistant from two extremes, but as a mixture

[65] *De insomniis* (Migne, *Patr. Gr.*, LXVI, 1308 C). Note that *sophrosyne*, formerly a characteristic of the Attic style, is now the antithesis of the hyperattic.

[66] See Emil Orth, *Die Stilkritik des Photios* (Leipzig, 1929), p. 101, for evidence of the Byzantine leaning toward the Atticist style and of Photius' interest in the problem.

[67] Heraclian (*Bibl.* 85 [Bekker, I, 65, l. 1]), Diodorus Siculus (70 [Bekker, I, 35, ll. 8–9]), and Herodian (99 [Bekker, I, 85, l. 38]).

[68] Cicero *Or.* 21. 70 ff.; 28. 100; 29. 101.

[69] vi. 14. 11.

[70] iv. 8. 11.

[71] E.g., *De div.* i. 51. 115; *De off.* i. 1. 3.

of the other two styles.[72] This is the view of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who uses such terms as *κεραννύειν* ("to mix") and *εὔκρατος* ("well-blended") to describe both the middle character of style[73] and the middle type of composition.[74] There is no doubt that the Ciceronian *temperare* is the equivalent of various Greek words denoting "mixture,"[75] yet Greek-speaking Romans may well have connected *temperatus* with the idea of *sophrosyne* in spite of its true origin. Not only was there a powerful motive for confusion in the accident that *temperantia*, a derivative of *temperare*, became, thanks to Cicero, a favorite translation of the noun *sophrosyne*, but it was natural to regard the middle style as moderate, restrained, and free from excess, and this notion was, of course, implicit in the concept of *sophrosyne*.[76]

In one instance the Greek verb *σωφρονίζειν* approximates the primary meaning of *temperare*, either as an independent development or just possibly under the influence of the Latin verb in this situation.[77] In classical Greek the regular significance of *σωφρονίζειν* is "to chasten, bring to one's senses";[78] but Dionysius, in a passage already cited, gives it a meaning closer to that of *κεραννύειν* or *temperare*. He describes the style of Isocrates as tempering grandeur with simplicity (*σεμνότητα σωφρονίζων λιτότητι*).[79] It is altogether probable that we have here an allusion to Dionysius' concept of the middle style as a mixture of the grand and the plain. We know that he regards Isocrates as a practitioner of the middle style who, for emotional effect, borrows the *σεμνότης* and *μεγαλοπρέπεια* of Gorgias and Thucydides but for didactic purposes the simple and unadorned style of Lysias,[80] and we have many passages in which he treats *σεμνότης*

[72] This concept of the middle style is not new in *Orator* (see *De orat.* iii. 52. 199). It is unnecessary to describe at length the two chief theories about the origin of the three characters of style, particularly the *μέσος χαρακτήρ* (see Hendrickson, *AJP*, XXV [1904], 132–42 and XXVI [1905], 249–90; Stroux, *op. cit.*, pp. 104–8, 119; Kroll, *Rh. Mus.*, LXII [1907], 86–91, and his ed. of Cicero's *Orator* [Berlin, 1913], pp. 71 ff.; and *RE*, Suppl. VII, 1074–75; A. Körte, *Hermes*, LXIV [1928], 80–87; and S. F. Bonner, *Class. Phil.*, XXIII [1938], 261–63). But it is perhaps worth noting that the account given by Hendrickson and accepted by Stroux appears to suggest that Dionysius of Halicarnassus was the first to conceive of the middle style as a *μικτὴ λέξις* (see Hendrickson, *AJP*, XXV, 139, n. 1, on the phrase *μικτὴ λέξις*, which "represents Dionysius' conception of the middle style." According to this view, Theophrastus, commonly regarded as the inventor of the theory of the three characters of style, presumably called the middle style a *μεσότης* and meant by it, not a style that combined the elements of the other two, but one that lay midway between faulty extremes and avoided both; see also p. 145 on Dionysius' "unique interpretation of the *χαρακτὴρ μέσος*"). Yet certainly Cicero was familiar with this idea, and indeed it would be strange if so obvious a notion had occurred to no one between Theophrastus and Dionysius. That Cicero was not the only Roman author who regarded the middle style as a *μικτὴ λέξις* is evident from the passage in Gellius which, on the authority of Varro, refers to Nestor as using the *mixtum moderatumque* style (vi. 14. 7) and describes the *mediocris* or *medius* style as *in confinio utriusque modi particeps* (vi. 14. 3).

[73] *De Demosth.* 3 (Usener-Radermacher, I, 132. 16).

[74] *De comp.* 24 (Usener-Radermacher, II, 1, 120. 12–14).

[75] Roberts (*Dionysius of Halicarnassus on Literary Composition* [London, 1910], p. 301) gives *temperatum* as the Latin equivalent of *εὔκρατος*, as does Kroll, *Orator* (Berlin, 1913), p. 33; cf. p. 73 on Cicero's coinage of the word *temperator* to describe one who blends all three styles. See also *De orat.* ii. 53. 212, where Cicero recommends a mixture of ethos and pathos and calls the resulting style *temperata*, and cf. *Or.* 57, 196. For the relationship of *κεράννυμι* and *temperare* see, in addition to Ernout-Meillet, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine* (Paris, 1932), *s.v.* "temperare," Leo Spitzer, "Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony," *Traditio*, III (1945), 318–22. For *κεράννυμαι* =*temperari*, see Édouard des Places, "L'Équivalence, Kerannymai-Temperari," *Revue de philologie*, XVI (1942), 143–45, which also brings out the connection between the idea of mixture and of temperance or *sophrosyne* in Plato's *Seventh Epistle*.

[76] Note that in the Loeb translation of *Orator*, *temperatus* in this sense is rendered indifferently as "moderate" (16. 53) or "tempered" (29. 100).

[77] For a rare example of the influence of Latin usage upon the meaning of a Greek word see Richard Heinze, "Fides," *Hermes*, LXIV (1929), 163, n. 1, and 165. I owe this reference to Professor Friedrich Solmsen.

[78] E.g., Plato *Gorg.* 478 D; Euripides *Troad.* 350; Xenophon *Cyrop.* viii. 6. 16. The secondary significance of *temperare*, "to regulate, rule, moderate, bring to order," coincides with the ordinary meaning of *σωφρονίζειν*.

[79] *De imit.* 31 (Usener-Radermacher, II, 1, 212. 6).

[80] *De Demosth.* 4 (Usener-Radermacher, I, 134. 18–135. 18).

as a characteristic of the grand style and λιτότης of the plain.[81] Here, then Dionysius describes the process by which the middle style is produced and uses σωφρονίζειν precisely as Cicero used *temperare*. The usage did not gain currency,[82] however; nor did the Greeks themselves habitually regard *sophrosyne* as more characteristic of the middle style than of the plain or the grand.

More significant for our understanding of ancient theories of the art of poetry and composition in general is the appearance of *sophrosyne* in the Greco-Roman feud between the wine-drinking poets and their water-drinking rivals, a feud which involves as well the ancient belief in the divine origin of the poet's song,[83] the traditional comparison of poetic inspiration to madness[84] and drunkenness,[85] and the perennial controversy over the respective merits of natural endowment and technical skill in the writing of poetry. Although in most periods of history men of sense have concluded that the poet requires both φύσις and τέχνη, there was in the Hellenistic age a tendency in some quarters to overrate τέχνη at the expense of other qualities. The Alexandrine emphasis upon learning, imitation, labor, and flawless adherence to rule[86] provoked to opposition certain later poets of the Greco-Roman period, including Antipater of Thessalonica, Antigonus, and Nicaenetus, who, in violent reaction against the pedantry of Callimachus and his followers, engaged in a literary feud with the poets of τέχνη. Modeling themselves upon the supposedly bibulous Archilochus and Cratinus,[87] they recalled the

[81] See Paul Geigenmueller, *Quaestiones Dionysianae de vocabulis artis criticae* (Leipzig, 1908), pp. 54, 56.

[82] But Plutarch (*Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat* 15 E) seems to combine the ideas of "chastening" and "tempering" in the word σωφρονίζειν.

[83] On the subject of poetic inspiration see Wilhelm Kroll, *Studien zur Verständnis der römischen Literatur* (Stuttgart, 1924), pp. 24–43; Hans Lewy, "Sobria ebrietas: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der antiken Mystik," *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, IX (1929), 45–54; Fritz Wehrli, "Der erhabene und der schlichte Stil in der poetisch-rhetorischen Theorie der Antike," *Phyllobolia für Peter von der Mühll* (Basel, 1946), pp. 9–17; and Erwin Rohde, *Psyche* (Tübingen and Leipzig, 1903), II, 56 ff. Both the Apolline and the Dionysiac religions encouraged the Greeks to believe that the bard was filled with a divine afflatus, and the terms used to describe the poetic inspiration often contained the idea of enthusiasm. Next to ἐνθουσιάζειν itself (Plato *Phaedr.* 241 E; *Ion* 533 E; Democritus [Diels] 68 B 18; Ps.-Longinus *De subl.* 8. 1) the most transparent are βακχεία (*De subl.* 32. 7; *Ion* 534 A), φοιβόληπτος (*De subl.* 16. 2), κορυβαντιᾶν (*ibid.* 5. 1; *Ion.* 534 A), and νυμφόληπτος (*Phaedr.* 238 D).

[84] Plato *Phaedr.* 245 A; Aristotle *Poetics* 1455 a 33; Plutarch *Quaest. conviv.* 622 D; Lucian *De hist. conscr.* 5. 7 (Jacobitz, II, 3); Cicero *De orat.* ii. 46. 194; Horace *Ep.* i. 19. 3; *Sat.* ii. 3. 322 and 7. 117; *Ars poet.* 295–97, 455; Seneca *De tranq.* 17. 9–11. The frenzy of the poet is a commonplace in English literature from *A Midsummer-Night's Dream* to A. E. Housman, *On the Name and Nature of Poetry*.

[85] This comparison was particularly apt, not only because Dionysus was the traditional patron of poets but also because it was believed that divine influence could be acquired by eating or drinking a sacred substance, and, as the Pythia drank from a sacred spring and the bard of Apollo imbibed inspiration from the waters of Hippocrene, so, too, the wine of Dionysus became a source of inspiration, first for dithyrambic poets, then for poets of every kind. In the beginning, wine was thought of merely as the tool of Dionysus and was celebrated as such (see Archilochus, Frag. 77 [Diehl]), but gradually it achieved a degree of detachment and sometimes stood alone as an independent source of inspiration (e.g., *Anth. Gr.*, xi. 20; xiii. 29). This topic is to be distinguished from the comparison of an emotional, frenzied style of composition to drunkenness, which is found in the literary criticism of every age. We need seek no special explanation for many metaphors drawn by the ancients from the state of intoxication. E.g., Philostratus *Vit. soph.* 522 (Kayser, II, 35, l. 19) describes as τὸ μεθύειν περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς a style overloaded with ornament, while Ps.-Longinus *De subl.* 3. 5 treats unnecessary display of emotion as the result of a kind of μέθη and Aristides *Or.* l. 406 (Dindorf, II, 552, l. 12) says that certain Sophists seem to μεθύειν περὶ τοὺς λόγους. According to Cicero, an orator who seeks only to inflame his audience seems to *furere apud sanos et quasi inter sobrios bacchari vinulentus* (*Or.* 28. 99). Seneca criticizes the affected style of Maecenas as *ebrius sermo* (*Ep.* 19. 9; cf. *Ep.* 114. 4 and 22). τὸ νήφειν and *sobrietas* describe the opposite style, that which is calm, unimpassioned, and free from excess of any kind. See, for νήφειν: Xenophon *Symp.* 8. 21; *De subl.* 34. 4; for *sobrius:* Cicero *Or.* 28. 99; Gellius vii. 14. 10.

[86] See Kroll, *Studien*, pp. 37–39.

[87] Archilochus was famous in antiquity as a wine-drinking poet, and the Greco-Roman school of οἰνοπόται looked to him as to their prototype (see *Anth. Gr.* xi. 20). Callimachus refers to Archilochus as μεθυπλήξ (Frag. 223 [Schneider]). For the tradition

traditional patronage of Dionysus and acclaimed him as their leader but chose to lay particular emphasis upon his gift of wine, which they sometimes treated as the chief source of poetic inspiration.[88] Hence the rival groups were labeled "wine-drinkers" and "water-drinkers," and most of the evidence for their ancient controversy occurs in epigrams launched by the *οἰνοπόται* against the *ὑδροπόται*. The importance of the affair to the present study lies in the relationship of *sophrosyne* to the writings of the *ὑδροπόται*. Hans Lewy in his study of Philonian mysticism, *Sobria ebrietas*, brings together most of the evidence for the dispute, including the passages which use in this connection the word *σώφρων*; but he fails to note a point of considerable significance, the appearance of *σώφρων* in later criticism with a connotation exactly opposite to that employed by Plato in *Phaedrus*.

Apart from the *Greek Anthology*, echoes of the feud are heard chiefly in the *Treatise on the Sublime*, the *Epistles* and *Satires* of Horace, and the pseudo-Lucianic *Encomium of Demosthenes*. Horace, in *Ep.* i. 19. 1–9, indicates that drunkenness and insanity are synonymous metaphors used to describe the effect of poetic inspiration; and the equivalence of the two ideas is brought out with great clarity in an epigram by Antigonus, a contemporary of Horace and a poet of the wine-drinking persuasion. What is more to the point, his verses also remind us that *sophrosyne*, which could mean both "sanity" and "sobriety," was normally opposed to each of these two popular concepts of poetic inspiration—madness and intoxication. Taunting the poets who fail to seek inspiration from Dionysus, Antigonus says: "Alas for the water-drinkers. They are mad, but with a temperate madness (*μανίην σώφρονα μαινόμενοι*)."[89] The oxymoron *μανία σώφρων*, though unfamiliar in the classical period, is found occasionally thereafter in a wide variety of contexts. Its origin is uncertain, but the phrase probably owes something to various expressions signifying sober or "wineless" intoxication which were employed by Greek writers to describe the ecstasy of Dionysiac worshipers and religious mystics.[90] The implications of the phrase,

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about Cratinus see Aristophanes *Peace* 700–703; *Knights* 526–36; *Frogs* 357; *Anth. Gr.* xiii. 29; Horace *Ep.* i. 19. 1–8; and Meineke, *Frag. com.*, I, 47 and II, 1, 116–17, 119. Callimachus and his followers were facetiously described as *πικροὶ καὶ ξηροί* (*Anth. Gr.* xi. 322) and accused of drinking *λιτὸν ὕδωρ* from the sacred spring, i.e., Hippocrene or Aganippe (*Anth. Gr.* xi. 20), a charge which lends support to the view that the feud between wine-drinking and water-drinking poets was at least in part a rivalry between the poets of Dionysus and Apollo. On the inspiration derived from the sacred springs, see Martin Ninck, "Die Bedeutung des Wassers im Kult und Leben der Alten," *Philol.*, Suppl., Vol. XIV, Part II (1921), pp. 90–93, and Kroll, *Studien*, p. 29, n. 14.

[88] See *Anth. Gr.* ix. 186 and 406; xi. 20; xiii. 29. On the subject of inspiration from wine see Lewy, *op. cit.*, pp. 46, 50–54; and A. P. McKinlay, "Wine and Literary Inspiration," *PAPA*, LXIII (1932), lxxix. See also McKinlay, *Class. Jour.*, XLII (1946–47), 165. To ancient critics, Homer and Ennius, the epic poets, were subject to the influence of Dionysus no less than were the lyric poets (*Anth. Gr.* xi. 20; Horace *Ep.* i. 19. 6–7); but Milton held that, while convivial cheer was permissible for lyric poets, the epic poet should drink sober draughts of pure water (*Elegy* VI, ll. 53–62). This view seems to have no classical authority but is part of Milton's general concept of the temperate life (see Walter MacKellar, *The Latin Poems of John Milton* [New Haven, 1930], p. 230). For later tributes to the quickening power of wine see, e.g., Milton, *Elegy* VI, *Carmen amat Bacchum, Carmina Bacchus amat;* and Hilaire Belloc, "Heroic Poem in Praise of Wine," which contains the traditional legend about the coming of Dionysus out of Asia and praises wine as "true begetter of all arts that be." Faithful to tradition, Belloc even attacks the water-drinkers: "The horde Debased, accursed I say, abhorrent and abhorred."

[89] *Anth. Gr.* ix. 406.

[90] On such expressions as *ἄοινος μέθη*, *βάκχοι τοῦ νήφειν*, and the Philonian *μέθη νηφάλιος* and *θεία μέθη* see Lewy, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–107. There is some classical precedent for the idea of *μανία σώφρων*, but no parallel is really close. Euripides' much-quoted *σώφρων ἐν βακχεύμασιν* (*Bacchae* 317–18) refers to the power of a chaste woman to preserve her virtue even among Dionysiac revels, and the idea is purely ethical. In the postclassical period *μανία σώφρων* or its equivalent appears in several contexts unrelated to literary criticism. On the strength of Terence *Eunuchus* 61 f., Lewy conjectures that the phrase was used by

whether favorable or the opposite, hinge upon the attitude of the writer. The force of Antigonus' epigram obviously depends to a great extent upon the twofold connotation of σώφρων, which describes both the μανία and the ὑδροποσία of the poets in question. By using a word which means at once "sober" and "sane" Antigonus implies not only that the ὑδροπόται abstain from wine but also that they are untouched by the frenzy of true poetic enthusiasm. He says, in effect: "The water-drinkers are mad, but their inspiration is feeble, scarcely deserving to be called madness. They do not drink wine, and thus they forfeit the help of Bacchus." Antigonus uses the term μανία σώφρων contemptuously, rejecting the notion that *sophrosyne* and true poetic inspiration are compatible. He feels precisely as did the Platonic Socrates when in *Phaedrus* he drew an unfavorable contrast between the poetry of the σώφρων and that of the madman. According to Socrates, the only source of true poetic inspiration is θεία μανία—madness that comes, not from human weakness, but from divine influence. Directly opposed to this divine madness is *sophrosyne*, a merely human quality,[91] the sober sense of the poet who works by rule, without enthusiasm. He who without μανία from the Muses comes to the door of poetry, believing that he can become a poet ἐκ τέχνης, is unsuccessful, and the poetry of the σώφρων is far inferior to that of the madman.[92] In these terms Plato expresses once again his familiar belief in the irrational nature of song[93] and also casts his vote with those who deny that technical skill, divorced from inspiration, can produce poetry. There is no question but that he conceives the σώφρων poet to be the antithesis of the poet possessed by θεία μανία, nor is it possible to doubt that Antigonus three centuries later uses the word σώφρων with the same derogatory connotation, although, owing to the contemporary dispute over water and wine, he now makes capital out of the relation of *sophrosyne* to sobriety, whereas in *Phaedrus* the word alluded only to sanity. In the epigram of Antigonus, σώφρων virtually contradicts μανία, and the Platonic antithesis is maintained.

Curiously enough, however, we also find the oxymoron μανία σώφρων used not as the opposite but as the equivalent of the Platonic θεία μανία. Instead of being a contemptuous description of the feeble inspiration of the water-drinkers, it is endowed with a more profound meaning and indicates poetic enthusiasm controlled by reason and thus subordinated to the rules of art. Just as in the mystic vocabulary of Philo μέθη νηφάλιος is synonymous with θεία μέθη, so μανία σώφρων is substituted for the θεία μανία of *Phaedrus*. Like θεία, σώφρων specifies the kind of madness which the poet suffers, without in any way altering the fact that he is indeed mad. *Sophrosyne* is no longer, as in *Phaedrus*, mere sanity, a state of mind useless to the poet, but rather the rational quality which distinguishes the madness of divine inspiration from the madness of a sick mind.

This interpretation appears in the *Encomium of Demosthenes*, which shows many traces of the influence of Plato's *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*. No one but a Platonist would have endowed the commonplace phrase, μανία σώφρων, with this new content; yet to do so meant rejecting

Menander. To the examples cited by Lewy, *op. cit.*, p. 52, n. 2, and p. 137, add Eunapius, *Vit. soph.*, p. 469, l. 2 (Boissonade), σωφρόνως ἐνθουσιῶσαν, and the *Fragmentum Marcianum* (Hercher) in *Hermes*, III (1869), 386. 32, μέθην μεθυσθεῖσα τὴν σώφρονα.

[91] 244 E.

[92] 245 A. Paul Friedländer has detected in this passage an echo of Pindar *Paean* 7. 13 ff., which he suggests is "for us the earliest expression of this contrast of genuine and uninspired poetry" (*Class. Phil.*, XXXVI [1941], 52).

[93] Cf. *Apol.* 22 C; *Meno* 99 D; *Laws* 719 C.

Plato's antithesis between *sophrosyne* and *μανία*. Ps.-Lucian praises Demosthenes for subjecting his natural genius to the discipline of study and practice. Stressing the need for *μανία* in poetry and for a certain divine afflatus even in prose, he hails *μανία σώφρων* as the force which gives wings to the soul of the orator and enables him to contemplate Beauty Absolute.[94] In this passage *μανία σώφρων* describes not the style itself but the way of life adopted by Demosthenes, who rejected the sensual pursuits open to young Athenians and preferred the Heavenly Eros—philosophy—to the Pandemian Aphrodite. Yet it was precisely this life of self-discipline (comprising philosophical studies, rhetorical training, and endless practice) which produced the oratorical eminence of Demosthenes; and their connection is underlined in the subsequent listing of the orator's praiseworthy qualities, wherein *σώφρων βίος* immediately precedes *λόγου δεινότης*.[95] Moreover, Demosthenes is shown to have possessed *sophrosyne* not only in life but also in the style of his oratory. Among the acquired excellences listed by Ps.-Lucian we find that, as a result of his disciplined life, Demosthenes became brilliantly elevated and forceful, as well as *σωφρονέστατος* in his control over words and ideas.[96] This estimate reveals the effect of *μανία σώφρων* upon Demosthenes' oratory. It produced a corresponding *μανία σώφρων* in his style, for the grandeur and intensity of Demosthenes are but another name for *μανία*, while his perfect mastery over style and content is explicitly labeled *sophrosyne*. The passage is notable not only because it stresses the effect of a man's life upon his art but even more because it assumes that force and intensity, the supreme virtues of the grand style, are not only compatible with stylistic *sophrosyne* but, indeed, inseparable from it.[97]

The basic idea of the *Encomium*—that Demosthenes owed his greatness to the training afforded him by philosophy and rhetoric at least as much as to native endowment or any irrational element—is further illustrated by an allusion to the controversy over wine as the source of inspiration. Demosthenes is contrasted with Aeschylus, who brought heat and passion to his tragedies by writing while drunk.[98] The orator, however, owed nothing to *μέθη*. He was a water-drinker, and it was the midnight oil that lent perfection to his speeches.[99]

Lewy[100] has drawn attention to a strikingly similar line of thought which runs through the *Treatise on the Sublime*. Just as Plato recognized the superiority of poetry inspired by *μανία*, so Ps.-Longinus insists on the need for some element of ecstasy, of *ψυχαγωγία*, in the sublime style.[101] But he differs from the poets of pure inspiration (represented in Greco-Roman times by the *οἰνοπόται*) in that he

[94] 5. 494 (Jacobitz, III, 363).

[95] 18. 504 (Jacobitz, III, 370).

[96] 14. 501 (Jacobitz, III, 369).

[97] As the *Encomium* follows with great fidelity the traditional topics of epideictic, we should, as a matter of course, expect the author to attribute to Demosthenes *sophrosyne* and all the other virtues. Hence it is unnecessary to conclude from this conventional treatment of the subject that Ps.-Lucian or the Greeks in general believed that a continent and sober adolescence necessarily led to oratorical supremacy. It is, however, significant that the *σώφρων βίος* here designates a life spent in study and practice, for what Ps.-Lucian wishes to emphasize is the need for *τέχνη* and *μελέτη*, as well as *φύσις*, that is, *sophrosyne* as well as inspiration.

[98] The *οἰνοπόται* found support in a contemporary fashion in biography, which sought to find flaws in the heroes of the past. A favorite theme was the drunkenness of the great poets, among whom Homer, Archilochus, Anacreon, Alcaeus, and particularly Aeschylus were reputed to be *φιλοπόται*. For ancient references to the *ebrietas Aeschyli* see the Ritschl-Schoell edition of Aeschylus' *Septem* (Leipzig, 1875), pp. 14–16. The tradition seems to have arisen in the Peripatos (cf. Wilamowitz, *Sappho und Simonides* [Berlin, 1913], p. 111).

[99] 15. 502 (Jacobitz, III, 369); cf. Demosthenes *Philipp.* ii. 30.

[100] *Op. cit.*, pp. 53–54.

[101] E.g., 8. 1 and 4; 12. 4; 16. 2; 34. 4.

insists also on the need for technical skill, the ability to regulate nature by art.[102] Taking Demosthenes as the supreme example of oratorical genius, he compares his inspiration to the ecstasy of the Pythian oracle and the frenzy of the Bacchants but shows that even the most sublime inspiration must always be guided and controlled by the element of νοῦς. This principle Ps.-Longinus embodies in the phrase ἐν βακχεύμασι νήφειν ("to be sober amid the revels"),[103] an exact parallel to the phrase by which Ps.-Lucian describes the life and training of Demosthenes—μανία σώφρων. That the quality of νῆψις alone is quite as inadequate as uncontrolled passion Ps.-Longinus makes clear in his criticism of Hyperides, whose utterances, he says, are wanting in elevation and are the idle remarks of a man sober at heart (καρδίῃ νήφοντος).[104] This observation would win acceptance anywhere, but the arresting element in both treatises is the insistence that the specific quality for which Demosthenes was noted throughout antiquity—his δεινότης—[105] was due to technical ability as well as to native genius and that Demosthenes could not have attained sublimity without his power of moderation, his *sophrosyne*. This view corrects the erroneous assumption of Antigonus and his school that a restrained or σώφρων style is necessarily feeble and spiritless, a view as mistaken as its counterpart in ethics, the perennial misconception of *sophrosyne* and moderation as the virtues of the weak.[106] Antiphon the Sophist held that no one can become σώφρων without having to conquer his passions;[107] and Plato insisted that *sophrosyne* is achieved only by long practice in the mastery of pleasure and desire.[108] So, too, in the σώφρων style there must be passion, there must be μανία, as well as the power to control it; only from the union of Dionysus and Apollo is great literature born.

Properly understood, μανία σώφρων governs not only style but the whole process of poetic composition. Innumerable critics, both ancient and modern, have discovered that the poetry of inspiration, which is the expression of profound emotion, requires not merely emotion but also its control. To take but one example, the first of Ruskin's criteria by which to judge poetry is "absolute command over all passion, however intense"[109]—in a word, *sophrosyne*. The relevance of such a doctrine to prose, especially oratorical prose, and the eternal usefulness of the ancient *exempla* are evident in Paul Shorey's tribute to this same power of command over passion. Comparing Lincoln to Demosthenes, Shorey says:

> He affords the best modern illustration of the prevailing seriousness of the Demosthenic logic, suffused with, but not overmastered by emotion. . . . . And he resembles Demosthenes also in the incomparable effectiveness of the sudden flashes of passionate eloquence introduced at just the apt place, and confined to the right measure.[110]

[102] See esp. 2. 2–3.

[103] 16. 4. Cf. Euripides *Bacchae* 317–18. This phrase need not be taken as an allusion to the controversy over wine and water. The metaphor is a natural result of the comparison between the states of poetic inspiration and drunkenness. Later parallels to this passage are numerous. Rhys Roberts (*Longinus on the Sublime* [Cambridge, 1935], p. 25, n. 2) calls attention to Hamlet's advice to the players (Act III, scene 2, ll. 6–10): "for in the very torrent, and, as I may say, the whirlwind of passion, you must acquire and beget a temperance that may give it smoothness," while Lewy (*op. cit.*, p. 49, n. 1) quotes Shaftesbury's description of the true poetic enthusiasm as "reasonable ecstasy."

[104] 34. 4.

[105] Ludwig Voit, ΔΕΙΝΟΤΗΣ (Leipzig, 1934), pp. 41–47.

[106] E.g., Callicles in *Gorgias* 492 A ff.

[107] B 59 (Diels).

[108] *Laws* 647 D.

[109] Albert S. Cook, *Touchstones of Poetry* (1887), p. 13.

[110] *Quarterly Journal of Speech Education*, VIII (1922), 112. See also p. 113 on "the miracle of Lincoln's Greek sense of measure." Charles Lamb ("The Sanity of True Genius," *Works* [London, 1875], pp. 159–60) says that the true poet is not merely "possessed by his subject, but has dominion over it." In

To sum up the results of this investigation, we have found that references to the quality of *sophrosyne* in literary style, as distinguished from the morality of a speech and the ethical or intellectual endowments of a speaker, appear only after the close of the classical period and then rather infrequently. In earlier literature only rarely is the possession of *sophrosyne* by an author regarded as affecting his work in a way that is not purely ethical. The possibility of a nonmoral effect is first clearly seen in Plato's *Phaedrus*, which attributes a lack of true poetic inspiration to the fact that the poet is *σώφρων*, sane rather than mad. In postclassical times, when the concept of *sophrosyne* has stylistic implications, we sometimes find that it is still the author who is credited with this quality. His *sophrosyne* enables him to restrain the impulse to employ inappropriate metaphors, licentious rhythms, or undue archaism. Often, however, it is the speech itself which is described as *σώφρων*. Seldom do we find the noun *sophrosyne* in this connection. If a substantive is required, *τὸ σῶφρον* is preferred, but in most cases the adjective *σώφρων* is applied to such words as *λόγος*, *λέξις*, or *ῥητορική*. Sometimes the verbs *σωφρονεῖν* and *σωφρονίζειν* appear, usually with reference to the author rather than to the speech or poem. Antonyms employed in criticism reflect the varied significance of the word *σώφρων* in Greek ethics. They include *ἀκόλαστος*, *ἄφρων*, *κοῦφος*, and *μαινόμενος*. Although the word *σώφρων* was used by Dionysius of Halicarnassus to distinguish the Attic from the Asian type of oratory, ancient criticism in general recognized no one style as *σώφρων*. The term served to describe almost any component of literary style (rhythm, choice of words, arrangement, metaphor, and so on) which was used with moderation, good taste, and avoidance of excess. In the terminology of Nietzsche, we may say that *sophrosyne* is the Apolline element in literature and music, as Plutarch noted when he spoke of the paean as *σώφρων* in contrast to the emotional Bacchic dithyramb. Only in the last group of references considered did we find a more thoughtful analysis of the concept of *sophrosyne*. Here it was involved in the controversy over inspiration versus technical skill and was therefore bound to penetrate deeply into the whole problem of composition. In this discussion *sophrosyne* tended to represent the rational, nonenthusiastic element in composition and was therefore discounted by some ancient critics. A truer understanding of the nature of the grand style led to the realization that *sophrosyne* is the indispensable power of control over poetic enthusiasm and is therefore just as essential to great literature as is inspiration itself.

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spite of his madness, he has a "hidden sanity which still guides him in the widest seeming aberrations." Coleridge (*Biographia literaria* [London, 1906], p. 196) traces meter in poetry to "the spontaneous effort which strives to hold in check the workings of passion," and refers to "emotion . . . . tempered and mastered by the will." J. W. Bray (*A History of English Critical Terms* [Boston, 1898], p. 340) observes that "the general conception of temperance is connected . . . . with energy, power, and strength of style in a composition. The requirement is that this power in some way be restrained. If the restraint is externally imposed, as it were, ... from custom and precedent, then temperance looks toward the proprieties. If the restraint is in a sense self-imposed, then temperance becomes dignity and grandeur." For a modern use, not merely of the general concept of temperance, but even of the ancient ethical terminology, see William Everett (*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, XII [1901], 9, 16), who contrasts Catullus and Horace as literary artists and finds the one *ἀκόλαστος*, the other *σώφρων* and *ἐγκρατής*.

TEXTUAL NOTES ON SENECA

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To anyone who has made a consistent study of the text, together with the *apparatus criticus*, of a particular author, the vagaries and the prejudices of emendators and editors are often puzzling and curious. Emendations, insertions, and deletions appear with much frequency but not always with much justification. Accordingly, before these varied suggestions can come in for consideration, they must be regarded with a frank and ready skepticism. In many cases an honest investigation into the reasons for this state of affairs elicits no other explanation than the scholar's perverseness, fatigue, predilection for some manuscript or scholar, failure to understand the passage in question, or ignorance of the usage of the author.

However, there is another factor which should concern us when we consider the text of an author critically. While our goal is obviously to determine the words of the author himself, we must not delude ourselves as to the degree or the certainty of attaining this goal. We can do little more in many instances than try to reach back farther and farther to the readings of manuscripts antecedent to our extant ones and consequently closer in point of time and form to the archetype; and sometimes in so doing we may happily strike upon the author's precise words. Egotists that we are, we often not merely "improve" upon the text but even "improve" upon the author.

It would repay us in this connection to observe a few passages from the *Epistulae morales* of Seneca,[1] where the transmitted text is, in my opinion, perfectly sound and where uncalled-for changes have been introduced.

Ep. 17. 6: quod aliud erat illius patientiae praemium quam in arbitrium non cadere victoris? quanto *hic* maius quod promittitur: perpetua libertas, nullius nec hominis nec dei timor.

The *hic*, read by Hense and Beltrami[2] for *hoc* of the manuscripts, is no doubt intended to serve the purpose of pointing out the contrast between the reward of those who have bravely sustained hunger in sieges ("in arbitrium non cadere victoris") and the greater one of those who pursue the study of philosophy in spite of poverty and need ("perpetua libertas," etc.). The emendation *hic* has the august authority of Madvig.[3] And yet there is no reason at all for changing *hoc*, which expresses this meaning adequately (cf., further, *Ep.* 68. 8: "maius malum est *hoc*, quod non possum tibi ostendere: in pectore ipso collectio et vomica est").

Ep. 23. 10: non potest autem stare paratus ad mortem, qui modo incipit vivere. id agendum est ut satis vixerimus. nemo hoc *putat* qui orditur cum maxime vitam.

Axelson[4] has suggested *praestat* for *putat*. This may be an improvement on the text but is no less, in my opinion, an improvement on Seneca. The Latin verb frequently embodies implications which in translation need expansion and elaboration. In this context the expression "nemo hoc putat" is essentially little different in

[1] The text cited throughout will be that of Otto Hense's second edition (Leipzig: Teubner, 1914).

[2] Achille Beltrami's first edition was published as follows: Vol. I (Brescia: Apollonia, 1916); Vol. II (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1927). His second edition was published in Rome (Typis regiae officinae polygraphicae, 1931).

[3] *Adv. crit.*, II (Hauniae: I. H. Schultz, 1873), 468.

[4] Bertil Axelson, *Neue Senecastudien* (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1939), pp. 41 f.

significance from "nemo hoc se putare praestat" ("No one shows that this is the way he thinks"). Axelson himself admits of the phrase: "Sinnlos ist das wohl nicht"; as for his belief "dass hier schliesslich doch etwas in Unordnung ist," let him recall his own statements as to the nature of Seneca's not rarely careless style.[5]

Ep. 26. 8: desinere iam volebam et manus spectabat ad clausulam: sed conficienda sunt *sacra* et huic epistulae viaticum dandum est.

Doubt has been cast upon the correctness of *sacra,* for which *aera* has been suggested. The case for *aera,* first proposed by Madvig,[6] and accepted by Hess[7] and by Beltrami, has been resumed by Axelson,[8] who declares that Seneca would never regard the payment of his debt to Lucilius as a sacred rite. But Madvig's *aera* is insipid, and *aera conficere* does not convey the idea of "paying up one's debts." Surely Seneca could speak in humorous wise of his established practice of closing his letters with a quotation as a "ritual" (*sacra*) and in fact uses *sollemni munusculo* in a similar context in *Ep.* 22. 13.

Ep. 47. 5: alius sputa deterget, alius reliquias temulentorum ⟨toro⟩ subditus colligit.

Rossbach[9] suggested the possibility that *toro* was lost after *temulentorum,* and with him Hense (2d ed.) and Beltrami have agreed. Summers[10] makes no addition in his text but suggests that possibly *mensae* is to be supplied in thought with *subditus.* Whether it is *toro* or *mensae* that one supplies or understands is an indifferent matter. That any word is needed is doubtful. The participle *subditus* is middle in force (cf., e.g., *Ep.* 57. 4, *constitutus;* 87. 4, *inpositus sum;* 94. 70, *proiectus; Dial.* vi. 26. 3, *prohibitus;* xii. 18. 4, *circumfusus;* xii. 20. 2, *circumfusi; Ben.* i. 10. 1, *mota; Clem.* i. 3. 3, *obiecti circumfusique;* i. 3. 5, *circumdata;* etc.), and means something like "having got down (on his knees)."[11]

Ep. 47. 8: cum his [i.e., servis] cenare non sustinet [*sc.* dominus] et maiestatis suae deminutionem putat ad eandem mensam cum servo suo accedere. di melius! quot ex istis dominos *habet!*

The manuscript reading, *habent,* was altered by Haase to *habet,* which succeeding editors have adopted. Alexander[12] is of the opinion that *habent* really conceals the form *habebit.*

The sense required may be paraphrased thus: "How many cases there are in which the social status of the slave and of the master have been reversed, so that the masters find themselves subject to those who were formerly slaves." And that is what the manuscripts show: "quot ex istis [i.e., servis] dominos habent [*sc.* domini]." I am inclined to suppose that editors agree with this meaning but that they have been disturbed by the shift from the specific singular to the generalizing plural; yet in the light of more recent investigations[13] of the linguistic peculiarities of Senecan style there should be no hesitation in retaining the plural form.

5 See esp. *ibid.*, pp. 19–22.

6 *Op. cit.*, II, 472.

7 G. Hess, *L. Annaei Senecae ad Lucilium epistulae morales selectae* (Gotha: Perthes, 1890). Rudolf Mücke, however, in his revision of Hess (Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1929) resumes the reading of *sacra.*

8 *Op. cit.*, p. 141, n. 9.

9 Otto Rossbach, in his review of Hense's first edition, *Berl. philol. Wchnschr.*, XIX (1899), 651.

10 Walter C. Summers, *Select Letters of Seneca* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1910).

11 W. H. Alexander ("Seneca's *Epistulae morales:* The Text Emended and Explained [I–LXV]," *Univ. of California Pub. in Class. Philol.*, XII, No. 5 [1940], 78) likewise expresses the view, though without further explanation, that nothing is required to supplement the reading of the manuscripts and translates "crouched."

12 *Ibid.*, pp. 78 f.

13 Cf. Joh. Müller, "Kritische Studien zu den kleineren Schriften des Philosophen Senecas," *Sitzungsber. Akad. Wiss. Wien*, CXVIII (1889), 4 f.; Emil Hermes, *app. crit.* to *Dial.* i. 2. 7; Paul Thomas, *Morceaux choisis* (8th ed.; Paris: Hachette, 1918), "Remarques," No. 77, p. 28; A. Bourgery, *Sénèque prosateur* (Paris: Société d'édition "Les belles lettres," 1922), pp. 308 ff.

The future is not required here either; *habent* is the universalizing present tense.

Ep. 59. 15: [§ 14] iam docebo, quemadmodum intellegas te non esse sapientem. sapiens ille plenus est gaudio, hilaris et placidus, inconcussus. . . . . nunc ipse te consule . . . . ista, quae sic petis tamquam datura laetitiam ac voluptatem, causae dolorum sunt. [§ 15] omnes, inquam, *illi* tendunt ad gaudium, sed unde stabile magnumque consequantur, ignorant: ille ex conviviis et luxuria, ille. . . . .

Axelson has recently suggested [14] that we read *illo* with Cod. p; editors read *illi* with the other manuscripts. The *illo* would be redundant, according to Axelson, pointing ahead to the phrase *ad gaudium*. This redundancy would not be impossible in itself, but it serves no purpose here and is awkward. And, actually, *illi*, by qualifying *omnes* and by resuming the generalizing *tu* of the preceding clauses (for everyone must admit that Seneca is addressing the general reader and not Lucilius alone), marks a required contrast with *sapiens*. For the combination *ille* . . . . *ille* (=*hic* . . . . *ille*) cf. *Ep.* 21. 2, 36. 5, 47. 9; *Apoc.* 15. 2; *Dial.* ii. 13. 3, vi. 18. 8, x. 2. 4; *Ben.* iii. 24; *NQ* vii. 27. 3; etc.[15]

Ep. 68. 14: Non est tamen quod existimes ullam aetatem aptiorem esse ad bonam mentem quam quae se multis experimentis, longa ac frequenti rerum paenitentia *edomuit*.

Haase and Hense[16] have preferred to read *edomuit* rather than *domuit* because of their predilection for Cod. p, which shows *penitentiae domuit*. Beltrami accepts *domuit* of the other manuscripts (QVPb) on the ground that Seneca, "poetarum more," prefers to use the simple rather than the compound verb.[17]

I must agree with Beltrami in his choice. There are stronger grounds, however, for supporting *domuit* than the one which he presents. The fact is that Seneca nowhere uses *edomo*,[18] whereas he shows great fondness for *domo* (cf., e.g., *Ep.* 66. 44, 83. 22, 85. 41, 89. 18; *Dial.* iv. 15. 2, v. 22. 5, ix. 9. 2; *NQ* ii. 59. 4, iii praef. 10, iv. 13. 7, and very frequently in his tragedies). We should also bear in mind the fact that Cod. p, in spite of its high merit, shows more mechanical, more careless, errors than any of the other manuscripts —errors often serious and unexplainable.[19]

Ep. 76. 16: nam cum sola ratio perficiat hominem, sola ratio perfecta beatum facit.

Axelson[20] expresses the opinion that *perfecta* weakens the emphasis of the repetition of *sola ratio—sola ratio* and would therefore read Gruter's *perfecte*, comparing the phrases *perfecte beatum* and *perfecte beata* (*vita*) of *Ep.* 85. 19. The point that Axelson makes is hardly valid, especially since Latin style is very fond of the resumption of a verb in a participial form. The value of the citation of parallels for *perfecte beatum* is completely nullified by parallels for *ratio perfecta*. We have only to look at §10 in the same letter, where Seneca makes the same statement in slightly other words: "haec [i.e., *ratio*]

[14] *Op. cit.*, pp. 71 f.

[15] See, further, Thomas, *op. cit.*, "Remarques," No. 72, p. 28; Summers, *op. cit.*, note on *Ep.* 21. 2, p. 187; Axelson, *Senecastudien* (Lund: Håkan Ohlsson, 1933), pp. 98 f. and n. 34; Bourgery, *op. cit.*, p. 381. L. Castiglioni, in his review of Axelson's *Neue Senecastudien* (*Gnomon*, XVI [1940], 121) rejects Axelson's *illo*, pointing out that *illi* is admissible but that if it were not he would prefer simply to eliminate it. The author of the present article had likewise rejected *illo*, without discussion, in his review of Axelson (*Class. Weekly*, XXXIV [1940–41], 40).

[16] So also R. M. Gummere ("Loeb Classical Library" [London: Heinemann; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1917]); earlier editors read *patientia domuit*.

[17] With this view Jos. Albini concurs, in his review of Beltrami, *Riv. di filol.*, XLV (1917), 126. The reference made by Hense, in dissenting from Beltrami's view (*Supplementum Quirinianum* [Leipzig: Teubner, 1921], p. vii), to the *edomitam* of Cicero's *De fato* 5. 10 is not to the point and offers no evidence as to Seneca's usage.

[18] Cf. *Thesaurus*, V, Part 2, Fasc. I, 110 f.

[19] See Axelson, *Neue Senecastudien*, pp. 72–74.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 188.

recta et consummata felicitatem hominis implevit"; and, similarly, in the same section: "homini autem suum bonum ratio est: si hanc perfecit, laudabilis est et finem naturae suae tetigit."[21] A closer verbal parallel is to be found in *Ep.* 92. 2: "sequitur ut de illo quoque conveniat, in hoc uno positam esse beatam vitam, ut in nobis ratio perfecta sit."

One should also note that Axelson points out that *perfecte* gives a much more satisfactory clausula (double cretic). But this fact in itself is not strong enough ground for abandoning an otherwise sound manuscript reading. The principle of the clausula rhythm is only an auxiliary tool, to be used judiciously in deciding in case of doubt and not to be invoked merely on its own account.

Ep. 78. 8: . . . . quia spiritus naturali prohibitus cursu et mutatus in peius vim suam, qua viget admonetque nos, perdit. . . . .

Alexander[22] suggests *admonetque nos* ⟨*sui*⟩. However, there is no need for assuming that the *spiritus* must remind us of its own existence and that *admonet* requires an explicit (genitive) complement[23] (cf. *Ben.* v. 25. 4: "[deos] vota non exorant, sed admonent"; *Ep.* 46. 1: "sol me invitabat, fames admonebat, nubes minabantur"; also, though with slightly different force, *Ben.* ii. 4. 2, 10. 4, 11. 2, v. 21. 2, etc.).

Ep. 78. 3: in remedium cedunt honesta solacia, et quicquid animum erexit, etiam corpori prodest. studia mihi nostra saluti fuerunt. philosophiae acceptum fero, quod surrexi, quod convalui; illi vitam debeo et nihil illi minus debeo. (§ 4) multum autem mihi contulerunt ad bonam valetudinem amici, quorum adhortationibus, vigiliis, sermonibus adlevabar.

Beltrami (2d ed.) adopts Hense's addition of *et* before *amici*.[24] The *et* (= *etiam*), Hense declares, is required after the strong emphasis placed on Seneca's debt to studies and philosophy and to avoid the dactyl (*vale*)*tudinem amici*.

Actually, however, the *et* is superfluous; its sense is already implicit in the *autem* at the opening of the sentence. As for the rhythmical grounds, one can object that our knowledge of the practice of the ancients before a relative clause, or in fact before any dependent clause, is insufficient and that in any case, although here too our knowledge is not secure, we can scan without eliding *-em*, thereby obtaining a very satisfactory clausula (first paeon and spondee).

Ep. 78. 17: necesse est, ut exsurgit (morbus), et desinat.

The manuscripts read *exsurgat* (*exur-*, P); Hense, following Haase, emends to *exsurgit*. Jöhring[25] rightly objects to the change; and Summers[26] and Barker,[27] as well as Beltrami, also retain the subjunctive. Jöhring apparently regards *et* as the co-ordinate conjunction, linking *exsurgat* and *desinat* (whereas parataxis is usual with *necesse est*),[28] whereas Summers and Barker construe *ut exsurgat* as a purpose clause dependent on *desinat* (with *et* = *etiam*).

I agree with Summers and Barker that the subjunctive is to be retained and the

[21] Rudolf Helm, in his review of Axelson's *Neue Senecastudien* (in *Berl. philol. Wchnschr.*, LX [1940], 258) similarly refers to § 10 in rejecting Axelson's *perfecte*.

[22] *Op. cit.*, pp. 144 f.

[23] E. Philips Barker (*Seneca's Letters to Lucilius Translated* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932]) expresses the idea adequately with his rendering, "conveys suggestions to us."

[24] "Zu Senecas Briefen," *Rh. Mus.*, LXXIV (1925), 123.

[25] Johannes Jöhring, "De particularum *ut ne quin quominus* apud Senecam philosophum vi atque usu," *Prager Studien*, Heft 1 (1894), p. 27.

[26] *Op. cit.*, *n. ad loc.*, p. 267.

[27] *Op. cit.*, "Readings," I, 324.

[28] Cf. Stolz-Schmalz[5], p. 763. Seneca does appear to have *ut* in *NQ* ii. 14. 2; very possibly, however, the *ut* is an intrusion and, in fact, it does not appear in manuscripts P and Z, which Gercke (*app. crit. ad loc.*) thinks perhaps show the right reading.

et to be interpreted as *etiam*. However, Summers and Barker appear to read into the Latin that a disease must grow better in order to grow worse (or before it grows worse). "It must have its intervals," translates Summers, "to enable it to reach a climax." And Barker renders: ". . . . [it] must ebb before each flood." This view Summers bases on *Ep*. 78. 7; "as it [i.e., the disease] cannot always be at the climax [§7]," he continues, "the fact that at any given moment it is so implies that there has been an easier interval just before. . . . ." But Seneca is merely offering as a consolation the fact that in pain of the highest degree the intensity must come to an end and does not imply that in order to reach an end of pain one must seek its extreme intensity.

In my view, the *ut*-clause should be treated as correlative with *et desinat*, and *necesse est* should be applied equally to *exsurgat* and to *desinat*, the sentence meaning: "ut exsurgat necesse est morbus, et desinat necesse est." It appears that here we have a statement of proportion formally expressed in one limb only. Seneca is extremely fond of this formula: (1) omission of *eo: Ep*. 19. 11, 53. 7, 79. 13, 85. 11, 123. 11, and many instances from the *Dialogues* and the *Naturales quaestiones* as well as the *Tragedies;* (2) omission of *tanto: Dial*. i. 6. 5, *NQ* vii. 15. 1; (3) omission of *tanto magis: Ep*. 31. 4; and (4) omission of *ita* (*sic*): *Ep*. 81. 19, 84. 8, 85. 36, 96. 3, 117. 17.[29] On the statement of proportion expressed by *ut . . . . et* (= *etiam*), compare *Ep*. 95. 37: "ut illos in bonum pronos citius educit ad summa, et hos inbecilliores adiuvabit malisque opinionibus extrahet, qui illis philosophiae placita tradiderit." Both here and in *Ep*. 78. 17, the passage under discussion, *et* . . . . *et* has been unnecessarily proposed for *ut* . . . . *et*.[30]

Ep. 82. 14: mors honesta est per illud quod honestum est, id est virtus et animus extrema contemnens.

Hense and Beltrami retain *extrema* of the principal manuscripts. Previously, editors had read *externa* with ς; and this has recently received the support of Axelson,[31] who compares *Ep*. 74. 6, 82. 5; *Dial*. i. 6. 1, vii. 4. 2.

One must admit that Seneca, both in the passages cited by Axelson and in a good many others, speaks of *animus externa contemnens*. However, there is no need to assume that he is doing so here. That the difficulty has probably lain in the interpretation of *extrema* is shown by translators who follow that reading; thus Gummere translates "a soul that despises *the worst hardships*," and Barker renders "a soul contemptuous of *the world's worst*." There can be little question, however, that *extrema* is here equivalent to *mortem*, just as in *Ep*. 18. 11, 54. 7, etc. That is exactly the point of Seneca's comparison in the passage immediately preceding the one under discussion between the honorable death of Cato and the shameful one of Brutus; and that is just what Seneca goes on to discuss in §16 of the same letter (cf. also *Ep*. 4. 3f., 24. 3 ff.).

Ep. 88. 17: nam quemadmodum scio omnia accidere posse, sic scio et non utique casura. utique secunda expecto, malis paratus sum.

Axelson[32] proposes reading Schweighaeuser's *itaque* for the second *utique;* Summers had previously suggested it as

[29] Here one might mention *Ben*. ii. 6. 1, where Haase (so, too, Hosius) unnecessarily adds an *ita* to balance *sicut*.

[30] Madvig, *op. cit*., II, 500 and 489, respectively. In the case of *Ep*. 95. 37, Madvig's suggestion was supported by J. Bartsche ("Zur Kritik der Briefe Senecas," *Rh. Mus*., XXIV [1869], 281) and by E. Hermes (*Quaestiones criticae in L. Annaei Senecae epistolarum moralium*, Part II [Mörs: Spaarmann, 1874], p. 24).

[31] *Op. cit*., p. 145.

[32] *Ibid*., p. 196.

possibly right,[33] and Beltrami does already read it in his second edition. One cannot disagree with them that *itaque* provides the exact transition and that it *might* have been displaced under the influence of the preceding *utique*. However, the asyndetic style is quite characteristic of Seneca; and the word-play,[34] in this case really a play on two different senses of *utique*,[35] is not so objectionable, however feeble it may be, that we should be induced to improve on Seneca. We are concerned here with the question of deciding between the ultimate authority of the manuscripts when their reading is not altogether open to objection and what the ancient author might have or should have said. The only choice, in my view, is the former.

Ep. 88. 30: verbis, rebus, adfectibus comem se facilemque omnibus praestat [humanitas].

Hense prints *comem* with ς; but in his *apparatus* he says "fort. recte" of *communem*, the reading of the principal manuscripts.[36] Beltrami reads *communem* without comment. Axelson[37] desires a return to *comem* on the ground that *communem* does not have the desired sense anywhere in Seneca. However, the statement is too dogmatic; *comis* appears to be used only in *Dial.* iv. 33. 6 ("benignus . . . . et comis adulescens") and *Ben.* vi. 29. 2 ("sermo comis et . . . . iucundus"), both without a dependent substantive of reference. Axelson also finds parallels in Suet. *Gramm.* 7 ("comi facilique natura"), Cic. *Lael.* 66 ("comitatemque facilitatemque"), Ter. *Heaut.* 912, and Suet. *Vesp.* 22, pointing out that *communis* (*communitas*) has replaced *comis* (*comitas*) in the manuscripts of the last three. Yet these parallels have no significance in view of the generally accepted instances of *communis* = *comis, benignus*, etc., as, for example: Cic. *Lael.* 18. 65 ("simplicem praeterea et communem et consentientem, id est, qui rebus isdem moveatur, elegi par est"), Cic. *Fam.* iv. 9. 2 ("communem . . . . in victoria"), Nep. *Milt.* 8. 4 ("summa humanitas, mira communitas"), Nep. *Att.* 3. 1 ("communis infimis, par principibus"), and Suet. *Claud.* 21. 5 ("nec ullo spectaculi genere communior aut remissior erat"). The word takes on color from the context and in the passage under discussion is further explained by the synonym *facilem*.

Ep. 89. 15: quid enim prodest inter ⟨se⟩ aestimata habere omnia, si sis in impetu nimius?

The manuscripts show *inter aestimata*. There have been various emendations proposed: *intus* (for *inter*), vulg. and Landi;[38] *in te*, Buecheler and Hense (I); *inter* ⟨*se*⟩, Gloeckner,[39] Kronenberg,[40] Hense (II), Beltrami, and Albini.[41] However, I am of the opinion that the reading of the manuscripts is correct; *aestimata* is neuter substantive and object of *inter*. The phrase *inter aestimata habere omnia* (literally, "to have all things among estimated things") is to be translated simply as "to have all things appraised." Seneca is extremely fond of the combination of *inter* and the neuter plural adjective used substantively, as, for example, with the following: *acerba* (*Ep.* 66. 44), *admiranda* (*Ep.* 114. 12), *adpetita* (*Ep.* 95. 57), *adversa* (*Ep.* 41. 4), *aliena* (*Ep.* 98. 4), *angusta* (*Ep.* 78. 9), *bona* (*Ep.* 66. 12), *cetera*

[33] *Op. cit.* p. 115 n.

[34] See Summers' discussion of "word-play" in Seneca (*op. cit.*, Introd., pp. lxxxii–lxxxvii).

[35] Respectively, "necessarily" and "at any rate."

[36] Castiglioni (see n. 15) indicates a hesitation to abandon *communem* for *comem*.

[37] *Op. cit.*, p. 145.

[38] Carlo Landi, review of Beltrami (II), *Atene e Roma*, IX (new ser., 1928), 187.

[39] Feodor Gloeckner, *Quaestiones Annaeanae* (dissertation; Halis Saxonum, 1877), p. 13.

[40] A. J. Kronenberg, "Ad Senecae Epistulas morales," *Class. Quart.*, I (1907), 208.

[41] Jos. Albini, review of Beltrami (II), *Riv. di filol.*, LVI (1928), 542.

(*Ep.* 79. 8, 113. 16; *Clem.* i. 13. 2), *divina* (*Ep.* 66. 12, 71. 16), *externa* (*Ep.* 93. 7), *foeda* (*Ep.* 71. 36), *humana* (*Ep.* 115. 4), *humilia* (*Ep.* 74. 17), *ignota* (*Ep.* 102. 26), *indifferentia* (*Ep.* 82. 10), *inrita* (*Ep.* 113. 1), *magna* (*Ep.* 119. 16), *maxima* (*Ben.* vi. 23. 7), *missa* (*Ep.* 95. 57), *opposita* (*Ep.* 92. 17), *peritura* (*Ep.* 91. 12), *placidissima* (*Ep.* 91. 7), *praecipitia* (*Ep.* 108. 24), *reliqua* (*Ep.* 99. 4, 119. 15), *subiecta* (*Ep.* 74. 17), *suspecta* (*Ep.* 74. 5), *tristia* (*Ep.* 66. 44), *tuta* (*Ep.* 97. 15), *ultima* (*Ben.* vi. 23. 4), *vicina* (*Ep.* 43. 2).

Ep. 89. 20: quo usque fines possessionum propagabitis? ager uni domino, qui populum cepit, angustus est. quo usque arationes vestras porrigetis, ne provinciarum quidem spatio contenti circumscribere praediorum modum?

Erasmus is responsible for *arationes vestras*, read by editors. Something, however, is to be said for Albini's defense of the reading of the manuscripts, *arationibus vestris;* he would understand either *praedia* or preferably *agrum* with *porrigetis.*[42] Perhaps *praediorum modum* may be supplied with *porrigetis* as well as with *circumscribere.*

Ep. 101. 2: iam Senecio divitiis imminebat.

Axelson[43] proposes *eminebat* on the ground that *imminere* is an uncomplimentary word, which Seneca would not have used of his intimate friend. And yet there is no reason to assume that Seneca necessarily used *imminere* in an unfavorable sense (cf., e.g., *Ben.* iii. 3. 4: "caduca memoria est futuro imminentium"; *Ben.* vii. 14. 6: "huic uni [negotio] imminens et operatus, ne qua se fugeret occasio"; *Dial.* vii. 6. 1: "futurisque [voluptatibus] iam immineat animus"). In *Ep.* 15. 6 *imminere* has more literal force but is likewise not pejorative in effect: "neque ego te iubeo semper imminere libro aut pugillaribus."

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 543.

[43] *Op. cit.*, pp. 206 f.

Ep. 114. 21: inritant illos (*sc.* hominum oculos) et in se a⟨d⟩vertunt.

The reading of the principal manuscripts, *avertunt*, was accepted by the earliest editors and by Fickert, Summers, and Hense (ed. I). It should be retained, since there is no objection to saying *ab ceteris rebus* (implied in the sentence under discussion) *in aliquid avertere* (cf. *Ben.* vi. 8. 1: "quomodo . . . . metus repentinus animum in aliam curam avertendo suspectas horas fefellit"; similarly [with *ad*], *Ep.* 78. 18: "ad alias cogitationes avertere animum et a dolore discedere").

Ep. 119. 10: hic ipse, quem circa dicimus, quem tu vocas pauperem, habet aliquid et supervacui.

Madvig's *circumcidimus*[44] for *circa dicimus* has been adopted by Beltrami. However, there is no need for correction. Apart from the frequent employment of anastrophe with *cum*, we find it with other prepositions as well (cf., e.g., *Ep.* 32. 4: "haec contra"; 82. 7: "quam contra").[45] In this case the question of euphony and of balance with the succeeding *quem* may well have influenced the order.

Ep. 123. 4: nam quod labor contraxit, quies tollit.

This passage is mentioned to indicate a type of criticism which is all too common but quite uncalled for. Axelson[46] proposes reading *solvit* for *tollit.* He himself points to the objection to this procedure by going on to state that he leaves it in dispute whether his "Verbesserung" is an improvement on the transmission or on the author himself.

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[44] *Op. cit.*, p. 511.

[45] For examples from the tragedies of Seneca, see Adolf Genius, *De L. Annaei Senecae poetae tragici usu praepositionum* (dissertion; Monasterii Guestfalorum: Althoff, 1893), pp. 50 f. Genius gives two examples from the tragedies of anastrophic *circa: Herc. f.* 720; *Oed.* 312.

[46] *Op. cit.*, p. 155, n. 32.

THE THEBAN EAGLE IN ENGLISH PLUMAGE

REUBEN A. BROWER

The most diligent and believing student will not find one glance of the Theban eagle in West and his colleagues, who have attempted to clothe the bird with English plumage. Perhaps he is the most untranslatable of poets, and though he was capable of a grand national music, yet did not write sentences, which alone are conveyed without loss in another tongue.—PREFATORY NOTE TO THOREAU'S TRANSLATIONS OF PINDAR (*Dial*, IV [1844], 379).

THE aim of this paper is not to damn unhappy translators but to draw attention to what makes Pindar's poetry almost unique and almost untranslatable—the metaphorical patterns of his odes. Let us first see what one of these patterns is like by making a fairly complete analysis of the First Pythian Ode. We shall then consider some English versions of Pindar, from the seventeenth century to the twentieth, to see what happens in translation to the beautiful and artful patterns of the original poems.

The First Pythian honors Hieron of Syracuse as founder of Aetna and his son Deinomenes, who is the king of the new city. In the course of the ode Pindar refers to Hieron's recent victory over the Carthaginians and Etruscans at Cyme and to Gelon's victory over the Carthaginians at Himera in 480. Beginning with the "quivering stroke" of χρυσέα φόρμιγξ, Pindar sings of the lyre's effect on men, gods, and the enemies of Zeus, especially Typhon, who rests beneath Mount Aetna. After praying for the new city and its founder, he tells how Hieron won his victory at Cyme, though, like Philoctetes, he was suffering from disease. He soon turns to sing of Deinomenes and to pray that the new Dorian city may ever be peaceful. Next he recalls the battles of Cyme and Himera along with the victories at Plataea and Salamis, which he had also honored with songs. In closing, he urges Hieron to say and do the right thing if he wants to enjoy a fair reputation now and after his death.

We may well wonder how the elements in this "eruption" can constitute anything like a unified work of art. Beyond the more obvious historical and mythological links, there must be some further mode of connection which makes us feel, as we certainly do, that the poem is a glowing imaginative whole. If we look closely at Pindar's language, we shall find a connecting pattern which is essentially poetic and Pindaric and through which the "extreme and scatt'ring" elements of the ode are linked in lively relation.

We first glimpse this pattern in a curious series of words which are closely related in meaning and etymology. Listen to them: l. 2, ἀκούει; l. 26, ἀκοῦσαι; l. 84, ἀκοά; l. 90, ἀκοάν; l. 99, εὖ ἀκούειν. (We should add to this group two other expressions: ll. 13–14, βοὰν ἀΐοντα; and l. 90, κλύειν). If a poet is concerned with what he talks about, Pindar seems to be concerned with "hearing." As the individual contexts show, Pindar's stress is on "what is heard" or on "sound," though his expressions never let us forget the active process of "hearing" and "making sounds." If we now read through the ode, we shall find a whole sequence of expressions for sounds or forms of utterance or closely related actions and things. There are at least thirty of them, from the φόρμιγξ of

the first line to the φόρμιγγες of the last epode. Similar echoing pairs are fairly common: l. 3, ἀοιδοί and l. 94, ἀοιδοῖς; l. 38, εὐφώνοις; and l. 70, σύμφωνον; l. 42, περίγλωσσοι and l. 86, γλῶσσαν; l. 60, ὕμνον and l. 79, ὕμνον. Among these resounding words[1] we should note especially κελαδῆσαι, which means both "sing loudly" and "praise." It is one of a considerable group of expressions for "praise" and "glory": l. 31, κλεινός; l. 37, κλυτάν; l. 38, ὀνυμαστάν; l. 43, αἰνῆσαι; l. 66, κλέος. Both κλυτάν and ὀνυμαστάν are closely connected with the "sound" series: the poet prays that Aetna may be

> . . . ἵπποις τε κλυτὰν
> καὶ σὺν εὐφώνοις θαλίαις ὀνυμαστάν.

("glorious for crowns and horses, and famed for the music of her feasts"). We feel a further link between "glory" and "sounds heard" in the etymological connection of κλεινός, κλυτάν, and κλέος with κλύω. The joining of crowns with "glory" and "music" points to a minor chain of echoes, "flower and wreath": l. 66, κλέος ἄνθησεν; ll. 49, 50, δρέπει πλούτου στεφάνωμ'; l. 89, εὐανθεῖ ὀργᾷ; l. 100, στέφανον.

From these rough groupings it is clear that the repetitions and echoes of sound and sense point to a large metaphorical structure in the poem. The central metaphor in this pattern is Sound—the sound of harmonious music and the sound of glorious deeds. The theme is not simply music[2] or harmony.[3] Nor is it true, as Norwood[4] suggests, that the lyre symbol united "all these events, hopes, and prayers." Though Norwood shows quite beautifully the continuity of the Sound metaphor, he is here, as elsewhere in his book, too eager to ascribe a unifying power to a single "visual object." Music, as symbolized in the lyre, is only one of several forms of sound through which Pindar envisages and *composes* his diverse interests, from love of his art to concern for Hieron's rule.

In the opening section of the poem we hear the lyre with its quivering (ἐλελιζόμενα) and rushing (ῥιπαῖσι) and dart-like sounds (κῆλα). We are made to think also of μουσική, the art of Apollo and the Muses (Λατοΐδα σοφίᾳ βαθυκόλπων τε Μοισᾶν). The more inclusive theme of Sound is introduced in the second line with ἀκούει, and the "sound of glorious deeds" appears in the next line in ἀγλαΐας, which is at once "brightness" and "victory" and the "songs of poets," the ἀοιδοί who are mentioned presently. So by the end of the first antistrophe we have almost all the elements which make up the harmony of the ode: the sound of the lyre, the sound of glorious deeds, and the poet's song.

In this opening section the complementary "quiet" theme appears: there is the sleep of the eagle (εὕδει) and the deep sleep of Ares (κώματι). Musical sound, we feel, brings peace and harmonious order, an implication which is later expressed in the prayers for the success of the new city (ll. 35–38; 67–73): the feasts of Aetna are to be εὐφώνοις and the peace a harmonious peace, σύμφωνον ἐς ἡσυχίαν.

But the Sound metaphor includes also inharmonious sound, which is associated with the enemies of Zeus and other disturbers of order. There is the "roar" (πατάγῳ) of Typhon's mountain, the "most dreadful streams he sends up, a marvel to hear" (ἀκοῦσαι). There is the barbaric cry, the ἀλαλατός of the Etruscans, and their lament for their lost ships (ναυσίστονον).

[1] Most of them are quoted in the course of the essay.

[2] "Music" is the title of the Wade-Gery and Bowra translation of the ode (cited below).

[3] See Basil L. Gildersleeve, *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (New York, 1885), notes to Pythia I, pp. 240–42.

[4] Gilbert Norwood, *Pindar* (Berkeley, 1945), p. 102; for discussion of symbolism, see Lectures V, VI, VII.

Pindar contrasts with these ugly noises the sound of the glory of the kings who rule the cities of Sicily. Immediately after describing the mountain's fearful roar, he mentions Aetna's "glorious founder" (κλεινὸς οἰκιστήρ) and the herald's cry which announces his victory. Pindar, the ἀοιδός, sings of his desire to praise Hieron (αἰνῆσαι μενοινῶν), of his ὕμνον for the new king and of his ὕμνον for the victory at Himera, and of his songs for the victories at Salamis and Plataea.

The poet also keeps fresh the memory of less dramatic honors—the way of life of a good king. The last form of the Sound metaphor, the "sound of kingly reputation," appears in the closing section of the poem. The connection between the arts of the poet and the ruler is rather subtly suggested. Indeed, it is hard to know whether Pindar is talking to himself or to Hieron when he says: "If your utterance is just right, there is less blame. . . . ." The closeness of the two arts is further implied by a curious echo: "Forge your *tongue* on the anvil of truth," he urges Hieron. The γλῶσσαν recalls the lines in which Pindar first speaks of his craft, when he tells of the gods who make men "wise and strong and golden-tongued" (περίγλωσσοι).

These closing lines are packed with wonderful resounding expressions—ἀκοά, the sound of a reputation which citizens cannot bear to hear; ἀκοὰν ἀδεῖαν κλύειν and εὖ ἀκούειν, the sweet sound of a wise ruler's reputation; αὔχημα δόξας, the boastful sound of good fame; ἐχθρὰ φάτις, the hateful talk which a tyrant hears; ἀοιδοῖς, φόρμιγγες, the music of poets' lyres; and παίδων ὀάροισι, the soft voices of singing youths. Back of the immediate references to Hieron and his rule rises the larger symphony of Sound, thanks to the resonances which many of these words have acquired in the earlier parts of the poem. The στέφανον of the last line shows at once this growth of meaning and Pindar's peculiar art. The crown is the lordly crown of wealth plucked like a flower (δρέπει πλούτου στεφάνωμ'). It is also the flower of glory (κλέος ἄνθησεν), the *heard* echo of great deeds. And, finally, the flower of glory is connected with the art of the ruler, who has just been told to rule εὐανθεῖ δ' ἐν ὀργᾷ παρμένων.

The Pindaric pattern which we have been describing is twofold: first, the sets of verbal echoes[5] (exact repetitions, etymological cognates, words parallel in meaning); and, second, the pattern of relations which make up the main metaphor. The various interests which excite Pindar—the power of music, the poet's art, the glory of heroes, the order of a Dorian city, the fear of barbarian disorder—enter into combination as so many forms of Sound. But this second pattern depends directly on the first. Pindar connects music and glory and order and royal tact by his art in using the Greek language to make those curious chains of verbal echoes. We have seen how he takes advantage of the likeness in forms and meanings of ἀκούω and its derivatives, of the etymological links between κλέος and κλύω, of the metaphors implicit in σύμφωνος and εὐανθής. The Pindaric harmony is inseparable from the notes which compose it.

If this is Pindar's way, it is easy to see why he has been the despair of translators. Cowley, who in 1656 published his "Pindarique Odes" expresses this despair and the impossibility of closely reproducing Pindar's language: "If a man should undertake to translate *Pindar* word for word, it would be thought that one *Mad*

[5] "Echoes" is used here in the sense in which Bury uses the term: "For Pindar does not confine his 'responsions' to verses metrically corresponding—and Metzger has to some extent recognized this—but indicates the train of his thoughts by verbal echoes anywhere, independently of the metre" (J. B. Bury, *The Nemean Odes of Pindar* [London, 1890], Introd., pp. xx–xxi).

man had translated *another*."[6] His versions, as we might expect, are very free, but they do make us feel some of Cowley's excitement in discovering the poetry of Pindar. Let us look at one of his translations, "The Second Olympique," and see what happens to the metaphorical pattern of the original. Pindar's Second Olympian, an ode to Theron of Agrigentum, has for its main metaphor the idea of alternation in human affairs, which is expressed most vividly in the figure of shifting streams. There is a more or less closely related theme of the "flower and shoot," i.e., the stock of a noble race. Cowley's version is happily not quite what we might expect from his headnote: "*The* Ode (*according to the constant custom of the* Poet) *consists more in* Digression, *than in the main* subject."[7] "The main subject" does appear in Cowley's poem, though in lines which give a rather sprightly version of the original metaphor:

> . . . . Fortunes favour and her *Spight*
> Rowl with alternative *Waves* like *Day* and
> *Night*.

But Pindar's optimism, being far less simple, is infused with the sense of fated recurrence of evil and good. "Oblivion" does not destroy "the very trace of foregone Ills," for *woe sleeps on:* θνᾴσκει παλίγκοτον δαμασθέν. Characteristically, the adjective suggests by its etymology that the woe returns, that it is barely checked. What is the central metaphor for Pindar becomes, in fact, a "digression" for Cowley, and he does not include in the rest of his translation a single one of the five or six echoes of the main theme. Although his version of the famous passage on the afterlife is full of incidental, rather Spenserian, beauties, the "flowery bindings" of Pindar's ἄνθεμα χρυσοῦ are completely missing. This translation, like Cowley's original "Pindariques," leaves us with the feeling that for him Pindar's poetry was indeed an "*unnavigable Song*." Although in 1706 Congreve wrote nobly of Pindar's "perpetual coherence" and "secret connexion"[8] of thought, poets and poetasters went on writing "Pindarick" odes in Cowley's "impetuous Dithyrambique" vein.

It is interesting by way of contrast to read some translations published in 1749,[9] made by a man who was full of scorn for Cowley and his imitators and who had a considerable knowledge of the Greek language and antiquities, Gilbert West. Readers of his version of the First Pythian may not hear the voice of Pindar, but they will find some nice passages in the just classical vein of Gray's "Elegy":

> Thus fresh, and fragrant, and immortal blooms
> The Virtue, Croesus, of thy gentle Mind.
>
> . . . .
>
> Him therefore nor in sweet Society
> The gen'rous Youth conversing ever name;
> Nor with the Harp's delightful Melody
> Mingle his odious inharmonious Fame.

As the last two lines suggest, West's version conveys some sense of Pindar's metaphor, the "harmony divine" of music. But closer comparison of West's language with Pindar's shows us why the total pattern of his poem is so un-Pindaric. Take, for example, a phrase which catches exactly the metaphor implied in the original, the translation of σύμφωνον ἐς ἡσυχίαν as "sweet Accord." But when we turn to West's translation of the parallel εὐφώνοις, we find only an eighteenth-century cliché, "heav'nly Lays," and so Pindar's "Accord" is lost. And if we note the context in

[6] Abraham Cowley, *Poems*, ed. A. R. Waller (Cambridge, 1905), p. 155.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 157.

[8] "A Discourse on the Pindarique Ode," *The Works of Mr. William Congreve* (3 vols.; London, 1710), III, 1074.

[9] Gilbert West, *Odes of Pindar . . . to Which is prefixed a DISSERTATION on the OLYMPICK GAMES* (London, 1749).

which "sweet Accord" occurs, we can see another reason why in West a happy phrase may have so little of Pindar's force:

And still in golden Chains of sweet Accord,
And mutual Peace the friendly People bind.

The musical metaphor is contained within another metaphor, which is merely occasional and ornamental. But Pindar's metaphor is functional; the sensuous beauty it evokes in passing contributes to the growing order of his poem. Almost nowhere in West's version can we find any equivalent for Pindar's musical sequences of "hearings" and "soundings." We miss most in West's language what is most important in Pindar, the particular, physical experience of hearing or making sounds; so we find for *ἀκούει*, "attends"; for *εὖ ἀκούειν*, "The soul-exalting Praise of doing well." Pindar's words do not let us forget that what he is connecting is like sensations or actions as well as like words, but West's elegancies often conceal both kinds of pattern. As Dr. Johnson put it, "He is sometimes too paraphrastical."[10] He strews his verses with phrases such as "sounding chords," "heav'nly choir," "the subtle pow'rs of Verse and Harmony," etc. Unlike Pindar's less numerous, but more precise, echoes, they produce no musical design, only a kind of rhetorical rumble.

We are reminded of that "cumbrous splendor" which so disgusted Johnson in the Pindaric odes of Gray. *The Progress of Poesy* (1757), Gray's "First Pythian," should be a constant reminder that to imitate Pindar is even more risky than to translate him; for, in spite of the "pomp of the poetical machinery," the ode falls apart into a series of show passages which are connected mainly by chronology and Gray's learned footnotes. Although Gray borrows Pindar's musical metaphor, his language shows little Pindaric continuity; there are few signs that, like Pindar, he felt the music in each of the experiences he so artfully describes.

It is curious that a translation published in 1822 (by Abraham Moore)[11] should show the most evil effects of eighteenth-century poetic conventions, particularly of that abstractness which eliminates the sensuous particulars from poetry. Too often in Moore's version, personification calleth unto personification. For example, the balance of *ἀκοὰν ἀδεῖαν κλύειν* and *εὖ ἀκούειν* comes out as:

Fame's dulcet voice, ...

and

Above
The goodliest gifts of Jove
Fortune the first, Fame claims the second, place;
The man whose grasp, whose filled embrace
Both Fame and Fortune holds, life's noblest crown has twined.

Clearly, in translating Pindar, one parallel will not do so well as another.

The nineteenth-century writer who it seems might have best shown English readers the harmony of Pindar was Thoreau.[12] Although he made a complete version of only one ode—the brief Fourteenth Olympian—Thoreau shows in this single translation that Pindar's poetic order may emerge if a translator will "leave the poet alone." One of the minor and beautiful symmetries in that poem is formed by the contrast between λιπαρᾶς Ἐρχομενοῦ, the home of the hero, and *μελαντειχέα δόμον Φερσεφόνας*, where the hero's father now rests in death. Thoreau's words bring out

[10] Samuel Johnson, *Lives of the English Poets*, ed. G. B. Hill (3 vols.; Oxford, 1905), III, 33.

[11] Reprinted in *The Odes of Pindar*, trans. Dawson W. Turner ("Bohn's Classical Library" [London, 1898]).

[12] *The Writings of Henry David Thoreau* ("Walden" ed. [20 vols.; Boston, 1906]), Vol. V: *Excursions and Poems*, "Translations from Pindar," pp. 375–92.

the full sharpness of this light and shadow. The strophe begins,

O ye, who inhabit for your lot the seat of
  Cephisian
Streams, yielding fair steeds, renowned Graces
Ruling bright Orchomenos,
Protectors of the ancient race of Minyae,
Hear, when I pray.

This is matched in the antistrophe by

Now to Persephone's
Black-walled house go, Echo,
Bearing to his father the famous news. . . . .

The transcendental editors who published these translations might well be forgiven their remarks about the attempts of "West and his colleagues."

Twentieth-century translators have at least one advantage over Thoreau and his contemporaries—the detailed knowledge of Pindar's art which has been gathered by the scholar-critics of the last two generations. They are fortunate, too, in writing at a time when the language of English poetry has been undergoing one of its major renewals. Two fairly recent translations of the First Pythian, one by Wade-Gery and Bowra (1928),[13] the other by Richmond Lattimore (1942),[14] show quite clearly both these advantages. The Wade-Gery and Bowra version is wonderfully free from the poetic clutter and classroom idiom which make so many scholarly translations unreadable. Although Pindar's echoes are seldom very closely reproduced, the main connections of metaphor stand out clearly: an English reader of this version can really see that Music is one unifying theme of the poem. And, occasionally, as in the opening strophes, a Pindaric series is quite exactly followed:

[13] *Pindar: Pythian Odes*, trans. H. T. Wade-Gery and C. M. Bowra (London: Nonesuch Press, 1928), pp. 79–87.

[14] *Some Odes of Pindar*, trans. Richmond Lattimore ("The Poet of the Month" [Norfolk, Conn.: New Directions, 1942), pp. 5–9. These translations are included in *The Odes of Pindar*, trans. Richmond Lattimore (Chicago, 1947).

The light foot *hears* you . . . .
And things that God loves not
Hear the voice of the maids of Pieria . . . .
A marvel and wonder to see it, a marvel even
  to *hear*. . . . .

These translators are no more able than others to find an English equivalent for the witty echo of *εὐφώνοις* and *σύμφωνον*; but they do not lose the "linked sweetness" of the original figure: "the music of her feasts" is answered by "peaceful concord."

Although Lattimore occasionally lapses into translator's English, he is often very adept at suggesting the chainlike sequences of Pindar's Sound pattern. Sometimes he does this by inventing parallels which are Pindaric, if not to be found in the original: for example, "shaken with music" (*ἐλελιζομένα*) and "shaken to hear" (*ἀτύζονται βοὰν ἀΐοντα*), or "singing fulfilment" (*ὕμνον τελέσαις*) and "singing in season" (*καιρὸν εἰ φθέγξαιο*). As these examples show, Lattimore brings the reader very close to Pindar's active language of "hearing" and "sounding." And so he succeeds more nearly than the other translators in equaling Pindar's closing strophes with their many sounds of sweet speech and song. But I should add that Lattimore's "good repute" (*εὖ ἀκούειν*), like Bowra's "good name," is a reminder that English is not Greek and that translators new or old are not Pindars. As we have seen in comparing various versions, though a translator may seem to have grasped Pindar's main metaphor, he can never achieve the same closeness of relation throughout the whole poem, for that depends on a kind of verbal device which can rarely if ever be reproduced. To read these translations is to see more clearly that Pindar's odes, which "to the Dorian mode . . . . rose like an exhalation," are the structures both of a genius and of the genius of a language.

AMHERST COLLEGE

INSULAR CONTRIBUTION TO MEDIEVAL LITERARY TRADITION ON THE CONTINENT (*Concluded*)

BLANCHE B. BOYER

The discrepancy which exists between the Insular and the Continental distribution of manuscripts of Aldhelm is paralleled in the case of his compatriot Bede. It appears even more extreme by reason of the voluminous works of the latter and the larger number of manuscripts subsequent to the tenth century.[64]

Out of more than 1,500 extant manuscripts, dating from the eighth to the sixteenth century, only 21 are written in Insular scripts of the eighth and ninth centuries, and 3 in mixed hands (Insular and Continental minuscule) of the ninth.

For the *Historia ecclesiastica* the total score of English manuscripts (70) is about equal to the Continental. For the early period and thereafter through the twelfth century, from which the largest proportion dates (almost one-third), the Continental outnumber the English; but in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the balance is restored by virtue of the fact that "about 70% of the manuscripts copied in these two centuries appear to come from English scriptoria."[65] The oldest manuscript is the Moore Bede, Cambridge Kk V 16 (*ca.* 737), in expert "Anglo-Saxon minuscule of an early type with various cursive elements .... written presumably in the North of England or possibly in a Continental centre with Northumbrian connexions."[66] The next oldest is Leningrad Q I 18, probably written in 746 by at least two practiced scribes using Anglo-Saxon pointed minuscule, with some variation of size and regularity. It may derive from the Continental scriptorium at Echternach, which was founded by the English missionary, St. Willibrord. A third Anglo-Saxon codex, London Cotton Tib. C II, *saec.* VIII *ex.*, originated in England. The text was copied by more than one scribe using pointed minuscule, with opening passages in round hand and titles and colophons in red. Its ornamentation and script suggest the south rather than the region of Durham, which Lindsay proposed.[67]

A single folio of another eighth-century manuscript is preserved in the London library of Chester Beatty, No. 1 (*olim* Cheltenham Phill. 36275 [recently offered for sale by the New York dealer, H. P. Kraus, item 3 in List No. 109, which appeared after this article had gone to press]). It contains only a section of chapter 29 and the whole of chapter 30, Book iii, in a bold, well-formed Anglo-Saxon minuscule somewhat resembling that of the British Museum codex just mentioned.

Of English origin also is London Cotton Tib. A XIV, *saec.* IX *in.* Its script is Anglo-Saxon minuscule, apparently the work of a single copyist, showing some variation in size but not in character. A fragment, part of one folio taken from a binding, now in the library of C. L.

[64] Cf. C. H. Beeson, "The Manuscripts of Bede," *CP*, XLII (1947), 73–87. The figures cited by Professor Beeson are derived from M. L. W. Laistner, with the collaboration of H. H. King, *A Hand-List of Bede Manuscripts* (Cornell University Press, 1943); Laistner, *Bedae Venerabilis Expositio actuum apostolorum et retractatio* (Mediaeval Academy of America, 1939); and Charles W. Jones, *Bedae Opera de temporibus* (Mediaeval Academy of America, 1943).

[65] Laistner, *Hand-List*, p. 8.

[66] E. A. Lowe, *CLA*, II (1935), No. 139.

[67] W. M. Lindsay, *Notae Latinae* (Cambridge, 1915), p. 461.

Ricketts (Chicago), No. 177, is all that exists of a second ninth-century English copy.

On the Continent 1 of the 2 eighth-century manuscripts of the *Historia ecclesiastica* is an Anglo-Saxon product of Fulda, Cassel Theol. Q 2, containing only the last two books (50 fols.); and 1 of the 9 ninth-century codices is Irish, viz., Bern 363, written in northern Italy.

Insular manuscripts are somewhat more rare in the tradition of Bede's other writings. In approximately 1,000 theological manuscript items (200 antedating, and 800 dating from, the eleventh century), there are 2 English witnesses of the early period in Anglo-Saxon minuscule: London Merton Collection 42, *saec.* VIII *ex.*, one folio of Bede's *Commentary on Luke;* and Oxford Bodl. 819, *saec.* VIII–IX, the *Commentary on Proverbs*, written most likely in Northumbria. In a Continental codex of mixed script, Munich 14423, *saec.* IX (from St. Emmeram), the *Commentary on the Apocalypse* is written in Insular minuscule (fols. 54r–76v) among other non-Insular items. The same work was copied at Fulda in Anglo-Saxon minuscule, Cassel Theol. F 25, *saec.* IX *ex.*

For the other biblical commentaries there is not extant a single Anglo-Saxon or Irish manuscript contemporary with these. But Laistner adduces evidence of Insular exemplaria for single ninth-century Continental manuscripts of four of the remaining commentaries, viz., *Quaestiones XXX*, *Collectaneum on the Pauline Epistles*, *Commentary on Mark*, and *Tobit;* for two ninth-century manuscripts of the *Commentary on Genesis* and for one on Luke. The most striking instance is that of the *Collectaneum on the Pauline Epistles*, St. Omer 91, *saec.* IX *in.* (from St. Bertin), of which he says: "It is the work of about ten different scribes, some of whom, in writing Continental minuscule, display an Insular style. Wilmart concluded that these scribes were English monks who had migrated to France; he also believed that the archetype of the MS was an eighth-century codex written in England."[68]

There is no native English codex among the 21 manuscripts of Bede's *Martyrology*, but there is one of Continental origin written in Insular half-uncial or large minuscule, St. Gall 451, *saec.* IX.

In the case of his scientific treatises, out of a total of more than 300 manuscripts, 2 only were written in England as early as the ninth century: Oxford Digby 63, from Winchester, which contains selections from *De natura rerum* and chapter 1 of *De temporum ratione;* and Salisbury 158, which has only *De temporum ratione.* On the Continent the latter work exists in 1 Anglo-Saxon codex, Cassel Astron. F 2, *saec.* IX, from Fulda, and—in part—in 1 Irish minuscule manuscript, Vienna 15298,[69] *saec.* IX, 4 folios badly damaged and discolored; also in Bern 207, *saec.* IX, written in an unusual type of Continental Insular (of Fleury?), chapter 1 only. Portions of *De temporibus* and *De temporum ratione*, as well as of *De natura rerum*, are found in Paris 14088, *saec.* IX, in mixed script. All three texts occur entire in a single Irish minuscule manuscript, Carlsruhe Reich. 167, *saec.* IX. *De natura rerum* and *De temporum ratione* are contained in Paris N.A. 1632, *saec.* IX, from Fleury, written in Caroline minuscule but possibly by an English or an Irish copyist; and *De temporum ratione* in Carlsruhe Reich. 229, *saec.* IX, which is said by Jones to display a "modified Irish script with marginal scrawlings that sug-

[68] *Hand-List*, p. 38.

[69] Not 15928, as given by Laistner (*ibid.*, p. 151) and Kenney (*The Sources for the Early History of Ireland*, I, 671).

gest a school-boy."[70] Jones also remarks *passim* upon the evidence discovered for a "not-too-distant Insular archetype" or immediate exemplars of certain non-Insular manuscripts in his lists.

For two of the school treatises, *De arte metrica* and *De schematibus et tropis*, there is no English manuscript as old as the tenth century, and for *De orthographia* 1 only of the ninth, Cambridge CCC 221. But the first two tracts are preserved in 1 Continental manuscript of mixed script, Paris 14088, and *De arte metrica* in another of the same sort, Paris 16668,[71] both *saec.* IX. And in Paris 7520, which once formed a part of Bern 207, the *De schematibus* is found, but not *De tropis*.

An English manuscript, Cambridge CCC 183, *saec.* IX, contains both metrical and prose versions of the *Life of St. Cuthbert*, written in Anglo-Saxon minuscule. An earlier fragment of the metrical *Life*, consisting of a single sheet taken from a binding, reported from Budapest,[72] is believed to have been written in York *ca.* 780 and to have belonged to one of the early codices sent from England to Fulda.

The meager manuscript remains of early Insular production reveal, in the case of Bede also, the outstanding role of Anglo-Saxon and Irish foundations on the Continent in preserving their national literature. Even greater was their contribution to the preservation and dissemination of the Latin classics. This is, however, far less obvious, for in only a few instances do we have the clue of a surviving Anglo-Saxon or Irish manuscript. A striking example of Insular transmission is furnished by the *Scriptores historiae Augustae*, in which, curiously enough, the clue of an actual Anglo-Saxon manuscript is illusory.

There are extant only two complete manuscripts of the ninth century, Rome Pal. lat. 899 and Bamberg E III 19 (Class. 54). The Bambergensis, which originated in the region of Fulda,[73] is written in Anglo-Saxon minuscules of the second half of the century. In the older editions[74] of the *Scriptores*, it was regarded as an independent authority, of earlier date than, but on a par with, the Palatinus. Peter[75] dismissed in the following summary fashion what he understood to be the suggestion of an anonymous critic that the case was otherwise:

> itaque magno captus est errore qui nuper in Zarncki annalibus (1863 nr. 41), cum censorem exercitationum criticarum in scriptores historiae Augustae (Posnaniae 1863) a me conscriptarum ageret, inter multa alia quae uereor ut certis argumentis stabilire possit, etiam hanc sententiam iecit, ut codicem Bambergensem e Palatino descriptum esse tamquam pro certo adfirmaret.

For him there was no argument; the dates currently assigned to the manuscripts precluded any such possibility; the Bambergensis (B, *saec.* IX) was judged at least a century older than the Palatinus (P, *saec.* X *uel* XI). Peter held his ground stubbornly; and, though he asserted that the decisive factor was the comparison of their readings, his point of view even here continued to be governed by the respective dating of the two manuscripts.[76]

It was Mommsen who first disregarded the question of dates and concentrated his attention on the evidence of variant readings. Using Peter's second edition for B and notes on P forwarded from Rome by a friend, he published a collation of the two

[70] *Op. cit.*, pp. 151–52.

[71] The *Schemata* of fols. 39v–40r is not Bede's work.

[72] Laistner, *Hand-List*, p. 88.

[73] Traube, *Palaeographische Forschungen*, IV (Munich, 1904), 7.

[74] H. Jordan and Fr. Eyssenhardt (Berlin, 1864); H. Peter (Teubner, 1865).

[75] *Op. cit.*, I, viii.

[76] *Editio altera* (Teubner, 1884), pp. viii–x; "Bericht über die Litteratur zu den Scriptores historiae Augustae in den Jahrzehnt 1883–1892," *Bursian's Jahresbericht*, LXXVI (1894), 148–49.

for chapters 1–27 of the *Vita Alexandri* and chapter 1 of *Gallieni duo*, to show on what basis he, "wie schon vor Jahren ein Anonymus," had gained the impression that B was copied from P¹. The most striking item in a numerous list is his representation of the concluding words of chapter 19 and the beginning of chapter 20 of the *Vita Alexandri* as they stand in P. A diagonal tear in the parchment, repaired by sewing, necessitated the placement of two lines of text (approximately) as follows:

trem locum ēē moderationis
tante fuit ut nemo umquam ab eius
latere summoueretur ut omnib. se blandum

This explains the reading of B, whose scribe mistook the position of *tantae fuit* in his exemplar and in copying wrote: "ut nemo umquam ab eius tantae fuit latere," instead of "tantae fuit ut nemo umquam ab eius latere." The lacunae of chapter 1, *Gallieni duo*, are identical in PB, except that various correctors in late (fifteenth-century) hands have partially filled in gaps in P and modified its original readings, which are preserved in B. Thus the value of B, Mommsen pointed out, lies in its function as "eine Controle" for the differentiation of the alterations in P effected by the original scribe and those of the later correctors, a differentiation which is "für die Kritik massgebend."[77]

Dessau carried Mommsen's thesis further.[78] He demonstrated that certain errors in B derive from misinterpretation of firsthand corrections in P; e.g.,[79] for *naturalis* (v. 1. 6), P reads *natalis*, corrected by suprascript *ur* over *t*, which B transcribed as *nauralis;* for *historia* (x. 3. 2), P has *histoa* with *ri* suprascript over *o*, B *histria;* for *scurra* (xix. 9. 5), P shows *scura*, with *r* suprascript above *u*, B *scrra*.

Thus by the investigations of Mommsen and Dessau was established as fact the hypothesis which Peter had strongly protested thirty years earlier. Actually, his reviewer had voiced no such hypothesis. But this was not pointed out until half a century had passed. Then it was revealed[80] that Peter had misread the comment of his critic, who was none other than Eyssenhardt. The latter's position was precisely that of Peter himself and of all others up to the time of Mommsen's re-examination, viz., that B and P were copies (older and younger, respectively) of the same codex. Thus Mommsen's discovery was his alone and not a confirmation, as even he believed, of a predecessor's view. The accomplishment of Mommsen and Dessau was acknowledged by Peter; but, in reversing his position, he made a further mistake by accepting the opinion of Fr. Ruehl that B dates from the beginning of the eleventh century.[81] There seemed no alternative to one who, himself not a paleographer, accepted the general belief that P was not younger than the tenth century (Peter said in both editions [p. vii], "saeculi X uel XI"), although in the Vatican catalogue of 1886 it was given as "saec. IX vel X,"[82] and Dessau had suggested that P was, rather, of the earlier date.[83] Peter subsequently

[77] *Hermes*, XXV (1890), 281 ff. (=*Gesammelte Schriften*, VII [1909], 352 ff.).

[78] *Hermes*, XXIX (1894), 393 ff.

[79] References throughout are to Hohl's edition (2 vols.; Teubner, 1927).

[80] Ernst Hohl, "Beiträge zur Textgeschichte der Historia Augusta," *Klio*, XIII (1913), 259–60, n. 2.

[81] In a review of Lessing's *Lexicon*, Fasc. I: "Die letzten Zweifel hat mir eine Untersuchung des B und der Photographie zweier Seiten des P beseitigt, die der handschriftenkundige Fr. Rühl angestellt hat; nach dem mir gütigst mitgeteilten Ergebnis ist B jünger, als er in dem Katalog von Jaeck angesetzt worden ist; bisher wurde P dem 10. Jahrh. . . . . zugeschrieben, B dem 9., jetzt ist die letztere HS in den Anfang des 11. Jahrh. heruntergedrückt worden" (*Berliner philologische Wochenschrift*, XVII [1897], 814).

[82] Stevenson, *Codices Palatini Latini* (Rome, 1886), I, 320.

[83] *Op. cit.*, pp. 397–98.

credited Dessau with correction of the age of P and reverted to the original estimate of B.[84] Errors still persist, however; Hall speaks of P as "9/10 cent." and of B as "now recognized to be an 11th cent. copy of the Palatinus";[85] Jardé of the Bambergensis "du IXe siècle" and the Palatinus "du Xe ou XIe."[86] The script of the Palatinus is ninth-century Caroline minuscule.[87]

A third ninth-century manuscript, Vat. Pal. 886 (Π), preserves a collection of excerpts.[88] Its relation to P has been a matter of dispute. According to Salmasius, Gruter, Jordan, and Peter (in his editions), it is an independent witness, derived from the same source as P. Following Becker and Dessau, Hohl[89] earlier regarded it as a descendant of P, but in his later edition he questioned whether it derives from P or from a similar codex.[90] Since the excerpta appeared to him "minimi momenti," he gave no very serious consideration to the manuscript and recorded few of its variants.[91] It is carelessly written, the work of an ignorant and negligent excerptor, who often began or ceased his transcription in the middle of a sentence and made no attempt to connect the disjointed fragments. He misread his exemplar and miscopied it. In consequence, Π is extremely corrupt, in spite of a corrector's effort to effect some improvement. But, by happy accident, there are preserved in Π in the original hand a surprising number of correct readings, against the firsthand errors of P(B). These have been adopted by Hohl at numerous points, though without acknowledgment in his *apparatus;*[92] e.g.:

i. 16. 3 *pruinas*] Π *ruinas* PB
17. 7 *parieti*] Π *parietis* P *corr. in ras.*, B
25. 9 *dicitur*] Π *dicit* P
ii. 5. 11 *alias*] Π *aliis* PB *corr.* b (Peter *alus* PB)
iii. 9. 4 *arabia*] Π *arabiam* P
iv. 17. 7 *una missione*] Π *unam missionem* P
27. 7 *sententia*] Π *sententiam* P *corr.*, B
28. 4 *quid de me*] Π *quid* me* P (*e eras. teste* B)
v. 2. 6 *omnes*] Π *omne* PB
4. 6 *liuida*] Π *libida* P
ix. 1. 7 *belgicam*] Π *bellicam* PB
x. 14. 11 *profectus*] Π *profectos* P *corr.*, B
xi. 11. 1 *quaesiuit*] Π *quaesibit* P *corr.*, B
xii. 4. 3 *pertenui*] Π *pertinui* PB
5. 6 *alueis*] Π *albeis* PBΣ(*deteriores*)
5. 9 *fasciolis*] Π *fassiolis* PB
6. 3 *celebre*] Π *celebem* P *corr. ad celebrem* (=B), *m exp.*
xvii. 25. 6 *exhiberi*] Π *exhibere* PΣ
xviii. 13. 2 *illa*] Π *ille* PB
13. 5 *ambitu*] Π *ambito* PB
51. 7 *dici iubebat*] Π *dic nubebat* PB
59. 4 *igitur*] Π *ign* P *corr. ad igit*

At iv. 8. 9, where Hohl adopts Halm's emendation ⟨*apud*⟩ *Romam* for *romam* PB, he reports Peter's reading *Romae* but fails to note that this is found in Π. It is probably correct: there is no instance of

[84] "Bericht über die Literatur zu den Scriptores historiae Augustae in den Jahren 1893–1905," *Bursian's Jahresbericht*, CXXX (1907), 34–35.

[85] F. W. Hall, *A Companion to Classical Texts* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), p. 267.

[86] Auguste Jardé, *Études critiques sur la vie et le règne de Sévère Alexandre* (Paris, 1925), p. 100.

[87] Peter spoke of P as "litteris Saxonicis scriptus" in both editions (p. vii). After Dessau called attention to his error (*op. cit.*, p. 397), he confused the two manuscripts, reporting P as Anglo-Saxon and B as Caroline minuscule (*Bursian's Jahresbericht*, CXXX 1907], 34).

[88] Dated by Jordan (p. vii) *saec.* X; by Peter (pp. xv[1], xvi[2]) *saec.* XI; Dessau (p. 413) "von einer Hand, wie es heisst, des 11. Jahrh."

[89] E. Hohl, "Beiträge zur Textgeschichte der Historia Augusta," *op. cit.*, p. 262.

[90] Praef., pp. vi–vii.

[91] The excerpta are mentioned four times in the *apparatus criticus:* at v. 2. 5 *Telephum* is read with *exc. Pal.* against *Talephum* P; at xii. 2. 4 *Amazonio* is read with *exc. Palat.*[2] against *amazoniae* P; at xv. 11. 3 *in facetum* is read with Mommsen (Jordan) against *in latinum* P^a *in latum* P^b *in lautum exc. Palat.*[2]; at xv. 12. 7 *subteradnexum* is read with *exc. Pal.* against *super adnexum* P.

[92] Presumably from corrections in P (*argumentum ex silentio*), except for certain readings!

apud Romam in the *Scriptores*. Though with some names of towns both the locative and the accusative with *apud* occur interchangeably, the accusative *Romam* is used only with verbs of motion. In the same chapter (iv. 8. 14) the locative appears, *Romae positus*, and in xx. 14. 7 *uel in Africa uel Roma⟨e⟩*] *roma* PB *rome* Σ. In two other instances Π may preserve the genuine reading: at x. 14. 13 Hohl reads *figurata* with PΣ; the older editors read *figurate* (=*figuratae* Π); at ix. 1. 7 Hohl prints *Albim* for *album* P *albium* BΣ (from *album?*). Klotz[93] called attention to the existence of the alternatives *Albis* and *Alba*. From recurrent confusion of *u* and *a* in P, he suggested that P's exemplar read *albam*. This is the reading of Π. At vii. 1. 8 *constuppatus* PΠ is corrected to *constupratus* in the latter ($Π^2$), *construpatus* Σ. In two places $Π^2$ probably gives the correct reading against the others: the first is accepted by Klotz[94] but not by Hohl; the second is adopted by Hohl,[95] viz., xv. 11. 3 *infa⟨ce⟩tum*] Hohl (Momms., Jord.) *in latinum* P *corr. ad inlatum, illatum* Σ *inlautum* Petr. $Π^2$ *inliteratum* Peiper: xix. 2. 1 *procer et*] $Π^2$ Gruter *procerte* P *procer* Σ. The most significant error in Π is *tamen* for *tantum* (i. 12. 8). It can have resulted only from an abbreviation $\overline{tm}$ in the exemplar.

Obviously, Π does not derive from P. But it belongs with P and with two contemporary (?) manuscripts,[96] now lost, to a single family, which is characterized by displacements in the text and by "Christian interpolations."

A second family of manuscripts, lacking both characteristics of the first, is composed of several codices of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (Σ).[97] The independence of Σ was questioned by Dessau, whose thesis has been maintained and elaborated by Miss Ballou,[98] in an effort to prove that "all the younger MSS flow directly or indirectly from P." In making a study of the corrections in the Palatine codex, she found, in addition to firsthand and other contemporary corrections, a second "small body of emendation [*saec.* X], which antedates by four centuries the work of [5] correctors of the early humanistic period"[99]—four of whom she tried to identify as Petrarch, Coluccio Salutati, Gianozzo Manetti, and Bernardo Bembo. Manuscript Σ, she argued, derived from P after certain entries had been added between the years 1457 and 1475. But Hohl[100] discovered evidence that the text is of earlier date; proof that it was known in the fourteenth century is its use by Benvenuto Rambaldi da Imola in his *Romuleon* of 1361–62; further, the Σ redaction is contained in a manuscript of Admont, No. 297, which, according to its subscription, was written in 1439.

On the basis of a comparison with P, Hohl concluded that Σ as it is known to us derives from a medieval editor who, between the time of Charlemagne and the fourteenth century, worked over the text, supplying a title and adding supplementary material *passim*, but that the archetype of this family is not younger than that of P and, further, from their similar

[93] *Rh. Mus.*, LXXVIII (1929), 280.

[94] *Ibid.*, p. 272 n.

[95] *Rh. Mus.*, LXX (1915), 478.

[96] One was used by Sedulius Scottus for his *Collectaneum* (*ca.* 850); cf. his *Excerpta* in Cusanus C 14. 37 *olim* 52 *saec.* XII. Another was consulted by Erasmus for the edition of Frobenius (Bâle, 1518). The latter belonged to Murbach and is listed in the ninth-century catalogue of that library (Bloch, *Strassburger Festschrift zur XLVI. Versammlung deutscher Philologen und Schulmänner* [Strassburg, 1901], p. 271).

[97] Hohl, "Beiträge zur Textgeschichte der Historia Augusta," II, *Klio*, XIII (1913), 387–414.

[98] Susan Ballou, *The Manuscript Tradition of the Historia Augusta* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1914), p. 5.

[99] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[100] "Zur Textgeschichte der Historia Augusta: Ein kritisches Nachwort," *Klio*, XV (1917–18), 97, 89; *Rh. Mus.*, LXX (1915), 475, n. 1.

lacunae at the end of the *Vita Valeriani* and the beginning of the *Gallieni duo* and from their individual variation elsewhere in corruptions shared by both, that PΣ go back to a common faulty archetype, in which the displacements (preserved in the first family) were corrected after the transcription of P. Accordingly, he adopted the following principles in editing the *Scriptores*:[101] (1) P should be considered the basic text; (2) where P is correct, all other manuscripts should be ignored; (3) where P is wrong, Σ should be consulted; and (4) where PΣ err, emendation should take place.

Hohl's conjectures regarding Σ have been repeatedly questioned,[102] but in all the criticism no one has remarked his fundamental error. This is his disregard of Π. As shown above (p. 35), this excerpt manuscript is an important, if limited, witness to the tradition of the first family. By his failure to evaluate properly the readings of Π, Hohl overlooked a clue to the date of the second family, viz., the agreement of ΠΣ in correct readings against errors in P. The following instances, adopted in Hohl's text and attributed by him to Σ only, are proof that the second family is as old as the first:

vi. 3. 5 *defuerunt*] ΠΣ *defuerant* P
vii. 17. 3 *iusta*] ΠΣ *iuxta* P
viii. 12. 2 *inlibera[bi]lis*] *inliberalis* Π *illiberalis* Σ *inliberabilis* P
xii. 2. 2 *misi*] ΠΣ *missi* P¹ *misisem* P *corr.*
xv. 11. 4 *nol[u]it*] ΠΣ *noluit* P
xviii. 22. 8 *unum[quem]que*] ΠΣ *unumquemq.* P
38. 6 *livore[m]*] ΠΣ *livorem* P
41. 6 *delec⟨ta⟩tus*] ΠΣ P *corr.*, *delectus* P¹ *teste* B
41. 7 *us⟨que⟩*] ΠΣ *ut* P
44. 1 *convi⟨vi⟩is*] ΠΣ P *corr.*, *conuiis* P¹ *teste* B
51. 5 *cenavit*] ΠΣ P *corr.*, *cenabit* P¹ *teste* B
62. 1 *tum*] ΠΣ *cum* P¹ *teste* B
xix. 1. 5 *vicino*] ΠΣ *vicini* P

The background of both families is Insular. There are characteristic letter confusions of *n* (*m*), *p*, *r*, *s* as follows:

p for *n*: xv. 13. 1 *voluntates* R (Σ family) *voluptates* P (also at xxvii. 8. 4) ACh (Σ family)
n for *p*: xviii. 37. 2 *opiparum*] Gruter Salm. *opinarum* P *opinatum* P *corr.*, *opimum* Σ
xix. 12. 1 ⟨*ac*⟩*ampis*] Pet. *amnes* P¹ *p amnes* P *corr.*, *ad amnes* Σ *omnes* Eyss.
xxviii. 1. 2 *ipse*] *inse* PΣ
r for *n*: xx. 25. 3 *mater* ⟨*n*⟩*os*] *mauros* P *maurus* Σ
xxiii. 9. 6 ⟨*in*⟩*solentia*] *solertia* PΣ
n for *r*: viii. 7. 6 *penuriam*] P *corr.* *pecuniam* P¹Σ
xvii. 35. 5 *disertioribus*] *disertionib;* PΣ
xxvi. 35. 3 *porticibus*] *pontifices* PΣ
n for *h*: ii. 4. 6 *hunc*] *nunc* PΣ
vii. 3. 7 *orchestra*] *orcnestra* P
xxvi. 38. 3 *mihi sit*] Salm. *mini sit* P *incessit* Σ
h for *n*: xviii. 41. 4 *n[a]ec*] *haec* P *hec* ChV (Σ family)
ii. 4. 5 *constellatio*] *cohstellatio* P¹
m for *r*: i. 6. 8 *Roxanalorum*] *mox alanorum* PΣ
i. 12. 6 *ruralis*] *muralis* PΣ
xvi. 8. 4 *familaritatem*] *familiam tamen* PΣ
r for *m*: viii. 11. 9 *cum*] Σ *cur* PΠ
p for *r*: iv. 25. 12 *Cyrrum*] *cyprum* PΣ
vii. 1. 8 *constupratus*] Π² *constuppatus* PΠ *construpatus* Σ
xx. 29. 1 *Arriano*] *apriano* PΣ

[101] *Klio*, XIII, 409.

[102] For a résumé see Hohl's "Bericht über die Literatur zu den Scriptores Historiae Augustae für die Jahre 1924–1935," *Bursian's Jahresbericht*, CCLVI (1937), 129–35. Hohl's reply to the charge that no clear picture of Σ can be drawn from his critical apparatus is a reiteration of his earlier appraisal of "die freilich arg verwilderte Σ-Überlieferung" and its "schrankenlosen Wilkur" in regard to word order, conjunctions, prepositions, tenses, and moods—the otiose details of which he forbore to record. In consequence, he accepts as the highest praise the objection that in his apparatus Σ "zu kurz komme."

xxvi. 30. 4 *Carporum*] *caprorū* P (metathesis?) *carprorum* Σ (Klotz[103] *Ca*^{r}*prorum ?*)

r for *p:* i. 8. 9 ⟨*p*⟩*r*⟨*a*⟩*estiterit*] P *corr. restiterit* P^1 *restituerit* Σ
i. 16. 3 *pruinas*] Π *ruinas* P^1Σ
xv. 2. 2 *nuncupavit*] Σ *non curavit* P (Peter: *noncuravit* B *noncunarit* PΠ)
xxi. 17. 6 *petit*] Pet. *rettit* P *restitit* Σ
xxix. 7. 6 ⟨*p*⟩*romam*] Eyss. *romã* PΣ *ponam* Pet.

for *p:* xiii. 5. 9 *apros*] P *corr.* Σ *afros* P^1
xvii. 7. 1 *typum*] *tyfum* P

p for *f:* ix. 4. 1 *fratrem*] Gru. *patrem* PΣ
xviii. 29. 5 *fronte*] P (f *a.m. posuit in ras.; sed antea quoque eadem littera exstabat, ut videtur* [*Hohl*]) *pronte* ΠP(?)

r for *s:* v. 2. 5 ⟨*He*⟩*f*⟨*a*⟩*estionem*] Pet. *fertionem* PA (Σ family)

s for *r:* xvii. 6. 8 *quam* [*q*] *virgo maxima*] *quã quisgo maxima* P^1 *quã quis uirgo maxima* P *corr., quoniam quis Gomaxima* Σ

s for *f:* xviii. 42. 4 *vicena mulas*] Salm. *vicenam filas* P^1 *vicenam fialas* P *corr. vicenam silas* Σ

f for *s:* xxx. 3. 7 *sic*] P *corr.* Σ *fit* P^1

st for *fi:* xviii. 40. 6 *bafiis*] *bastis* Π

s for *g:* xviii. 51. 6 *virgis*] P *corr.*^{2} Σ *uirsis* P^1 *u**rsis* P *corr.*^{1}

Open *a* in the exemplar(s) caused many instances of *u* for *a* and vice versa in P, occasional cases in PΠΣ, in PΠ, PΣ, Π, and Σ. Insular subscript *a* may explain *mgno* P^a *magno* P^b (xxvi. 35. 4).

Additional evidence consists of errors arising from Insular abbreviations: unfamiliarity with the suspension $\overline{ap}$ for *apud* may account for the omission of the word in PΣ once, in P four times, and the substitution of *cum* in P (xxi. 16. 7); any one of several varieties of symbol for *contra* (ɔɔ, ɔ–c, ɔ) could cause *cum* (xix. 17. 3) and *con* (xxi. 8. 2; xxviii. 4. 3) in P or emendation to *apud* in Σ (xxvi. 25. 2); figure-7 *et*[104] underlies the frequent omission of the conjunction in P (20 cases in Hohl's text; more than 30 in Peter's); *īḡi* (from *iġ ?*) for *igitur* produced *ign* P^a *igit* P^b; *ġ* for *igitur* became *ergo* (*g̊*) in Π; $\overline{nc}$ for *nunc* produced *non* in PΣ (xxiv. 22. 11); conceivably *plo* for *populo* caused *paulo* in Π (x. 14. 11); $\overline{pt}$ for *potest* became *post* in P (xxv. 2. 6); *ꝑ* for *per*, confused with *p̄* (*prae-*) may be responsible for *praemitteret* Π (xviii. 29. 4) and *premisit* P (xviii. 43. 1); *p̄t* for *propter* gave *praeter* ($\overline{pt}$) in PΣ (xix. 29. 7); *q̧* for *quam* was omitted before *quia* (*q*) in PΣ (xxix. 3. 5), and became *quae* in P (xxx. 10) and Π (ii. 5. 1), or *-que* Π (i. 13. 5), or *quia* Π (vi. 11. 5; xiv. 3. 1); *-que* became *quam* PΠ (xviii. 40. 3); *q̄si* for *quasi* appears as *quae* P (x. 7. 9), *quos* PΣ (xiii. 2. 6), *quisi* P (xiii. 8. 7; xvii. 26. 3), *quam* PΣ (xv. 3. 7); *q* for *quia* became *qui* (*q*) in PΣ (xv. 3. 5), P (xviii. 28. 7), and vice versa (*quia* replaces *qui*) in P (xv. 8. 4); *ꝙ* for *quod* gave *qui* P *quae* Σ (xvii. 16. 5); $\overline{st}$ (*sunt*) in the phrase *nomini* $\overline{st}$ *tributae* (xxvi. 21. 11) led to the error *nominis tributae* PΣ and in *relata* $\overline{st}$ (xv. 3. 1) to *relatas in*— PΠCh (Σ family) *relata sint* $Π^2$ *relata sunt* R (Σ family).[105] The symbol *tm̄* for *tantum* is interpreted as *tamen* (*tn* or *tm̄*) by Π (i. 12. 8, with *tantum sscr.*), by P (v. 10. 7, corrected to *tantam* P^b), by Σ (xxviii. 2. 6); *ū* (the old symbol) for *uel* may be the source of *uer* in P (ii. 5. 12)—the word is omitted from PΣ three times and twice from P alone; the ancient nota *ū* for *ut* probably caused the error *alexandrum* PΣ for *alexander ut* (xvii. 13. 2), and frequent omission of the word (PΣ six times, P nine times).

[103] A. Klotz, review of Hohl's edition of the *Scriptores*, *Philologische Wochenschrift*, XLVIII (1928), 458.

[104] Suggested by Klotz, *Rh. Mus.*, LXXVIII (1929), 292.

[105] Klotz (*ibid.*) suggested the ligature by way of explanation of the reading in P; but he would prefer *sint* "wenn es überliefert wäre." Hohl reads *Sin*⟨*t*⟩: the indicative *sunt* is probably correct (cf. *quae . . . . erunt*, xiv. 1. 1).

The orthography shows Insular traits of double for single consonant and vice versa, particularly in the case of *s;* e.g., in P *dissertior, missi, recusasse* vs. *dixiset, mesale* (for *Messalae*), *misus, necesitas, possesiones;* in Π *uespassiani;* in PΣ *missum* (for *uisum*) vs. *misit* (for *missis*); in Σ *potuiset.* One of the twelfth-century manuscripts of the *Excerpta Seduli Scotti,* Cusanus C 14 *nunc* 37 (*novissime* 52) is reported by Klein[106] as reading *basiano* for *Bassiano.* P also preserves the typical Insular spelling *terrentio* (for *Terentio*) and the Insular *Finit* in a subscription (at the end of iv, Antoninus Pius), i.e., *Finit Vita Finita Vita Antonini Philosophi.*

Actual abbreviations in Σ are without significance because of the late date of the manuscripts. In Π they are few in number; even *-que* is usually written out: but at i. 13. 5 *quisq.* has been changed to *quisquam;* at iv. 19. 5 $\overline{nc}$ is corrected to *non* (from *no ?*); at xviii. 59. 4 *igi* (from *ig̃ ?*) occurs for *igitur* (cf. above *ergo* for *igitur* in Π). Once or twice the following occur: *ħ* for *haec;* $\overline{qm}$ and $\overline{quo}$ for *quoniam;* and $\overline{tn}$ for *tamen.* In P are seen abbreviations of the common ninth-century usage. From the form *a* $\overline{ura}$ (fol. 12v, for *a vestra,* ii. 2. 2), Dessau believed that Π derived the error *au*$\overline{ra}$ with *aurium sscr.*, but it is more plausible that an abbreviation *a* $\overline{ura}$ stood in the archetype. For *post* P has ꝑ (*per,* xxvii. 15. 3); *q.* (*quae*), $\overline{qm}$ (*quoniam*), ƚ (*uel*). A corrector in P used ǂ (*enim*), ÷ (*est*), -r̄ (*-rum*), and subscript *i.* But the fact of P's Insular origin is established—even without consideration of other features—by the presence on fol. 167v (xxiv. 15. 4) of the reversed-*e* symbol for *eius* (ɘ), which Hohl reproduced as Greek λ and dubbed "*littera incerta*" (*apparatus criticus ad loc.; eius* B). Thus P is shown to have been a Continental link between two Insular exemplaria of the *Historia*—a lost predecessor and the copy B. MS B, Traube believed, was written "im Fuldischen Gebiet."[107] Lehmann asserts that P originated at Lorsch.[108] It was used by Salmasius and Gruter at Heidelberg and came with the Palatini to the Vatican in 1623. The text of Π was probably written at Lorsch: item 543 of the Lorsch catalogue[109] almost certainly includes it.

At Murbach there were many Irish manuscripts, and the lost Codex Murbacensis may have been one of these. It is not impossible that the Irishman Sedulius Scottus obtained his copy for use in the *Collectaneum* from this library.[110] Only the Bamberg and Murbach manuscripts of the *Historia* are cited by name in medieval catalogues.

The first family shows contact with the Insular centers Fulda, Lorsch, Murbach: the second, which betrays no local attachment but derives from an Insular intermediary also, must be of like origin. The Insular archetype of the *Scriptores* presumably was transcribed at some German monastery which was frequented by visitors from the British Isles.

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106 Joseph Klein, *Über eine Handschrift des Nicolaus von Cues* (Berlin, 1866), p. 97.

107 Cf. above p. 33, n. 73.

108 Paul Lehmann, "Deutschland und die mittelalterlichen Überlieferung der Antike," *Zeitschrift für deutsche Geistesgeschichte,* I (1935), 143.

109 Catalogue 37, Becker, *Catalogi bibliothecarum antiqui* (Bonn, 1885), p. 115. The reference is to *ex libro Macrobii saturnalium de servis.* Pal. 886 is a miscellany; the part in question, fols. 125–63, with separate quaternion signatures, contains Macrobius *De servis* (fols. 125–41), and the *Excerpts* from the *Historia Augusta* (fols. 141–63), written, according to Peter, by the same hand.

110 Hohl, *Klio,* XIII (1913), 402, n. 2.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

NOTE ON THE NUMBERS IN PLATO'S *CRITIAS*

In his description of Atlantis in the *Critias*, Plato gives the exact numbers and measures of practically every phase of its geography, public works, and political institutions. In the description of ancient Athens, in the same dialogue, there is only one numerical detail given (the total fighting strength of the state).[1] This suggests that the use of such specific figures is a device peculiarly appropriate to a description of the Atlantean state and that the specific figures which Plato invents have some characteristic intended to reflect peculiarly Atlantean principles of legislation and technology.

The institutions and customs of ancient Athens can be and are adequately specified by reference to a normative standard embodied in legislative principles; the exact measurements can be summed up by the statement that they are those which are best adapted to proper functioning. In a disordered and only loosely unified state such as Atlantis, on the other hand, institutional and technological details are not determined and co-ordinated by a rational unifying plan. The closest analogue to the structural statements made about ancient Athens (where the structure of the society is organized around rational legislation) in an account of Atlantis is, therefore, the separate description of the institutions and public works of which this social structure happens to be composed.

The substitution of some set of specific figures for considerations of proper function in a total plan is peculiarly appropriate to the description of the type of disunity and disorder which Atlantis illustrates. That the specific figures given have in common an arithmetical characteristic which emphasizes Atlantean irrationality and confusion will be shown in the discussion which follows.

Poseidon seems to have been an ancestor not likely to produce philosophic and mathematically minded offspring; for, if we compare his ordering of circles of land and sea in Atlantis to the circles of the heavens described in the *Timaeus*, it becomes evident that, when this god geometrizes, he does it like a carpenter's apprentice. And the institutions preserved by the descendants of Poseidon who rule Atlantis show that, in fact, the offspring have made no improvement, philosophically or mathematically, on the insight of their ancestor. The key to the selection of all the numbers in the *Critias* is the statement that these rulers "met alternately every five and every six years, paying equal honor to the odd and to the even."[2] That this shows a total and fundamental lack of understanding of the nature of number is clear if this passage is compared to the careful distinction of kinds of sacrifices which should be made in odd and those which should be made in even numbers, in *Laws* 717 A. Not only is the confusion of even and odd (which are the basic contrary principles of the most elementary mathematical science) a sign of total lack of theoretical ability, but the specific numbers cited here, which represent the even and the odd, reflect this same confusion, the one being the sum and the other the product of the first odd and the first even number.

Since in Plato's mathematical images and formulas in dialectical and cosmological contexts the basic opposition of odd and even is observed and since in contexts dealing with legislative detail ease of manipulation or religious propriety is the determining factor (and in the latter case the basic distinction is again that of odd and even), while in mythical contexts periods and distances are poetically dismissed as "myriads" (perhaps composed of lesser, proportionately related periods, which are indicated by smaller powers of 10), the absence of anything remotely resembling

[1] *Critias* 112 D.

[2] τῷ τε ἀρτίῳ καὶ τῷ περιττῷ μέρος ἴσον ἀπονέμοντες (*Critias* 119 D. 3).

"alternating fives and sixes" in other Platonic contexts is causal, not accidental. The choice of "six and five alternately" by the Atlantean kings is not only an example of mathematical ignorance on so grand a scale that they cannot distinguish the natures of the odd and the even but also a sign of a lack of rational statesmanship so great that no real principle of any sort is observed in the fixing of these meetings of the rulers, the state's most important political and religious festival.

Reflecting and leading up to this final detail, where an explicit statement is given of the underlying confusion which accounts for its selection, all the other numbers and measurements cited, however casually, are (except one) either (*a*) multiples of 6 or 5 or (*b*) parts of a sum, product, or ratio which in its entirety is a multiple of 6 or 5 or (*c*) 6 or 5.

Poseidon himself begat *five* pairs of twin sons;[3] his statue depicts him driving *six* horses;[4] his engineering consists in the construction of *five* circles (three of sea and two of land)[5] about a central island with a diameter of *five* stades.[6] Further, the total widths of the circles of sea are to the total widths of those of land in the ratio of 6:5.[7] (This consideration of total widths is relevant, since precisely this type of relation gives the adumbrated geometrical structure operative in Plato's assignment of relative sizes to the rims of the whorls described in the Myth of Er.)[8]

The divinity of Poseidon's nature reveals itself only in the ease with which he performs his mechanical operations: he established the circles of sea and land "with ease, as a god might."[9] His descendants, like him in this respect, created public works of such magnitude that it appeared incredible;[10] but they were also like their ancestor in their partiality for 6's and 5's. Working with a plain (which was oblong and crooked, not perfectly square or straight) 6,000,000 square stades in area,[11] they constructed an intersecting network of canals.[12] The outermost canal of this network, encircling the plain, had its breadth related to its depth in the ratio of 6:1. The total length of this ditch was 10,000 stades (since its sides were, respectively, 2,000, 3,000, 2,000, and 3,000 stades long).[13] These dimensions and details represent 6 as the product of 3 and 2; 10 as the sum of 2, 3, 2, and 3; and a 6:1 ratio, reflecting the confusion in these numbers of the even and the odd, in the first two cases, by the alternatives of multiplying and adding the first odd and first even number. In this context, therefore, the representation of 10 as a sum of 3's and 2's is not really an exception to the rule of the prominence of 6's and 5's.[14]

The military arrangements of Atlantis[15] afford a remarkable array of 6's. The 60,000 military districts supply the Atlantean army with a grand total of 120,000 archers, 120,000 hoplites, 120,000 slingers, 180,000 javelin-throwers, 180,000 light-armed slingers, 240,000 horsemen and charioteers, and 240,000 sailors. Consequently, the total military personnel in the Atlantean armed forces is 1,200,000—exactly sixty times the force that the ancient Athenian state maintained, as we know from the one specific figure that is given in connection with the description of ancient Athens.[16] Military armaments and matériel in Atlantis

[3] *Ibid.* 113 E.

[4] *Ibid.* 116 D.

[5] *Ibid.* 113 D.

[6] *Ibid.* 116 A.

[7] *Ibid.* 115 D–E.

[8] *Republic* 616 C–617 D; J. Cook Wilson "Plato, *Republic*, 616 E" *Class. Rev.*, XVI (1902), 292–93; Adam's notes in his edition of the *Republic* (in which he rejects his earlier interpretation, presented in his note "On Plato, *Republic X* 616E," *Class. Rev.*, XV [1901], 391–93). The counterpart of the "Law of Nines" diagrams in the present context would be:

Water	Land	Water	Land	Water	(Central Island)
3	3	2	2	1	5

(5) (6)

[9] *Critias* 113 E.

[10] *Ibid.* 118 C. 5.

[11] *Ibid.* 118 A.

[12] *Ibid.* 118 D. These canals actually represent an arrangement too haphazard to fall under the rule of 6's and 5's; Plato says that there were transverse canals every 100 stades (a total of 31 canals, counting the outer ditch), with connecting canals which had been cut between them. The image of a geometrical maze is used here within the arithmetical metric frame to reinforce the notion of confusion.

[13] *Ibid.* 118 C. 7–D. 2.

[14] The use of "myriads" has a special function, discussed below; but the length is stated in a way which does emphasize its determination by the sides, hence its derivation in this context from the summation of 2's and 3's, which elsewhere is presented by 5 as a symbol of the confusion of odd and even (*περὶ δὲ πᾶν τὸ πεδίον ὀρυχθεῖσα συνέβαινεν εἶναι τὸ μῆκος σταδίων μυρίων* [*ibid.* 118 D. 1]).

[15] *Ibid.* 118 E–119 B.

[16] *Ibid.* 112 D.

included 1,200 ships and 10,000 chariots. Since this last figure seems an exception to the prevalent multiples of 6, Plato adds the explanation that this was made up by "the leader of each allotment supplying *one-sixth* of a chariot."[17]

As we survey these two sets of figures, a second principle of selection is also seen to be operative: the vastness of the numbers and distances involved is reflected by the prominence of myriads as units of description. The ratios which give a qualitative aspect and dialectical point to these various precise statements of distances and numbers, however, remain, no matter what the scale, 6's and 5's.

The way in which this principle is carried out in the principal religious-political festival of the state has already been shown. It is further represented, however, in the law that no king might be sentenced to death without concurrence in the sentence of at least six of the members of the council.[18] In the state religion, the six steeds in the statue of Poseidon carry on this principle; and the dimensions of Poseidon's temple are stated in such a way that, while their basic ratio is 2:1, the immediate reduction of stades to plethra, which the form of statement suggests, would yield a 6:3 ratio instead.[19]

The number of Nereids (100)[20] emphasizes the continuing influence of the cult of Poseidon, the Atlantean familiarity with the sea, and perhaps also their tendency to make everything bigger than they should. These are the factors emphasized by Plato's parenthetical remark in 116 E, which underscores the deviation from tradition. But it is a deviation which merely doubles a set of 5×10 and which, in conjunction with the contextual mention of the number of steeds, shows in the state religion the same basic confusion that is reflected in the alternation of 6's and 5's.

In summary, the apparently random numbers so liberally interspersed in Plato's account of the Atlantean state are not inserted simply to give an impression of great size or simply to create an effect of artistic verisimilitude (though, in fact, they do perform both these functions). These "random" numbers are constructed on a dialectical and artistic principle in such a way that each reflects some aspect of the rulers' basic and traditional mathematical and philosophic confusion. Plato's selection of these objective metric statements of structural details of Atlantean politics, public works, and geography illustrates, and adds further insight and precision to, his eloquent disapproval and condemnation of Atlantis as a whole. Plato reveals his philosophic and artistic precision and his sensitivity to the significance of detail in inventing the history of a bad state as well as in describing the archetype of a good one.

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[17] *Ibid.* 119 A. 7; cf. n. 14, above.

[18] *Critias* 120 D.

[19] *σταδίου μὲν μῆκος, εὖρος δὲ τρισὶ πλέθροις, ὕψος δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις σύμμετρον ἰδεῖν* (*ibid.* 116 D. 1).

[20] *Ibid.* 116 E. 1.

THE CHRONOLOGY OF CATULLUS' LIFE

Put in a nutshell, the traditional chronology of Catullus' life was worked out as follows: Jerome's notice places his death in 58 B.C. at the age of thirty (this is the meaning of "xxx aetatis anno," according to A. L. Wheeler).[1] As he mentions events after this date (e.g., the invasion of Britain, the existence of the Colonnade of Pompey),[2] he must have lived until at least 55 B.C.; and if the *age* at death is right, he then will have lived from 85 to 55; if Jerome reckoned from a known *date of birth* (which is less likely), Catullus would really have lived 88–55. Catullus mentioned the fact that his brother's death had driven him from the society of some woman in Rome[3] (presumed to be "Lesbia," the second Clodia,[4] wife of Metellus Celer); and, as he is assumed to have visited his brother's tomb in the course of his

[1] *Catullus and the Traditions of Ancient Poetry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1934), p. 88.

[2] Poems 11, ll. 11–12; 55, l. 6; possibly 53 (see H. Comfort, *Class. Phil.*, XXX [1935], 74).

[3] Poem 68, ll. 27–30.

[4] R. Ellis, *Commentary on Catullus* (2d ed., Oxford, 1889), Prolegomena, pp. lxiii–lxxii; Schwabe, *Quaestiones Catullianae* (Giessen, 1862), pp. 53 ff.

Bithynian journey, the liaison with Lesbia had therefore begun before 57, which is almost certainly the date of the voyage abroad.[5] Another identification which is thus made possible is that of Rufus (but not "Caelius"[6]) with Caelius Rufus, whose love affair with Lesbia took place about 59–58.[7] The former might have been a rival of Catullus, if the poet had succumbed to Lesbia's charms as early as this.

I mention these salient features in order to discuss the theories of Rothstein and Paul Maas,[8] who have departed widely from the traditional arrangement. There are many other points in the chronology of the poet's life which I omit, since the events stated above cover the main grounds of controversy. The vexed question of Veranius' and Fabullus travels will, however, be touched on as well.

Rothstein puts all the relationship with Lesbia after the poet's return from Bithynia in 56 and suggests—though not with conviction!—that she may have been the youngest Clodia, wife (subsequently divorcee) of Lucullus. Poem 68, which Rothstein takes as a single piece,[9] must then refer to some other than Lesbia, since it must date from before the Bithynian journey. All short poems written before 57 B.C. have been lost. The Caelius of poems 58 and 100 is not Caelius Rufus, according to Rothstein;[10] but he is inclined to gloss over the Rufus of poems 69 and 77, who is not so easily disposed of, however awkward it may be for the Rothstein theory.

The suggestion that "Lesbia" was Clodia Luculli is quite unprovable; and the dating of all the liaison after 56 is arbitrary and unnecessary; to account for the kind reference to Lesbia in poem 43 it is merely necessary to assume that Catullus at least still respected Lesbia as late as the period of Caesarean lampoons (probably 56–55 B.C.), since it need not be assumed that the Bithynian voyage completely cured him of his interest in that lady, although he perhaps learned there that romance was not the sole end of existence and could think of her now with more calmness.

It would thus appear that the date of the voyage to Bithynia (i.e., the date of the visit to the grave in the Troad) is the key to the entire structure of the chronology.

Maas has recently gone much further: he suggests two voyages to the East, the later one a separate trip for the purpose of visiting the tomb. He is inclined to identify Lesbia as Clodia Luculli; agrees with Rothstein in placing all the love affair after the Bithynian journey; and suggests that Catullus may have lived until about 50 B.C. The lady of poem 68*a* (=ll. 1–40), quite apart from 68*b* (=ll. 41–160), can now be identified with Lesbia (whoever she was), since Catullus' brother may have died *after* the first Bithynian journey. Curiously, Maas remarks that Caelius Rufus (the historical one) might have been a lover of Lesbia *before* 56 B.C. and Catullus' "Rufus" *after* that date; and he adds that, if we identify her as Clodia Luculli, the problem disappears; so also does practically all that the labors of scholars like Schwabe and Ellis have achieved on this subject! But this does not explain how Lesbia—who had not, so far as our information goes, a husband at the time, no matter which Clodia she was—had a *uir* ("whatever that means," comments Maas) during the courtship of Catullus.[11]

The theories of Rothstein and, to a greater degree, of Maas seem, in fact, to raise as many difficulties as they attempt to dispose of: the difficulty of poem 68*b* and its *domina;* of the *uir* of Lesbia, and, of course, Catullus' friends, Veranius and Fabullus. Maas considers it more natural that their travels should be referred (as in Rothstein's theory) to *one* journey instead of the usually assumed two—forgetting that he (Maas) has assumed two journeys abroad for Catullus? Admittedly, it would be easier for *one* man to go abroad twice than for *two* men to go abroad twice together, if their

[5] Schwabe, *op. cit.*

[6] Rufus, poem 69, l. 2; 78, l. 1; Caelius, poems 58 l. 1; 100, l. 1.

[7] Schwabe, *op. cit.*

[8] M. Rothstein, "Catull und Lesbia," *Philologus*, LXXVIII (1923), 1–34; "Catull und Caelius Rufus," *ibid.*, LXXXI (1926), 472 f.; P. Maas, "The Chronology of the Poems of Catullus," *Class. Quart.*, XXXVI (1942), 79–82.

[9] The unity question is of secondary importance, since the chronological evidence in ll. 1–40 is independent of that in ll. 41–160.

[10] "Catull und Caelius."

[11] Poem 68, l. 146; cf. also poem 83.

two missions were official; but the trip(s) to Spain may have been on private business, probably commercial, while their experiences in Piso's *cohors*[12] do tally with Cicero's descriptions of the former's treatment of his men in Macedonia.[13]

One point has escaped even the thorough analysis of Maas: that poem 101 contains no evidence whatever that Catullus paid a visit to his brother's tomb in the Troad: the poem may have been mere fancy or may have been written for himself (or someone else) to speak at the tomb; but that Catullus ever spoke it there is unprovable now. And in the descriptions of his homecoming[14] there is no grief or even decent gravity shown, while it might have been a matter of difficulty to leave the suite of the praetor on his way out to Bithynia or to leave Bithynia during his period of office, to visit the Troad. Thus far I think the evidence of poem 101 is, indeed, as valueless for the dating of the Lesbia affair as Maas supposes. But I cannot see that either Rothstein or Maas has improved on the excellent chronology of the Schwabe-Ellis school,[15] as a whole.

If one may dare to reconstruct the life in outline, it might be suggested that Catullus left home early,[16] possibly in pursuit of Clodia Metelli, who *might* have visited Cisalpine Gaul when her husband was governor there and *might* have been introduced to Catullus through the offices of Caelius of Verona;[17] that in Rome Allius gave Catullus opportunity to follow out his passion;[18] that his respectable parents quarreled with him[19] because of the scandalous affair and had him sent to Bithynia in order to "cure" him; and that his savage outbursts against Memmius[20] may have been a mere diversion of the wrath which a lingering *pietas* prevented him from venting on his father. When he came back, a more experienced man with a mind broadened by travel, may he not have continued to love Lesbia, not with the old fire but with more of pity than passion,[21] so that he could not tolerate the comparison with Ameana, Mamurra's mistress?[22] Does all this not make as credible a story as the later reconstructions, which solve practically none of the quite small problems of the earlier chronology and create even more difficulties?

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[12] Poem 28. [13] Cic. *Pis.* 17. 40; cf. 40. 96.

[14] Poems 4, 31, 46; cf. poem 10.

[15] Although Ellis makes a determined effort (Prolegomena to *Commentary*) to provide for one expedition only on the part of Veranius and Fabullus, which seems to me quite unnecessary.

[16] Maas thinks it unlikely that he lived in Rome before the voyage to Bithynia: but he was known, just after, as a loafer in the forum (poem 10, l. 2); and he must have known Veranius and Fabullus before they went away under Piso, more or less contemporaneously with his own voyage; but they may have been Veronese (*CIL*, V, 3441 and 3787) and in any case might conceivably have met the poet somehow before departure, without his actually having taken up permanent residence in Rome. But if we assume that Catullus came to Rome much earlier, there is no difficulty at all.

[17] Poem 100, ll. 5–7; Clodia was in Rome at *some* time during Metellus' absence (Cic. *Fam.* v. 2. 6).

[18] Poem 68, ll. 67–69.

[19] Poem 58, l. 3, may be a hint of such a quarrel.

[20] Poem 28, ll. 7–10.

[21] Poem 75; cf. 72, ll. 3–4. [22] Poem 43, l. 7.

PROCOPIUS *DE AEDIFICIIS* i. 4. 3

In *De aed.* i. 4. 1 (ed. J. Haury [Leipzig: Teubner, 1913], p. 22, ll. 16 ff.) Procopius records the construction at Constantinople by Justinian of a Church of SS. Peter and Paul. This was near the palace called the "Palace of Hormisdas," a building originally the house of a fugitive Persian prince of the time of Constantius (Zonar. xiii. 5. 30–33) which Justinian had converted for use as his private palace before he became sole emperor (it is described again in *De aed.* i. 10. 4). Procopius continues (sec. 3):

οὗ δὴ καὶ τέμενος ἄλλο ἁγίοις ἐπιφανέσι Σεργίῳ τε καὶ Βάκχῳ ἐδείματο, καὶ ἔπειτα καὶ τέμενος ἄλλο ἐκ πλαγίου τούτῳ παρακείμενον. (sec. 4) *ἄμφω δὲ τούτω τὼ νεὼ οὐκ ἀντιπροσώπω, ἀλλ' ἐκ πλαγίας ἀλλήλοιν ἑστᾶσι, συνημμένοι τε καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἐνάμιλλοι ὄντες. . . . .*

Procopius goes on to describe the plans of the two churches, which he says were joined together (secs. 4–8); one was a basilica, the other of central plan, and they possessed a common narthex and a common atrium.

The Church of SS. Sergius and Bacchus alone has been preserved; it is of central plan and stands near the sea wall of the city, south of the hippodrome and southwest of the Great Palace (see the map in A. M. Schneider, *Byzanz* [Berlin, 1936], and *Cambr. Med. Hist.*, IV, map 47*a*, No. 18 on key).

Other literary sources show that the churches of SS. Peter and Paul and of SS. Sergius and Bacchus were near each other. The *Synaxarium ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae* (*Acta sanctorum*, LXIII, ed. H. Delehaye [Brussels, 1902]) speaks (p. 180, l. 45) of *ὁ ναὸς τῶν ἁγίων ἀποστόλων πλησίον τῆς μονῆς τῶν ἁγίων μαρτύρων Σεργίου καὶ Βάκχου*. Here, the "holy apostles" are Peter and Paul, as appears from another passage in the *Synaxarium* (p. 878, l. 4): *τὰ ἐγκαίνια τῶν ἁγίων ἀποστόλων Πέτρου καὶ Παύλου ἐν τῷ Περιτειχίῳ*. Cedrenus (i, p. 642, ll. 20–22 of Bonn ed.) writes of *τὸν ναὸν δὲ τῶν ἁγίων Σεργίου καὶ Βάκχου ἐχόμενα τοῦ παλατίου πρὸς θάλασσαν . . . . καὶ σύνεγγυς τούτου ναὸν τῶν ἁγίων ἀποστόλων*. . . . .

The editors and translators of Procopius have uniformly understood that three churches were recorded in the passage in question: (1) SS. Peter and Paul; (2) SS. Sergius and Bacchus; and (3) a third, unnamed, church which was attached to SS. Sergius and Bacchus. On the other hand, J. Ebersolt and A. Thiers (*Les Églises de Constantinople* [Paris, 1913], pp. 22–23, 26) conclude that Procopius describes only two churches and that SS. Peter and Paul and SS. Sergius and Bacchus were joined to each other. How the present text of the *De aedificiis* can be interpreted to give this meaning they do not say. Their conclusion, however, is certainly right. The text is corrupt, and its restoration (which the present writer perceived before knowing their opinion) will show that the two churches were joined to one another. The words *καὶ ἔπειτα* through *παρακείμενον* were added by a scribe who misunderstood the text. When the scribe copied the phrase *οὗ δὴ* through *ἐδείματο*, he had—perhaps distracted by the somewhat ornate and quite characteristically Procopian description of the Palace of Hormisdas—forgotten that the Church of SS. Peter and Paul had been mentioned at the opening of the chapter. The Church of SS. Sergius and Bacchus being the only church which he had in mind at the moment, he was puzzled when he read the next sentence, *ἄμφω δὲ τούτω τὼ νεώ*. . . . . Having to account for the two churches which were then described, he added *καὶ ἔπειτα* through *παρακείμενον* in order to account for the second church. It is very difficult to believe that an author so fastidious and careful as is Procopius would have written *καὶ τέμενος ἄλλο* twice in the same sentence, and it would be surprising to find him writing *ἐκ πλαγίου* and *ἐκ πλαγίας* in successive sentences. When he had to use a word for "church" several times in the same sentence or in successive sentences, Procopius was usually careful to use synonyms (e.g., *ἱερά, ἐκκλησία, νεών*, ii. 3. 26; *νεών, ἱερόν*, v. 1. 6; *ἐκκλησία, ἱερόν, νεών, ἐκκλησία*, i. 2. 13–14). Moreover, if he had written the phrase in question, we should expect to find, instead of *τέμενος ἄλλο*, at least *τ. τρίτον* or *τ. ἕτερον*. Finally, there is no other instance, in the description of the churches of Justinian at Constantinople (i. 1–9) in which Procopius fails to give the name of a church which he mentions.

If the phrase *καὶ ἔπειτα* through *παρακείμενον* is deleted, Procopius' account is archeologically much more satisfactory. The Church of SS. Peter and Paul, designed to be a rival of the older Roman basilicas of St. Peter and of St. Paul, must have played an important part in Justinian's effort to build a New Rome, so that we should be surprised to find it merely mentioned and not described, as is the case in the hitherto accepted text of the *De aedificiis;* and it is natural to find that the text, as reconstituted here, shows that the church was a basilica.

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SENECA *EPISTULAE* 14. 8

Cum peteres Siciliam, traiecisti fretum. temerarius gubernator contempsit austri minas, ille est enim qui Siculum pelagus exasperet et in vertices cogat; non sinistrum petit litus, sed it a quo propior Charybdis maria convolvit.

sed itaquo Q sed ita quo LMPb set id quo *primo* p *dein* sed it quo sed id a quo *P. Thomas* (*sic Hense Beltrami Préchac*) sed id quo *vulgo olim*

The reading of the manuscripts seems better than the emendation, which is apparently a correction of the old vulgate. For the form *it* in Seneca, cf. *Ep.* 18. 3 and 94. 63; for the construction, cf. *Ep.* 74. 4: *quisquis ab igne propior stetit.*

Recognition that *it* is a verb may help clarify another problem raised in this passage. For *petit* Schweighäuser suggested *petiit,* which Beltrami accepts, printing *petît* (so also Préchac). The form *it* can be either present or perfect, but the rarity of the contracted form in the perfect (cf. Rubenbauer, *TLL,* Vol. V, Part 2, Fasc. 4 [1934], col. 627, ll. 33 ff.) is an argument in favor of taking both verbs as present.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Oedipe, ou la légende du conquérant. By MARIE DELCOURT. ("Bibliothèque de la faculté de philosophie et lettres de l'Université de Liége," Fasc. CIV.) Paris: Librairie E. Droz, 1944. Pp. xxiii+262+9 pls. Fr. 150.

A new book-size treatment of the Oedipus legend is an event to attract attention among mythologists. Robert's two-volume *Oidipus* is, to be sure, now over forty years old and was of too highly controversial a character ever to be entirely satisfactory. Many, including the present reviewer, have found much fault with Robert, but none had hitherto attempted to redo his work. The reader is, then, prepared for some new departures in interpretation, since there is certainly little to be expected on the historical side; and he is not disappointed. This interpretation is new and departs radically from familiar channels of thought on the subject.

It is difficult to state briefly the thesis of Miss Delcourt's discursive chapters, and that, perhaps, is one of the weaknesses of the book—that all the thought expended is never quite brought to focus and that the ideas suggested, rather than presented, remain correspondingly nebulous. She sets out with the avowed intention of demonstrating that there was originally no Oedipus; that there were only themes, which, as they came to be related, became the deeds of Oedipus and that out of these grew his life and then his character; and, finally, that the themes are in origin ritualistic. "Oedipus is neither a historical figure nor a minor deity who was early humanized. He is the very typification of heroes of essentially, if not purely, ritualistic origin, whose deeds are antecedent to their personality" (pp. xii f.).

We have to do, then, with an interpretation on the basis of "ritual survival." Miss Delcourt expresses her view as to the origin of myth in the following terms:

> A religious myth is an attempt to explain a reality which is felt to be mysterious, and is often, but not always, a ritual in decay. The explanation is characterized by a personification which transforms the emotion common to all the audience of the myth into a remarkable event. This remarkable experience, as soon as it is set up as an example to be followed, is colored by an *affectus* from which results a potentiality of action upon the whole group which accepts it [p. 223].

This is "ritual survival" of a special kind. Myths are not viewed as etiologies, as explanations of practices of forgotten significance, but as conservative propaganda designed to help preserve a practice already on the verge of falling into desuetude. Myths so produced must obviously soon lose their proper significance with the passing of the practice or belief which they support; but in their survival they find new applications or are modified to suit changed conditions.

The rituals or practices which Miss Delcourt seeks to divine (a word of which she is inordinately fond) behind the façade of the Oedipus legend are naturally of immemorial antiquity, and little short of divination could hope to penetrate to them. The hazards of such a venture are clear to the author. She observes: "The trouble is that the cases are rare in which it is possible to detect beneath the transcription into mythical language rites which are well known"; and, further: "The difficulties begin when one divines in a myth a correspondence to practices of which ancient Greece preserved little or no memory, and which are not attested except for other countries" (p. xiii). The admission of such insurmountable difficulties with a method may serve as a *captatio benevolentiae* but cannot throw any philologist off the scent or take the place of convincing demonstration. We can only observe how these principles are applied.

The sources of the Oedipus legend are discussed in a brief section of the Introduction (pp. xv–xxiii). About them Miss Delcourt is remarkably optimistic, stating that "the sources from which we derive our knowledge of the legend are easily decipherable." She de-

votes these pages to a discussion of the famous Pisander *scholium* (Eurip. *Phoen.* 1760), which she believes is a résumé of an abridgment of a poem of the Cycle, an opinion not surprisingly different from that generally held (see my article "Oidipus," *RE*, XVII, 2106). One's confidence in the author's ability to handle the sources is somewhat shaken by finding that she understands *ἠγνόει υἱὸν ὄντα* as though it were *ἀνεγνώριζε υἱὸν ὄντα* and finds fault with the *scholium* here for not saying precisely what it does say. This feeling of distrust is not alleviated when she presses *ἐξεναρίξας* (*Il.* xi. 273) to mean "tua et dépouilla," where it certainly cannot be so pressed for evidence of Oedipus' having taken spoils from his father after killing him.

Chapter i treats the theme of the exposure. In the exposure of Semiramis, Cyrus, Perseus, Telephus, etc., the author would find as a common factor the central idea of a legitimization by ordeal, whereby the accuser is condemned if the accused is saved. The oracular motivation for the accuser, as in the case of Acrisius, would be the addition of a later age, which misunderstood the necessity for the condemnation of the accuser to satisfy a primitive sort of poetic justice. This train of thought would, then, be one of the tributaries forming the Oedipus exposure theme. Another would be that represented by the practice of exposing deformed or maleficent progeny, as in the case of the confused story of Cypselus in Herodotus. Yet a third is the retreat of adolescents to the mountains, preliminary to initiatory ceremonies, as represented by the myth of the youth of Jason. As a substratum underlying these three components is found the thought that each form of ordeal renders the subject worthy of the power that he later attains. Miss Delcourt believes, then, that Oedipus was originally a deformed infant and that his name was either originally devised to indicate this or else that, while the name was not originally significant, it was later so explained to fit the story. The name Labdacus, like that of Labda in the Cypselus story, would be of similar origin and that of Laius would be due to his concern for the people of the state in exposing a maleficent infant. The ordeal of legitimacy would aid in explaining the mythologically unusual fact of the exposure by the child's own father.

There can be no objection to the belief that any given mythological theme is the resultant of the interaction of a multiplicity of influences, but it is impossible, as Miss Delcourt herself remarks, to derive anything from hypotheses based on other hypotheses. Not one of these beliefs or practices, save the bare fact of exposure, is vouched for by any direct evidence for any period in the history of Greece. Similarly, there is no objection to understanding the name Oedipus to mean *Pied-contrefait*, but then, if his exposure is to be understood as a transcription of the practice of exposing deformed infants, there is nothing so absolutely unintelligible in this theme as to make it necessary for Greeks of any period to explain it by reference to any oracle or anything else.

We are introduced to the subject of the parricide in chapter ii by the statement: "A judgment of God always results in a condemnation. If it turns to the advantage of the accused, it is the accuser who must perish" (p. 66). The development of this thesis follows. As in the case of Acrisius, the accuser's enmity is explained by an oracle, and the crime of parricide is lessened, as by Perseus' lack of murderous intent. Still, the parricide of Oedipus is not glozed over in our versions, precisely because it was dictated by an older tradition which showed a hostility between father and son, a hostility which cannot be explained merely on the basis of the exposure theme. In such myths the enmity of father and son (or father-in-law and son-in-law) is invariably accompanied by a contest for power. The struggle between father and son springs from a ritual, that of mortal combat which, in primitive societies, allows the young king to succeed the old king. The family relationship of such mythical contestants is secondary and is an addition from the time when patrilinear succession had become firmly established. "The ritual of succession by murder seems to have disappeared totally in Greece of the historical period" (p. 74). How, then, one might ask, are we to know anything of it? "In any case it has left traces in the legends. These, in the form in

which we find them, all date from a period when sons regularly inherited the titles and property of their fathers" (p. 75). A convincing enough sort of argument if the evidence were capable of no other interpretation or if it were even reasonably certain that this interpretation might be correct. In the first place, I cannot be convinced that the state in which we find Laertes living in the *Odyssey* must be explained by his having been ousted by Odysseus. Pheres, Cadmus, and Peleus are likewise examples of former kings living in retirement, but there is no trace of the rivalry between generations. Conversely, in the myths discussed as showing a conflict between generations, there is either no murder or no seizure of power. In the case of Pelops and Oenomaus there is no murder. If the tale of Phorbas, who stopped wayfarers near Delphi and killed them if they could not answer his questions, until he, in turn, was killed by Apollo, can be of any possible significance here, why not also drag in Sciron and Procrustes? Procrustes might be useful in such a scheme! Heracles kills Eurytus but wins no kingdom. Jason regains his rightful kingdom, but there is no murder. Telegonus kills Odysseus but wins no kingdom. The succession of Zeus to Cronus is a case in point but can hardly, by itself, rescue so desperate an argument. Finally, the author ventures on the dangerous ground of the encounter at the crossroads and emerges, leaning on the staff of Apollodorus' statement that both Oedipus and Laius were mounted on chariots, to propound the theory that originally the contest between the two took the form of a chariot race, such as that between Pelops and Oenomaus.

Closely connected with this theme of the conquest of power is that of the marriage to the "princess" which is dealt with in chapter v. This theme again is treated as an isolated cell containing elements of diverse origins. The thesis here asserted is that "the winning of power is associated with marriage" (p. 184). The matriarchal explanation of this is rejected. The attitude adopted is that the right to marriage was primitively associated with initiatory rites which qualified youths for membership in the tribe. Traces of this are sought in myths which present tests that confer the hand of the princess along with royal power. Typical of the sort of circular reasoning which the author decries in others and which is the essence of this whole book is the following: "What can have been the concrete significance of these tests by which youths demonstrated their fitness for marriage or the exercise of power or both? Again we have to guide us only the stories, which we must interpret with caution" (p. 169). We know of the tests only from myths and must interpret them on the basis of the same myths!

Two types of story are singled out for special consideration. First, there is the race to win the bride (represented by Atalanta), reflecting simple nuptial rites, and, second, the kidnaping of the bride (represented by Hippodameia), reflecting marriage rites combined with a rite for the conquest of power. Perseus' winning of Andromeda by killing the monster is considered as another example of the winning of power along with the bride, but no power is thus won by Perseus. Neither does Heracles win any by the rescue of Hesione ("Laodamia," p. 184, must be a mistake for "Hesione"), and, moreover, he does not marry her. The feature of the journey with the bride in a chariot is thought, further, to reflect the similar symbolical progress by chariot of a new king with a fertility goddess in a form of hierogamy. The tale of Pisistratus' entry into Athens with the huge maiden, Phye, is explained on this basis. As for the application of these ideas to the Oedipus legend, the marriage to Jocasta, the queen, must be separated from the theme of incest; and the mere mention of Hera Gamostolus in the Pisander *scholium* must serve to recall the hierogamic procession by chariot.

Chapter vi deals with the theme of incest. Discarding any Freudian interpretation, Miss Delcourt proceeds from Artemidorus' *Onirocritica*, with its interpretation of dreams of incest as favorable for men of political interest, since they presage taking possession of the mother-earth, to an interpretation of the incest theme in the Oedipus legend as another symbol of the conquest of power. An obvious absurdity appears in this chapter (p. 207)

when the author remarks: "An indignant man throws some object on the ground probably to call the earth to witness the injustice which is done him." As an example of this is cited the act of Achilles in throwing his scepter upon the ground in his wrath!

Whatever may be said of the rest of the book, chapter iii, "The Victory over the Sphinx" ("La Victoire sur la Sphinx") makes a definite and valuable contribution to our understanding of the legend. It is impossible to say when the Theban Φίξ came to be identified with the oriental winged lioness or when the Sphinx episode became a part of the Oedipus legend, but it has been commonly supposed that the Sphinx is, by origin at least, a creature of chthonic character (cf. my article, "Oidipus," *RE*, Suppl., VII, 770). Miss Delcourt also sees in the Sphinx a "tormented spirit" like the Keres or the Sirens. The Sphinx is referred to as a musician; she sings like the Sirens, to enchant. But something else has gone into the makeup of the Sphinx, something that had hitherto escaped notice. A close scrutiny of the graphic and plastic representations of the Sphinx with a victim shows that they do not portray a violent combat, as everyone has supposed, but rather an erotic symplegma (as can be seen with unmistakable clarity on a red-figured lecythos, No. 1607 in the National Museum in Athens) in which the youth usually appears as though spellbound. The literary versions had thrown everyone off the scent here. The Lamiae and their like are known to have had erotic proclivities, and a Siren is portrayed in a symplegma similar to those of the Sphinx on at least one monument. Miss Delcourt argues quite convincingly that this conception of the Sphinx points to the monster's having been the equivalent of an Incubus in popular imagination. An Incubus was, to be sure, male for the Romans, but obviously female for the Greeks, appearing to men in their dreams. Literature had, then, expurgated the character of the Sphinx as it had that of the Sirens.

Chapter ix deals with the riddle of the Sphinx as a separate theme. Without adducing any evidence from Greek myth, Miss Delcourt believes "that we may consider the myth of the riddle to have been influenced by beliefs underlying the mysteries." Mysteries are to be understood here in a vague sense appropriate to an early period, when

> the people must have imagined they could bestow on the living, formulae and passwords calculated to give them victory over the infernal powers. . . . . Those of the formulae which did not find any place in the teaching of the mysteries would easily have been degraded to themes of stories wherein, instead of finding himself before the Queen of the Underworld or a judge of trespasses, the initiate finds himself before a Siren or a Sphinx [p. 149].

Chapter vii attempts a history of the theme of blindness. Oedipus may originally have been only πηρός, i.e., "impotent," as a result of his union with his mother. But the inference *ex silentio* that Oedipus was not blind according to Homer or Hesiod is unjustified. The second supposition is that blindness would have been introduced as a punishment for violation of the taboo against incest, and Oedipus' blinding of himself would be due solely to Sophocles' invention. The great difficulty with the latter part of this scheme is that Aeschylus had already said as plainly as possible (*Septem* 782–84) that Oedipus did blind himself.

Some general observations on interpretation are collected in the final chapter, and the volume is concluded with appendixes on: "Legends and Cults of Twin Infants" ("Légendes et cultes d'enfants jumeaux"), "Animal Stories in Greece" ("Les Contes d'animaux en Grèce"), and "The Religious Significance of Spoils in the Homeric Poems" ("La Valeur religieuse du butin dans les poèmes homériques"). The book is well indexed and has a list of ancient authors and principal passages commented on. It is very well printed, considering the date and circumstances of publication. I have noted no more than fifteen misprints.

I hope that I have given a fair idea of this work. It has been difficult in many instances to sketch briefly the highly intangible lines of reasoning, but I have tried to give the essence of them as clearly as possible. On the whole, it must certainly be said that, while myths may be woven of multiple strands of immemorial

antiquity, chosen almost at random, because their colors seem to blend imperceptibly into one another, we cannot hope to achieve any solid results in interpretation by applying an equally capricious and unguided procedure, which depends on divination. The scholar needs the myth-maker's imagination, but he must control it by reference to solid reality, which is no concern of the myth-maker.

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L'Empire chrétien (325–395). By ANDRÉ PIGANIOL. (Vol. IV, Part II, of *Histoire romaine*, in GUSTAVE GLOTZ, *Histoire générale*.) Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1947. Pp. xvi+446. Fr. 350.

The book under review, Piganiol's recent work, *L'Empire chrétien*, belongs to the *Histoire générale*, founded by the late G. Glotz, to the section *Histoire romaine*, in which it is the second part of Volume IV. The first part of this volume, written by M. Besnier, contains a history of the Roman Empire from the period of the Severi down to the Council of Nicaea (in 325). An immediate continuation of this work, Piganiol's book describes the period from 325 to 395, i.e., from the Council of Nicaea to the death of the Emperor Theodosius I.

The book consists of four sections: an opening chapter dealing with sources and bibliography (pp. vii–xvi); a brief Introduction describing the Empire in 325 (pp. 1–21); the first and larger part of the book, entitled "Les Personnages et les événements" ("Personalities and Events"), devoted to the political and religious history of the Empire (pp. 25–272); and the second and final part, entitled "Les Institutions et la vie sociale" ("Institutions and Social Life"), treating of various aspects of the internal history of the Empire (pp. 273–422). The book is supplied with a very fine Index.

A good and reliable work covering the entire fourth century from Constantine the Great to the death of Theodosius I has long been urgently needed. Professor Piganiol has now filled this want by writing a very fine book on this subject. He is thoroughly acquainted with the original sources, which, incidentally, differ in value, often contradicting one another, and which, especially in regard to Constantine and Julian, are biased, perhaps even fabricated. He is also very well informed on secondary works in general, and in particular on the contributions produced in Europe during and after the war—contributions which have only recently begun to reach this country. His style is simple but beautiful, and with great skill he chooses for quotation the most effective passages from his sources, which add brilliancy and vivacity to his presentation of his subject.

The major part of the book is devoted to the political and religious history of the period under consideration (pp. 25–272). This aspect of the history of the fourth century has, of course, been dealt with repeatedly in various historical works by other authors. Piganiol, however, has taken into account the results of the most recent European studies and employs them critically; as a result, he has succeeded in giving a vivid picture of the politically and religiously turbulent period, and one reads his work with great interest and substantial profit.

The most important section of Piganiol's book is the second part, "Institutions and Social Life." This section, supplied with ample references to primary sources and secondary works, deals with the various aspects of the internal structure of the Empire—slavery and peasantry, landed property, industrial production, transportation, instruments of exchange (precious metals and currency), and trade. The emperor, his complicated bureaucracy, the army, the tax system and compulsory service (*les corvées—munera*), the social classes of the Empire, the constitution of the church, dogma and cults, monasticism, the expansion of Christianity, the intellectual life, the evolution of morals and the law—all these aspects, which cover practically the whole internal life of the Empire in the fourth century, are very convincingly and graphically delineated. In my opinion, this section of Piganiol's book lays a solid foundation for any further general study of the social-economic history of the later Empire. We may disagree with some of Piganiol's conceptions; we may enlarge on one or another aspect of his masterly picture; but no devia-

tion or enlargement diminishes in the least the great significance of this section for the study of the internal life of the Empire.

Several specific points made by Piganiol deserve particular mention. After describing the activities of Constantine the Great, Piganiol comes to the following conclusion: "If one considers Constantine from the point of view of the Middle Ages, it must be recognized that he gives us the first appearance of a medieval sovereign (p. 72)."[1] I wish also to point out here Piganiol's stimulating but debatable observation that Christianity was in some respects a form of Platonism accessible to the masses (p. 401). The book closes with the following statement (pp. 421–22):

> It is too convenient to pretend that at the arrival of the barbarians in the empire "everything was dead; it was an exhausted body, a corpse stretched out in its own blood" [Herder], or that the western Roman Empire was not destroyed by a brutal concussion, but "fell asleep" [*s'est endormi* (Sundwall)]. Roman civilization did not die a beautiful death [*de sa belle mort*]. It was assassinated.

In reading these lines, I am unable to resist thinking that if the western Roman Empire disappeared as a political organism, Roman civilization in some form or other continued to exist. I cannot see sufficient justification for so extreme a statement as "it was assassinated."

A few notes on Piganiol's Bibliography (pp. vii–xvi) follow: *P. viii:* Piganiol, following some recent studies, calls the lexicographer Suidas, Σοῦδα. *P. ix:* E. Sachau did not edit the *Chronicle of Arbela* but merely translated it into German; the Syriac text of the *Chronicle* had already been published by A. Mingana, in 1907. *P. ix:* The Arab historian, Tabari, is to be attributed to the tenth century rather than to the ninth (he died in 923). *P. xi:* To Piganiol's note on the *Expositio totius mundi* may be added A. Vasiliev's special study "Expositio totius mundi" (*Seminarium Kondakovianum*, VIII [1936], 1–39). *P. xi:* Piganiol mentions only the first edition of Lebeau's *Histoire du Bas-Empire;* he should also have included the second edition, revised and enlarged, by two orientalists, Saint Martin and Brosset (21 vols.; Paris, 1824–36). *P. xii:* Instead of citing the Russian edition of Vasiliev's *History of the Byzantine Empire*, which is now of no value (the first volume contains no footnotes), it would be better to cite, in addition to the French edition, the English edition (2 vols.; Madison, Wis., 1928–29); a Spanish edition came out in 1946 (Barcelona). *P. xv:* To the bibliography on religious history should be added a very important Russian book by V. Bolotov, *Lectures on the History of the Ancient Church*, Volume III: *A History of the Church in the Period of the Ecumenical Councils* (St. Petersburg, 1913). *P. 25:* To the legendary lives of Constantine and Helen may be added *Βίος καὶ πολιτεία τῶν ἁγίων θεοστέπτων μεγάλων βασιλέων καὶ ἰσαποστόλων Κωνσταντίνου καὶ Ἑλένης* (from Cod. Marc. CLXVIII), which was published in *Θεοφίλου Ἰωαννοῦ Μνημεῖα ἁγιολογικά* (Venice, 1884), pp. 164–229. See an almost unknown study written in Latin by a Russian professor, M. Kraševinnikov, "Prodromus sylloges vitarum laudationumque sanctorum, Constantini M. et Helenae matris eius Graece atque Slavice mox edendarum," Supplement to Volume I of *Revue byzantine* (*Vizantiiskoe obozrienie*) (Yuryev, 1915), pp. 122. *P. 26:* In the bibliography on the so-called "Edict of Milan" the excellent Russian work of A. Brilliantov should be mentioned, *The Emperor Constantine the Great and the Edict of Milan, 313 A.D.* (Petrograd, 1916).

To conclude, Piganiol's excellent work is of such value that it fully merits a suitable presentation in the English language.

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Observations on Familiar Statuary in Rome. By RHYS CARPENTER. ("Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome," Vol. XVIII.) New York: American Academy in Rome, 1941. Pp. 110+34 pls.

During the last fifty years a number of books on Greek sculpture have been greeted by

[1] Cf. N. H. Baynes, in the *Cambridge Ancient History*, XII (1939), 699: "Constantine sitting amongst the Christian bishops at the oecumenical council of Nicaea is in his own person the beginning of Europe's Middle Age."

enthusiastic reviewers as "the most important work since Furtwängler's *Masterpieces*." If all or most of the theses in Professor Carpenter's book are approved by posterity, it will indeed be a landmark comparable to the *Masterpieces;* and in nature it is not wholly unlike the earlier work, though Furtwängler's timid and faltering advocacy of his views offers one contrast. There is an amusing parallel in that Carpenter rebukes his predecessors, including Furtwängler, for relying too much on the ancient writers and too little on the study of existing sculptures, just as Furtwängler rebuked *his* predecessors. And there is no doubt whatever that both men were very keen observers. A broad distinction might be drawn between comparative observation of sculptures scattered over Europe, in which Furtwängler excelled, and observation of what other people have been unable to see in single pieces, which is Carpenter's specialty. Either or any kind of observation usually requires interpretation by sound judgment, in the light of broad and accurate knowledge, if it is to mark an epoch in scholarship.

The "Terme Niobid" is briefly discussed (pp. 28 f.), and it is decided that she was made not later than 440 and was not in the pediment at Bassai. This conclusion is naturally acceptable to me; my remarks to the same effect, though not published until 1943 (*AJA*, XLVII [1943], 16 f.) were written without knowledge of Carpenter's discussion. My own candidate for the pediment (*ibid.; CP*, XXXIX [1944], 48 f.) has now been fully published (*Mon. Piot*, XXXIX [1943], 49–80), along with its companion piece, by Picard, who regards the two as lateral akroteria of the Bassai temple. I had mentioned this possibility, but preferred the pediment chiefly on the assumption that the treatment of the back and the weathering would favor it; and, indeed, the treatment shown in the views of side and back published by Picard is proper especially to a pedimental figure, though it could occur in an akroterion. But the difference between these two hypotheses is of slight importance for the "Terme Niobid"; if either is right, it proves that the entire exterior of the Bassai temple was *not* completed years before the interior; and the theory thus disproved is almost a prerequisite for the attribution of the "Terme Niobid" to a pediment of the temple.

A remarkable theory is developed (pp. 30–35) about the "Esquiline Venus": that a sculptor of the Claudian period combined a Hellenistic Aphrodite type (from the waist down) with a boy athlete type of *ca.* 460 (from the waist up, including the head), with only superficial modification of the latter, in order to make what could be sold as a female nude of the fifth century. The discussion intended to show that this procedure is nothing astonishing is remarkable especially for the statement that "Greco-Roman statue-cutters were quite literally copyists and could only make statues from statues." As a universal rule, which is what it is on its face, this statement is contrary to general knowledge. As for the specific arguments on the Venus, I am not impressed by those that I feel competent to appraise; but I should record that the distinct horizontal line across the back, supposedly marking the "seam" between the two types, has been thought by competent students of anatomy, whom I have consulted, to require some explanation. Recently, a new element in the problem has appeared (Charbonneaux in *Mon. Piot*, XXXIX [1943], 35–48), a torso in the Louvre. If the "Esquiline Venus" is copied from a transitional original, the torso is another copy from the same original; if the "Venus" originated in any such manner as Carpenter believes, then the torso must be copied from the "Venus" herself. Late classicistic creations were not often copied, yet sometimes they were; so this consideration is not decisive. The head belonging to the torso was not a close copy from the head of the "Venus," as remaining bits of hair show, and neither was the support; these differences, as far as they can be seen, would be normal variations between copies from a common original. And the "seam" on the back is much less marked on the torso.

The "Spinario" is discussed on pages 35–40, with a conclusion which has been the majority view for some time—that head and body belong to types not originally associated. The chief new observation is that the neck was cast

in a separate piece, as is indicated by two fine seams which are visible "under a strong light and beneath a powerful magnifying-glass." In neither seam are the two pieces joined by tongue-and-groove, as are the right arm and both legs of the statue. Carpenter's conclusion is that the late sculptor cast a bronze head from an original of the fifth century, a bronze body from an original of the third century, and a bronze neck of his own make and soldered the three pieces together. This is an unreasonable and improbable procedure: in such a case he would surely unite his two positives in plaster by a neck in plaster or clay, and then proceed with his casting as if the model had been made in the usual way.[1] The condition that Carpenter reports in the "Spinario" indicates that the head and body were not recastings, but the pre-existing bronzes themselves. (He does not explicitly disclaim this view for the body, but apparently considers its genesis similar to that of the head.) Thus the problem again arises, whether the head is an original of the fifth century. Carpenter presents, and indeed emphasizes, an observation of interest in this connection: that the eyes of the "Spinario" were fixed in place from the inside, as was customary before the first century B.C. There appears to be no evidence against the head as an original, unless in the "exaggerated projection of the upper eyelids beyond the lower." The exaggeration does not seem great, but would not be surprising; it would be analogous to the practice of some vase-painters in the second quarter of the fifth century, who, delighted at having learned to draw profile eyes, draw them even in frontal faces.

Illustrations are provided of the marble head in the Museo Mussolini (what is the present name of this collection?), which is declared a copy from the same original as the "Spinario" head. Ordinary photographs of the "Spinario" do not show the head well; the best published illustrations of the head, as far as I know, are those from a cast, published in the *Archaeologische Zeitung* for 1883. A comparison between them and the pictures of the Museo Mussolini head shows that the two heads have nothing in common except the general arrangement of the hair. The hair is not similar in detail, and nothing else is similar at all. It is naturally impossible to be sure that the maker of the marble head was not acquainted with the Spinario type, but his product has no value for the study of the bronze.

In the discussion there are several passages which, though unimportant for the argument, disturb the reader by looseness of thought or of expression. "The head was cast separately and therefore the traces of the peculiar attachment of the head to the neck must refer to the original assemblage of the statue and not to some supposed repair." "Could" should be substituted for "must," since the separate casting of the head is no guaranty against damage. Carpenter objects to Kluge's view that heads were cast separately in order that the eyes could be set from within, apparently without noting that Kluge was also considering cases in which only the upper part of the head was separate, which hardly admit any other explanation. And he rebukes Kluge for supposing that the head of the "Spinario" was knocked off, whereas, if I am not mistaken, Kluge means that a head previously worn by the statue had been knocked off.

In the discussion of the "Ludovisi Throne" (pp. 41–61), attention is called to the fact that the reliefs are slightly mutilated by the cuttings for the corner-pieces; and it is concluded that small corner-pieces were planned but that larger ones, requiring larger cuttings, were eventually used. "Something was intended to fill and cover these triangular fields, and that something ultimately demanded more space than had been foreseen" (p. 43). This section is one of the most interesting in the book. Some of it makes hard reading, though the matter singled out by the author (p. 45) as "a very subtle point, which I almost despair of making clear," seems simple enough, unless I have missed it altogether. Also I am neither baffled nor astonished by the exposition to the effect that the strip of blank space remaining at the bottom, in the central part of the front of the Throne, does not represent water or anything else. But if "the rocky slopes imply noth-

[1] I have had the privilege of discussing this matter with Professor Ulrich Middeldorf and with Mr. and Mrs. F. C. Hibbard, who are both experienced sculptors.

ing whatever as to the character of the material world where the cloth hangs suspended," then rocky slopes ought to be commoner than they are in Greek relief.

It is not clear whether Carpenter believes that there were smaller cuttings at the corners, preceding the present ones. Von Gerkan found an extension of the cutting on the wing with the flute-player, more roughly done than the rest; but this difference is ignored by Carpenter, for whom all the existing cuttings belong to the "final field." Apparently, then, there is no evidence for earlier cuttings; but, if this is so, there appears to be no evidence that any separate ornaments at the corners, vegetabiliar or other, were present or planned in an earlier scheme. The evidence for any revision consists only in the encroachment of the present cuttings on the sculptures (certainly the anathyrosis on the bottom is no reinforcement), and it is questionable whether this evidence is valid. It is hardly conceivable that any circumstances could really have *required* corner-pieces of any specific size; it must have been by oversight that pieces were made which necessitated the adjustments, and this could have happened at one time as well as at another. It is Carpenter's hypothesis that his later and larger corner-pieces corresponded pretty closely to those of the Boston "Throne"; but this appears to be purely conjectural, even if all his antecedent assumptions be accepted. The subject matter of the reliefs is discussed, and the conclusions are in part convincing; it may be remarked that a white-ground pyxis in Ancona (*Rivista del R. Istituto d'archeologia e storia dell'arte*, VIII [1940], 45 ff.) may be regarded as supporting the interpretation as the birth of Aphrodite, but hardly justifies it.

The "Thusnelda" of the Loggia dei Lanzi is found to be a copy of a Medea by Polykleitos, which is imitated also in a Peliad (not Medea) in the Peliad relief in the Lateran. The identification as Medea could be right, but it would hardly be a fifth-century Medea; and there appears to be no connection with the figure in the Lateran relief. I am glad to find Carpenter among those—the majority party in recent years—who assign the "Capitoline Amazon" to Polykleitos, but I cannot see a cogent resemblance between the Amazon head and the head of "Thusnelda." Specifically, the Amazon's hair, with its remarkable interlacing locks, is totally unlike Thusnelda's, for which the best parallel that I have observed is the hair of the Soranzo "Eros." (That is fifth century, to be sure, but not Polykleitan.) The long, isolated locks on the forehead are hardly paralleled in the fifth century, though somewhat similar ones are common enough later ("Eros of Centocelle," "Vatican Melpomene").

The remainder of the book may be summarized in a series of brief propositions. The "Lateran Marsyas" is not copied after Myron but from an original of the late fifth or fourth century; so also the "Protesilaos," the "Pollux," and the "Perseus" head sometimes ascribed to Myron. The Subiaco youth is copied from an original a few decades earlier than Myron's diskobolos. The Anzio maiden is copied from the *epithyusa* of Phanis. Glyptic sculpture gave way to plastic sculpture about 200 B.C. The Belvedere torso is Marsyas, and a colossal draped fragment probably belonged to an Apollo that accompanied it. Studniczka's Menander is really Vergil (I am beginning to believe it). The "Hellenistic Prince" of the Terme is probably Lucullus, perhaps by Arkesilaos. More recently (*AJA*, XLIX [1945], 353–57) he has been identified by Carpenter as Sulla; and this is combined with a remarkable hypothesis, according to which the "Prince" and the bronze boxer of Apollonios originally belonged to a group representing Amykos and the Dioskouroi.

Of course, these brevities give no idea of Carpenter's discussions, and, indeed, the fuller comments above give only a very inadequate idea. The book abounds in alert observation and ingenious suggestion, and it is written in a beguiling style which requires the reader to keep his wits about him if he is to weigh the evidence. A great deal of the evidence cannot be appraised without a trip to Rome or to a really good collection of casts; the latter would have some advantage for comparative study but has the preponderant disadvantage that no good collection of casts exists anywhere on

earth. The author did his best to provide illustrations; they are numerous and evidently chosen with care, and the photographs were excellent, but the reproduction is not very good. However, the study of sculpture from photographs, no matter how good they are, is a business full of pitfalls.

This review is not so tardy as might be supposed, for the war made copies of the book very scarce until recently. It is safe to say that it has been eagerly studied, and will be for years, by specialists all over the world.

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La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, Vol. I: *L'Astrologie et les sciences occultes*. By [A.-J.] FESTUGIÈRE, O.P. ("Études bibliques.") Paris, 1944. Pp. xii+424.

This notable work on Hermes Trismegistos deserves a wider audience than its rather forbidding title might invite. Father Festugière has written a thorough and authoritative study of a movement which is little known even to many classicists. Yet for an understanding of later antiquity this movement is important, both in itself and because it is symptomatic of a new and pervasive frame of mind. The introductory chapters, in particular, should be of interest to anyone who is concerned with the intellectual history of Europe.

The modern world, in considering its heritage from classical antiquity, thinks of the achievements of Greece—whether in literature, the fine arts, or philosophy—primarily as expressions of the power and supreme value of human reason. The Greek mind at its best sought, above all, to understand and to set forth, in whatever medium was appropriate, a picture of the world and of man himself that was ordered, clear, and intelligible. It is this aim, no less than the things achieved by it, which typifies for us the Hellenic spirit.

Yet we must not fall into the error of seeing in Hellenism nothing but a rationalism pure and unalloyed. Nonrational movements and tendencies existed at all periods of Greek history, at times far below the surface, again clearly apparent to our view. Hermetism was such a movement. Though predominantly Greek in its development, it appears notably un-"Hellenic" in so far as it represents a turning-aside from the characteristic Greek emphasis on reason. Men still sought the truth, and sought it passionately; but many had despaired of finding it in the old way.

The Hermetic literature is part of a considerable body of writings of revelation which enjoyed an increasing vogue in the early centuries of the Christian era. As men lost faith in the efficacy of human reason to chart their path in this world and the next, they turned to a type of wisdom which purported to be divinely revealed and which was above, or beyond, the realm of reason. Pythagoras and (strangely) Democritus emerge as prophets of such "wisdom," but even greater appeal attached to the names of oriental sages, more remote in time and distance. It was in the guise of revelations by Egyptian, Jewish, Persian, Chaldean, and Indian prophets or gods that most of this material gained currency. Festugière is here concerned with those writings which relate to the Egyptian god Thoth, identified by the Greeks with Hermes. The present volume deals with the earlier "popular" Hermetic writings, those on astrology and the occult sciences. A second volume will carry on the study to include the theological and philosophical works, such as the *Corpus Hermeticum*, of which an edition by Festugière and A. D. Nock is now appearing in the Budé collection. The completion of these two works will constitute a major contribution to the knowledge of later antiquity.

The first four chapters of the present work, admirably Gallic in clarity, perception, and brevity, serve as an introduction to the entire Hermetic movement. The second century of our era was crucial for the future course of the Western world, and its intellectual and spiritual atmosphere is here brilliantly portrayed. It was an age when Hellenism seemed supreme, the age which set and defined the content of a "liberal education" for the next thousand years. It was also (though Festugière does not discuss this) the age in which Christianity gained a strong and enduring foothold. And it

was the age when the reaction against the rational humanism of Greece made itself strongly felt. The opening chapter of the book is appropriately entitled "Le Déclin du rationalisme."

A chapter on "Les Prophètes de l'Orient" brings out the characteristics which were, for the most part indiscriminately, ascribed to the reputed authors of this type of literature. Never, perhaps, was the oriental "mirage," which had fascinated the Greeks from at least the time of Herodotus, stronger in appeal than at this period and in this milieu. "La Vision de Dieu" makes clear, by a number of examples, how the visions were obtained and what they were intended to reveal. From the traditional oracles men had sought foreknowledge of specific facts and events affecting them as individuals; from these visions they now sought to obtain a revealed doctrine, whether of religion, of morality, or even of science. We are so familiar with the idea of *religious* revelation that we are likely to forget that it was not a normal part of the Hellenic tradition. More startling to us is such a revelation as that obtained by a certain Thessalos from the god Asklepios: dissatisfied with the medical results of his use of the *Book of Nechepso*, Thessalos prevailed upon an Egyptian priest to produce for him a vision of the god, provided himself with paper and ink for the occasion, and emerged from the interview with the treatise *On Plants Subject to the Twelve Signs of the Zodiac and to the Seven Planets!*

In the final introductory chapter Festugière traces the development of Hermes Trismegistos, and his emergence as a figure to whom revelations were ascribed. There is no clear evidence that the temples of Egypt had, under the Pharaohs, any collection of writings attributed to Thoth. From the Ptolemaic period on, however, there was a Hermetic literature *in Greek*, some parts of which may go back to the third century B.C. By whom was this literature composed, and for whom? Festugière disposes effectively of the older view that there were Hermetic conventicles, for whom the *Corpus Hermeticum* constituted a devotional book, a theory which would not in any case account for the secular Hermetic writings. Hermetism was a *literary* phenomenon; there was no Hermetic "church." Even the philosophical writings form a unity only by their attribution to Hermes, which gave them the prestige of a great name and the warrant of revelation; and there is nothing essential which distinguishes the occultism of Hermes from that of any other of the oriental prophets. Nor, apart from the settings and from certain elements in the astrological treatises, is there anything that is specifically Egyptian. The writings do not represent the ancient priestly lore of Egypt. Whether, then, the actual authors were Hellenized native priests or Greeks resident in Egypt is relatively unimportant.

Most of the remainder of the volume is a detailed consideration of those parts of the literature which deal with astrology and the occult sciences. Much of this is now fragmentary, and Festugière's task is, in part, one of reconstruction. Inevitably, much of the minute analysis which this entails will concern only the specialist. It is, however, an outstanding merit of the work that Festugière never loses sight of the larger framework. And even the details are not without interest, in view of the fact that much of this material was held in esteem down through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance and was used by the occult practitioners, the Dr. Fausts, of those ages.

The fundamental occult science was astrology. The others fall into three divisions: those in the fields of the natural sciences and medicine, alchemy, and magic. In the Hellenistic period it was chiefly works of astrology which were ascribed to Hermes. Festugière gives a brief but illuminating account (pp. 89–101) of the principles of Hellenistic astrology, which he characterizes as an amalgam of a seductive philosophical theory, an absurd mythology, and scientific methods ingeniously misapplied. Equally brilliant is the passage (pp. 189–97) in which he contrasts the aims and methods of the Aristotelian scientists with those of the Hellenistic and Greco-Roman *physikoi*. Where Aristotelian science was disinterested and speculative, the pseudo-sciences, on the contrary, were intensely practical and utilitarian; interest centered in *mirabilia* and in the occult properties of particular things

by a knowledge of which men hoped to work their ends. And since these properties and affinities could not be discovered save by revelation, the distinction between science and religion finally disappeared.

Analysis of the literary fictions employed (chap. ix) shows that the form used for the writings of occult Hermetism was one long current in Egypt and that from popular Hermetism it was later adopted for the writings of philosophical Hermetism. A brief concluding chapter highlights some of the major results of the study. There are several appendixes, including one by Louis Massignon on Arabic Hermetic literature.

The scholarly world owes a debt of gratitude to Father Festugière for undertaking a task as difficult as it has proved rewarding. All readers of this first volume will wish him success in the completion of his undertaking.

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The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man: An Essay on Speculative Thought in the Ancient Near East. By H. and H. A. FRANKFORT, JOHN A. WILSON, THORKILD JACOBSEN, and WILLIAM A. IRWIN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946. Pp. vii+401. $4.00.

Aristotle says somewhere that the educated layman ought to be able to judge correctly the explanations given by specialists. This Aristotelian assumption is the sole qualification of the reviewer to speak of this volume, written by eminent orientalists in the University of Chicago. The rather clumsy title conceals the importance of this symposium. Following, without being aware of it, as it seems, the Hellenistic idea that the "Barbarians" uttered their philosophy in myths, "in the manner of riddle" (Diog. Laert. *Proem.* 6), the authors try to understand oriental mythology as an interpretation of the cosmos. They explain to the general reader the conception of the world as expressed in oriental speculations about the nature of the universe, the functions of the state, and the values of life. Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the Hebrews, are dealt with by Wilson, Jacobsen, and Irwin, respectively, while Mrs. and Mr. Frankfort provide an "Introduction" and a "Conclusion."

Any meager summary cannot do justice to the attraction of this new and learned approach to the understanding of the ancient Near East. The volume is a sequence of interrelated interpretations and observations, which, together, give a new integrated view of the subject. Of course, you may pick up in this book the idea that the Egyptian cosmos, like the Nile Valley, "had limited space but reassuring periodicity" (p. 60) and that in the Sumerian mythology the universe was conceived of as a state (p. 130); but such formulae do not reveal very much of the substance, let us say, of sixty pages describing "The Cosmos as a State." Let us rather quote the book at random. We read, for instance, that "with relation to gods and men, the Egyptians were monophysites: many men and many gods, but all ultimately of one nature" (p. 66). Is it accidental that the monophysite doctrine, confounding the divine and human natures in Christ, was rooted in Egypt and has remained the belief of the Coptic church? In the admirable chapter on "the values of life," as seen by the Egyptians (pp. 93–119), a historian is pleased to discover how the same topic was dealt with in two different phases of Egyptian civilization. An earlier writer stresses the fact that even the wise men, Imhotep and Hardedef, have passed away, "as if they had never been" (p. 104). A later author answers that these wise men "are gone and forgotten, but their names, through [their] writing cause them to be remembered." He adds: "Books of Wisdom were their pyramids" (p. 118). If I am not mistaken, that is the earliest occurrence of the Horatian *exegi monumentum.* Like the ode of Horace, the Egyptian thought of a writer's immortality is fundamentally different from the Greek conception that the bards keep alive the memory of heroes and their deeds. One would like to know how this new attitude to literature was connected with the profound change in the whole outlook of the Egyptian of the later age, who was now required "to emphasize his conformance to the national patterns of obedience" (p. 114). The Sumerian

myths, on the other hand, show that obedience to authority was regarded as a principal virtue from the very beginning of the Mesopotamian civilization (p. 202). One understands that the nonconformism of Hebrew prophets and Greek philosophers would have been out of place between the Tigris and the Euphrates or on the banks of the Nile.

According to the authors, the basis of thinking in the ancient Near East was the conception of the phenomenal world as a "Thou." The distinction between subjective and objective, or our contrast between reality and appearance, was meaningless for the Ancient Man. He did not know impersonal and mechanical causality. "The primitive man simply does not know an inanimate world" (p. 5). I am afraid that, even in this new metamorphosis, the "animistic" or "prelogical" man of anthropological theories will still appear to the reader as a fiction produced by modern scholars. To put it bluntly: A man for whom the difference between an act and a symbolic performance was meaningless (p. 12) never walked on the face of the earth. Macaulay humorously describes how even a plain man, who never heard of Bacon, nevertheless uses the Baconian rules of induction when he wishes to discover the dish which has provoked indigestion. Likewise, a caveman already used the logical principle of contradiction; he knew that a stone, which had just missed his enemy, cannot be and not be at the same time in his hand. In Mesopotamia "it was thought possible for a man to achieve partial identity with other gods and thus share in their natures and abilities" (p. 133). But the man who identified his neck with "the necklace of the goddess Ninlil" surely continued to protect his body with a shield in a skirmish. The charm could protect him only from attacks by witchcraft (p. 133). In so far as the "mythopoeic" thought was not fabricated and propagated for the benefit of the rulers of the society (e.g., p. 80: the power of the Pharaoh to control the Nile), it existed in the ancient world, as it does in our own beliefs, just to the extent of the unknown. The Edwin Smith Medical Papyrus contains very rational prescriptions of an Egyptian surgeon in forty-seven cases of wounds and fractures of intelligible origin. But the same physician quotes a charm in the forty-eighth case, where the cause of injury is unknown to him. An Egyptian text admirably defines the essence of the "mythopoeic" idea. God, the Creator of all, says the Egyptian, "made for men magic as weapon to ward off [evil] events" (A. Gardiner, *Jour. Egypt. Arch.*, 1914, p. 34). So far as Ancient Man was able to exercise control over his environment, for him as for "modern, scientific man" the phenomenal world was "primarily an 'It' " (p. 4). The builders of the Pyramids did not treat stones as living persons. Generally speaking, the authors of the symposium too easily succumb to the modern myth that Ancient Man must have been an irrational and mystic being. The Egyptians put in the tombs model loaves of bread made of wood. That is presented as a proof of the thesis that "to the ancient Egyptian the elements of the universe were consubstantial" (p. 63). What about the metallic wreaths we lay on the tombs? Does that mean that we believe in the principle of substitution and, besides, suppose that the dead retain a taste for fragrance? As a penetrating French sociologist, fallen in this war, put it: "To himself man appears as a technicist, to the others as a creator of rites" (Charles Le Cœur, *Le Rite et l'outil* [Paris: Alcan, 1939], p. 62). But is it really necessary to belabor the point after Bergson's unforgettable pages on the function of "extra-mechanical" causality in our life?

The scientific thought, the speculation in which myth was overcome in principle, was, of course, created by the Ionian philosophers in the sixth century B.C. The "Conclusion" of the symposium eloquently restates this fact, and a Hellenist is naturally pleased to lay stress on this homage paid to the Greek spirit. But in this stimulating chapter on the "Emancipation of Thought from Myth" (pp. 363–88), I miss a hint that the Miletus of Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes was a dependency of Lydia; that Heraclitus was subject of Darius of Persia; that for Xenophanes the appearance of the Medi in Ionia (that is 546 B.C.) was an event of contemporary history. Ionian craftsmen worked for Nebuchadnezzar and at Babylon rubbed shoulders with Egyptians and Indians,

Jews and Elamites. Greek intellectuals gathered at the court of Croesus. Since Aramaic, by which the peoples of the Near East communicated from the seventh century on, was used also in Lydia, it is inconceivable that the Ionians should have remained ignorant of oriental knowledge. We have learned recently that medical observations of Egyptian physicians found their way into the Hippocratic corpus (E. Iversen, "Papyrus Carlsberg No. VIII," *Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, Hist.-fil. Meddelelser*, Vol. XXVI, No. 5 [1939].) Thales may never have sat at the feet of Egyptian teachers, but the Egyptian priest who claimed an Egyptian source for Thales' idea that water is the origin of things (Plut. *De Is. et Os.* 34) had more historical sense than these modern skeptics who deny the possibility of such dependence. The Ionian philosophers were also, and before all, technicians and scientists. They could not fail, for instance, to learn astronomy from the Babylonians and the Egyptians, who, as Aristotle says (*De caelo* 292 a), had watched the stars from the remotest times. But for the Egyptians, Nun was the primordial waters out of which life came (p. 45); for the Mesopotamians, Marduk created the cosmos from the primeval waters. Thales replaced gods by material causes. "The astonishing novelty" (p. 378) of his approach may be more easily understood if we remember that the gods he left out of the cosmogony were not his gods. In Babylonia, cosmic myths were a part of the ritual; in Greece, Hesiodic cosmogony was Hesiod's private speculation. If Thales depended on oriental sources, he could not help dropping out of his speculation Nun, Marduk, etc., who were for him but names void of meaning. In the same way the names of planets were changed in Greek. "Nabu" became "a star of Hermes" (F. Cumont, *Ant. Cl.*, 1935, p. 11), since the Greeks did not worship the celestial bodies. The Greeks made use of oriental knowledge but separated it from oriental myths because the Gods acting in these myths were aliens.

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École Libre des Hautes Études
New York

The Odes of Pindar. Translated by Richmond Lattimore. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947. Pp. xii+170. $2.75.

The "trend toward materialism" is notoriously pulling North American culture away from classical studies. Far less often deplored is its potency within the circle of those studies themselves: classicists are far more usually archeologists than they are students of literature; and Greek poetry today wins hardly more real appreciation from scholars than poetry in general finds among the Philistines. For this reason Professor Lattimore's translation deserves welcome, because each new book on Pindar increases the likelihood that some young student may desire to know and love the most glorious lyrics ever sung.

But, alas, with utter good will and the most vigorous sympathy for a fellow-Pindarist, I can see scarcely any other reason for publishing this book. Written in vers libre, it naturally lacks the poetical charm of (for example) Billson's rendering into rhymed verse; and it does not attain the exactness of Sandys' prose version. Nor is it remarkably good as vers libre. To be sure, it surpasses most of the compositions in that medium which are being put forth nowadays. But that is no prodigious feat. Vers libre has degenerated into a convenient device for scribblers too lazy or incompetent to make the effort demanded by rhyme and verse-rhythm. No doubt some fine compositions have been so written: Matthew Arnold's *Strayed Reveller* and the most characteristic of Robinson Jeffers' works are masterpieces. But—to be pedantic in a good cause—the moment sooner or later arrives when one contemplates these successes with a certain ruefulness, since their power and skill conceal the fact, which otherwise must have been clear from the outset, that vers libre is humbug—not a true literary form at all but merely imaginative prose chopped into arbitrary lengths. How does Arnold's poem differ from his magical prose translation of Maurice de Guérin's *Centaur*?

Considered purely as a book of vers libre, Professor Lattimore's work (I repeat) stands far above the contemporary ruck. But it is a translation, and in this respect shows grave

weaknesses. This much, after all, can be said for vers libre translation, that, since you have bidden both rhyme and verse-rhythm good-bye, you are so unfettered that you can keep no less close to your original than if you were writing prose (as, in fact, you are). But again and again our translator diverges from Pindar—though, I admit, only in details. A good example awaits us on the threshold (*Ol.* 1. 1): *ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ*, "best of all things is water." Why "of all things"? Some have held that Pindar has in mind the doctrine of Thales and means "best of the elements." This is doubtful but should warn us against inserting, here or elsewhere, comment in a translation. In *Pyth.* 11. 35, *νέα κεφαλά* becomes "young head of a kingdom," the last phrase being inserted and untrue. Such things, though I would lay little stress on each, are too numerous. Further, one often looks in vain for help in passages which it is hard, perhaps impossible, to translate adequately. (This brings up the whole question whether Pindar can be translated at all, on which I have said quite enough elsewhere, and which I refuse to employ as a cudgel upon Professor Lattimore.) Having myself made a big effort in vain, I should have been immensely grateful for a good version of that magnificent phrase (*Pyth.* 4. 295) *θυμὸν ἐκδόσθαι πρὸς ἥβαν*. But "give over his heart to gladness" will not do at all. Way's attempt at least renders *ἥβαν*: "yield his heart to the joyance of youthfulness." In *Nem.* 1. 1, *ἄμπνευμα σεμνὸν Ἀλφεοῦ* presents another kind of difficulty. As a Freshman I heard Sandys recite by instalments his version of Pindar and clearly remember my distress at "Sacred spot where Alpheus came up to breathe." But Professor Lattimore's "Grave child of the waters of Alpheus" is in its own way no less objectionable. It exemplifies, moreover, another weakness (which, by the bye, is perhaps the only serious recurring fault of Sandys' translation)—that curse of English prose, the repeated "of." A strong instance occurs in this version at *Nem.* 10. 90:

ἀνὰ δ' ἔλυσεν μὲν ὀφθαλμόν, ἔπειτα δὲ φωνὰν
χαλκομίτρα Κάστορος.

"But he set free from darkness the eyes of Kastor of the brazen belt, and his voice thereafter." Would it not be easy, and better, to write "But he set free the eyes, and thereafter the voice, of bronze-belted Kastor"? Indeed, anyone who essays to translate Greek poetry into English must make a special point of collecting, and inventing, compound words.

Despite all this, Professor Lattimore does at least give us the feel of the Pindaric diction—the sense that our fingers are passing over silk, not velvet as in Billson, or linen as in Way, or tweed as in Sandys. Let me offer him some amends by quoting a passage (*Nem.* 8. 22–34) that shows this merit:

It was this that slaughtered the son of Telamon
and bent him over his own sword.
A quiet man, no talker, steadfast of heart, lies forgotten
in the rage of dispute. The great prize is given to the supple liar.
In their secret ballots the Danaans made much of Odysseus,
and Aias lost the golden armor and died struggling in his own blood.
In truth, otherwise were the gashes that in the onset
they tore in the warm flesh of their adversaries
under the spears of defense about Achilles' body,
in many another combat of those wasting
days. But hate, even then, was there with its pretexts.
It walks companion of beguiling words; it is sly and a spite that makes evil;
it violates the beautiful and brilliant
to lift up out of things obscure a glory rotten at the heart.

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Currency in Roman and Byzantine Egypt. By LOUIS C. WEST and ALLAN CHESTER JOHNSON. ("Princeton University Studies in Papyrology," No. 5.) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. Pp. ix+195. $3.00.

The authors of this valuable monograph bring an unusually happy combination of talents to bear upon an exceedingly difficult task. Dr. West contributes an exact knowledge of ancient coins and a banker's practical experience in the handling and circulation of money, while Professor Johnson is an eminent papyrologist and a recognized authority on ancient

economic problems. The result is a work of prime importance to students of papyri, of numismatics, and of the economic history of ancient Egypt. This work is not a history of Egyptian coinage from Augustus to Justinian, though it is a fundamental study for anyone who undertakes such a history; but it aims primarily to elucidate the evidence available in the papyri regarding monetary terms and methods of accounting in the light of the actually existing means of making payment in cash, and it discusses a number of problems that arise in determining what these were.

In the period from Augustus to Diocletian the monetary system of Egypt was virtually isolated. Though much gold and silver must have passed through the country, both in coins and as bullion, in the trade with the East and though her lively export trade must have brought much to her borders, the imperial gold and silver coinage did not circulate generally within them; nor did Egyptian currency circulate beyond them. Moreover, it remained a fiduciary currency. In the first two chapters the authors trace the development of the "silver" coinage in billon tetradrachms from its organization by Tiberius, the fixing of a bronze standard in relation to it, and show how the premium for conversion between silver and bronze, which was usual also outside of Egypt (see at Pergamum, *IGRP*, IV, 352) led to the establishment of a regular tariff of 27–29 obols the tetradrachm. Two incidental points may here be noted. First, on page 4 it is suggested that the reason why Caracalla abruptly discontinued in 214 all issues of "silver" and bronze from the Alexandrian mint was perhaps his introduction of the antoninianus, "although there is no evidence that this coin ever circulated in Egypt." Is it possible that his action was connected with the events which induced him to take such a bloody revenge upon the youth of Alexandria the following year (D.C. lxxviii. 22–23; Herodian iv. 6. 1, and ix. 1–8; see Rostovtzeff, *SEHRE*, p. 483 [Ital. ed.])? Second, on page 24 it is noted that, while local subsidiary coinage in most of the Empire ended abruptly under Gallienus, there appears in Egypt to be a gradual disintegration of the system after Antoninus Pius. Egypt's monetary isolation makes it difficult to apply here Bosch's explanation (*Arch. Anz.*, 1931, pp. 437 f.) that the debasement of the imperial silver coinage made it no longer profitable to issue local bronze; nor did the debasement of the Egyptian tetradrachm under Marcus Aurelius go that far (see p. 11 and Table II). Moreover, according to Tables IV and V, the process seems to involve the cessation of the bronze issues of the smallest size (identification of the denominations remains somewhat uncertain [see p. 25]), while in the same period price levels were rising (pp. 80 ff.). Possibly the smallest units became unnecessary either as small change or for the payment of taxes.

Chapters iii and iv deal with special terms, the AI KAI formula and ΡΥΠΑΡΑΙ, respectively, while chapters v and vi document fully, from the papyri, accounting practices and calculations and monetary terms and co-ordinate the evidence with the coinage itself. The brief listing of hoards in chapter vii is little more than a supplement to earlier work. In chapters viii and ix the authors turn to the larger economic problems of price levels and of exchange outside Egypt. There are examples enough to indicate that prices rose gradually but steadily during the period, that taxes in money rose very little, and yet the producers who should have profited by this condition were evidently in increasing distress. The explanation, the authors believe, is that taxes in kind must have become much greater than before. The exchange necessary to pay tribute to Rome and to purchase necessary imports was amply provided by exports, and it is clear that in case of difficulty the government would intervene to regulate the price of gold. Hence the authors' discussion of the special conditions that caused a drop in the price of gold at Alexandria in 113 (pp. 90 ff.) and of the silver bullion at Coptos in 117 is particularly welcome.

The remaining chapters deal with the period after Diocletian, when Egyptian isolation ended and the history of Egyptian currency becomes a chapter in the history of that of the Empire. In this section, too, the authors' method of confronting the terms and numbers in the papyri with the facts of the coinage brings il-

luminating results. Specially to be noted is the conclusion that, once the new coinage in gold was established, the apparent inflation of the bronze coinage was merely a matter of terminology, since prices in terms of the *solidus* and its fractions varied little. A useful set of tables and a convenient selection of documents complete the work. Flaws in text and book-making seem few. I note φυλακών on page 33, *be* for *the* on page 53, and find *grams* ambiguous at first glance on page 109.

T. Robert S. Broughton

Bryn Mawr College

Les Métaphores de Platon. By Pierre Louis. ("Collection d'études anciennes," publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé.) Paris: Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1945. Pp. xxii+269. Fr. 250.

In this careful listing and analysis of Plato's metaphors, M. Louis begins his Introduction with an attempt to define metaphor, mentions Aristotle's definition in the *Poetics* and its general acceptance by the ancient world, and quotes several modern definitions, including that of W. Bedell Stanford (who appears once as "W. Beddel Stanford" and twice as "W. B. Stranford"): "The essence of affective [*sic*] metaphor is a clear and definite understanding of the two constituent ideas incorporated in the metaphorical term, together with an appreciation of the new concept integrated from those constituent ideas." M. Louis feels that this definition is too close to Plato's definition of the *paradeigma* in *Politicus* 278 C. He goes on to distinguish between metaphor and simile: the second part of a simile can be detached while the metaphor is essential to the sense of the phrase.

In his discussion of the difference between metaphor and *paradeigma*, M. Louis has correctly noted that the latter is not merely a stylistic device but a philosophical concept; it would have been of interest had he noted the discussion of, and emphasis on, this aspect of *paradeigma* which Jaeger, for example (*Paideia*, I, 31–33, 215–17, 239–40), makes; but this work is generally confined to the metaphor. He notices Plato's predilection for metaphors drawn from man and human activities, from animals, plants, and natural phenomena and Plato's tendency to describe philosophical inquiry as a journey or a voyage. It would also have been interesting to trace the source of these metaphors, which in Plato sometimes seem to have more significance than that of a mere commonplace. Plato's interest in ordinary human activities is compared and contrasted with that of Homer and the tragedians. M. Louis remarks: "L'emploi métaphorique d'un mot nous renseigne moins sur la mentalité de l'écrivain que sur celle du milieu social dans lequel il a vécu" (pp. 12–13). But why did Plato use particular metaphors, especially when some of them are extended throughout a complete work?

M. Louis indicates the traditional method of treatment of Plato's metaphors—according to the domain from which they are borrowed. He goes on: "Quiconque les étudie, s'aperçoit vite qu'elles ne sont pas de simples ornements, mais qu'elles sont toutes destinées à exprimer des idées mieux que ne le ferait un long développement" (p. 14). His own plan, then, is to group the metaphors according to the ideas which they express. Living metaphors and commonplaces are distinguished, although the distinction often seems largely subjective.

Then the metaphors are studied. First come those which describe "l'activité intellectuelle"; those which describe dialectic (the author seems influenced throughout by A. Diès, to whom the work is inscribed and whose definition of dialectic, "l'art à chercher à deux, c'est-à-dire de penser à deux," is here adopted); those which describe "le discourse"—the speaker "molds" or "weaves" or "carves out" the argument. Remarks on the sources of the metaphors are generally drawn from A. L. Keith's *Simile and Metaphor in Greek Poetry from Homer to Aeschylus*.

The second part of the work takes up "La Doctrine" under the headings "man," "the soul," "the theory of knowledge," "moral principles," "social life," "God and the universe." Under "the theory of knowledge" are discussed the metaphors which describe the de-

grees of knowledge: ignorance as a "disease" and the other medical metaphors.

M. Louis's conclusion is simply that there is little invention in Plato's metaphors; many are traditional; his originality is rather "l'art incomparable avec lequel il renouvelle et transfigure des images usuelles" (p. 175). All images cannot be reduced to a single formula; some are inevitable; spiritual things can be described only by a transfer of words which apply originally to material things. Some metaphors take their origin in a trait of character, as those which employ a play upon words (*soma*, *sema*) begin in the desire for humor. Sometimes the metaphor has particular reference to the topic under discussion, as the metaphor of harmony in the *Phaedo*. The metaphor is never merely a stylistic device; like the *paradeigma*, its function is that of a real argument: "ce sont ... de véritables arguments, et les meilleurs qui soient, puisqu'ils sont sensibles" (p. 181).

A lengthy Appendix catalogues metaphors and similes according to the fields from which they are borrowed, with an additional list of "souvenirs mythologiques, historiques et litteraires"; there are indexes of Platonic passages cited, of other authors and of Greek words; pre-Platonic instances of particular metaphors are listed fairly completely in footnotes. The book is bound in paper, and the typography is good for a wartime product. There are typographical inaccuracies on pages xix, xx, xxi, and xxii of the introductory bibliography and two on page 4, note 17.

EDMUND G. BERRY

University of Manitoba

The American Numismatic Society Museum Notes, Vol. I (1945). New York. Issued annually. Pp. 106+23 Pls. $1.50.

The need for an American scholarly periodical intended primarily for articles and notes of less than monographic extent has long been felt in the numismatic field. *Numismatic Review*, under the able editorship of Professor Thomas O. Mabbott, has for the past several years in part met the want. The publication in 1946 of the inaugural volume of *Museum Notes* promises now to fill this gap in American numismatic literature and adds a welcome companion to the two distinguished series of the American Numismatic Society, "Numismatic Notes and Monographs" and "Numismatic Studies."

As its name implies, *Museum Notes* is concerned chiefly with coins and numismatic problems connected with the valuable collections in the museum of the society and its acquisitions during the year preceding publication. Contributions on topics unrelated to the museum also appear, however, in Volume I, and more are promised in future volumes.

The major portion of the present volume is devoted to Greek and Roman coins. This fact —an added recommendation to classicists— reflects the relatively ampler provisions that have been made by the friends of the society for the acquisition of Greek and Roman coins rather than any predisposal on the part of the society or its staff, which prepared the current volume, to favor the coinage of antiquity.

A brief Introduction to the new volume by the past president of the society, Herbert E. Ives, is followed by six articles on ancient coins. Sydney P. Noe writes of the Greek acquisitions in 1945, prefacing their description with an illuminating discussion of the chronology of the late tetradrachms of Abydus. Agnes Baldwin Brett contributes an article on the coins of Ake-Ptolemais issued by the Seleucid rulers from Seleucus IV to Tryphon, which is based on her examination of the Seleucid coins in the collection of the Newell Bequest. A. R. Bellinger makes the acquisition of an octuple of Timarchus, who revolted against Demetrius I of Syria in 162 B.C. and ruled until his death in 160, the occasion for an excellent summary of what is at present known concerning the rare coinage of this ruler. Aline Abaecherli Boyce, in connection with a newly acquired medallion of Caracalla, brilliantly traces the use of the symbols of state cult on imperial coinage to designate the presumptive successor. Louis C. West offers convincing evidence that "computations in terms of weights used by the Romans themselves would produce more accurate and satisfactory results than have been reached by defining the standards in

terms of grains or grammes." This unit for gold was the carat or *siliqua*. Sawyer McA. Mosser contributes an interesting note on four very finely preserved Roman medallions and a large bronze of Apamea in Phrygia acquired by the society in 1945 which once formed part of the collection of the Vicomte de Sartiges.

In the section devoted to medieval and modern coins, Herbert E. Ives publishes additions to the list of imitations of the English noble published in his ***Foreign Imitations of the English Noble***. John L. Dresser describes two rare European coins—a Salzburg 10-kreuzer "Klippe" of 1583 and a gold gulden of the Count of the Palatinate, Louis IV (1436–49)—which have recently been added to the society's collection. Robert I. Nesmith is the author of one of the longer articles of the current volumes, a study of Lima and Potosí silver 8-reale "cob" pieces which formed part of a considerable hoard discovered recently in Lima. The size of the lot, which numbers 190 coins—40 Lima and 145 Potosí pieces—and the rarity of such discoveries lend particular interest to this masterly article. The section is concluded with a brief table of identification of the miscellaneous accessions illustrated on Plates XXII and XXIII.

The oriental section consists of a brief article by Mehmet Aga-Oblu on the nature of the alloy of the *dirhams* struck in Bukhara during the administration of Ghitrif ibn ʾAta al Kindi (792–93) which are called after his name, *ghitrifi*.

The volume is concluded with a brief description by William L. Clark of the Ballantine Bequest of Decorations, consisting of 107 decorations, made to the society by Lt. John H. Ballantine, Jr., who was killed in action in December, 1944, in the Pacific.

In size and format, *Museum Notes* is identical with "Numismatic Notes and Monographs." The quality of its twenty-three plates is of the same high standard with which readers of the society's publications have long been familiar. These plates should do much toward fulfilling the hope expressed by Mr. Ives in the Introduction that *Museum Notes* would better acquaint the society's membership with the extent and character of the museum's acquisitions. The distinguished scholarship of the notes and articles that accompany them will make this initial volume of *Museum Notes* a welcome addition to every numismatist's library. The American Numismatic Society and its staff have cause to be proud of their new publication.

Meriwether Stuart

Hunter College

St. Augustine: The First Catechetical Instruction. Translated by Joseph P. Christopher. ("Ancient Christian Writers," edited by Johannes Quasten and Joseph C. Plumpe, No. 2.) Westminster, Md.: Newman Bookshop, 1946. Pp. vi+171. $2.50.

The present volume is an adaptation and revision of the author's larger work, a doctoral dissertation which appeared in 1926 as Volume VIII of the "Catholic University of America Patristic Series." That volume presented the Latin text of Augustine's *De catechizandis rudibus*, with an English translation and 217 pages of commentary, besides elaborate Bibliography, Introduction, and indexes. Most reviewers greeted it with approval—"a model of how the thing should be done" (A. Souter); "a genuine contribution to patristic study . . . . commentary full and learned throughout . . . . translation close and accurate" (E. H. Blakeney); "destiné à rendre de grands services" (L. Rochus); "eine sehr verdienstliche Leistung . . . . eine reiche Fülle von Erklärungsmittel" (C. Weyman).

The present volume omits the Latin text and the Bibliography and reduces the commentary to 59 pages. The additions and corrections seem to be few and are of minor importance. The mistakes which are retained are, I believe, more numerous than the corrections. Among others I notice these:

Page 5: "This treatise is therefore unique inasmuch as it embodies both a manual for the catechist and a catechesis for the prospective catechumen." But, as De Labriolle pointed out in his review of the dissertation (***Rev. de phil.***, II, 393), it is not intended for the catechumen at all. Dr. Christopher, apparently in deference to his eminent critic, has changed the

wording of his sentence without clearly correcting his error.

Page 95, note 14: "The idea of the soul being imprisoned in the body is both Platonic and Christian." But Augustine expressly repudiates the doctrine of Plato and the Neo-Platonists on this point (*Civ.* xii. 27; for discussion and further references see J. Mausbach, *Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus*, I², 161 f.).

Page 97, note 27: "The ancient book was a roll of parchment." In classical times the usual book was a papyrus roll. But from the time of Martial the parchment codex, or leaf-book, began to be used and by Augustine's time had become the usual form. For discussion and references see C. C. McCown, "Codex and Roll in the New Testament," in *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XXIV (1941), 219–50. But the *involucrum*, mentioned here by Augustine, is not a book of any sort but rather the wrapping or covering in which a book or other object was carried. In the passage here cited from Cicero (reference should be corrected to read *De orat.* i. 35. 161) *involucra* and *integumenta* are evidently synonymous.

Page 106, note 76: "Augustine is here referring to the Donatists." The reference is obviously to the crowds of drunkards, gamblers, adulterers, and other depraved persons who "fill the churches." In another section (p. 79) the same classes are more specifically said to be "in the Catholic Church herself."

Page 123, note 175: "According to the millenarian doctrine, ... of which Augustine was a champion at the time when he wrote this treatise, there are seven millennia, or epochs of world history, each lasting a thousand years." But Augustine's epochs, beginning with Adam, Noah, Abraham, David, Babylonian captivity, and Christ, did not each last a thousand years. Elsewhere (*Gen. c. Manich.* i. 42) he mentions their inequality.

More might be said of the commentary. Many of the notes are trivial. For example, the reader is briefly informed that *evangelium* means "gospel," *catholicus* means "catholic, orthodox," etc. (nn. 25, 77, 91, 286, etc.). But criticism of such points as these properly belongs to the original dissertation, with which interested scholars have long been familiar. This series of translations is intended rather to invite the attention of a larger number of readers to the ancient Christian writers. For those readers this commentary, with its copious quotation of Latin and Greek and frequent reference to learned works, would seem a gratuitous display of erudition. A reviewer of the first volume of the series (*Class. Bull.*, November, 1946, p. 10) suggests that such a commentary "is a means, on the *omne ignotum pro magnifico* principle, of stirring up interest in the classical languages." If this is actually the purpose, perhaps no classicist should quarrel with it, but doubt may still remain about the method.

The translation is close and generally accurate. But the casual reader will hardly be attracted by its style. Sentences of ponderous length everywhere preserve the structure of Augustine's Latin, with "wherefores" and "whomsoevers" which often suggest the tone of the seventeenth-century Bible translations. Both Catholic and Protestant translators are today offering the Bible in the sentence structure of the twentieth century—cannot the same be done for the Fathers? F. J. Sheed has been bold enough to defy precedent and give us a fluent translation of the *Confessions*. It is to be hoped that future translators of this series will show a similar boldness.

William M. Green

University of California

Études sur Cicéron. By Martin van den Bruwaene. Brussels: L'Édition Universelle, S.A., n.d. [1946]. Pp. 111.

In the four studies which make up this slender volume, Bruwaene, who is already known for his *La Théologie de Cicéron* (Louvain, 1937), undertakes to explain the genius of Cicero by demonstrating his concern for law and justice and his oratorical gifts. The evidence, chiefly Cicero's own writings, is handled skilfully, the argument is closely reasoned, and the result is an apotheosis of Cicero.

In the first essay Bruwaene discusses the problem of the restitution of the dowry to Cicero's former wife, Terentia, and attempts to reconcile Roman law concerning *cautio rei*

uxoriae with Cicero's own remarks on his domestic situation. From a careful analysis of Roman law and Cicero's own correspondence appertaining not only to Terentia but also to his later divorce from Publilia and the divorce of his daughter, Bruwaene concludes that Roman law at this period did not give a precise ruling in matters affecting the restitution of dowry. It should be noted, however, that E. Costa (*Cicerone giureconsulto* [2d ed.; Bologna, 1927], I, 59–62, 221, n. 2) and H. F. Jolowicz (*Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law* [Cambridge, 1932], pp. 243–44) indicate that the praetorian edict was quite clear in permitting suits for the recovery of dowry. That Cicero does not refer to such an edict cannot be used as an *argumentum e silentio*, for his letters on the subject seem evasive. Yet from these letters one gets the impression that Cicero was under a compulsion more cogent than his own sense of honor, and that compulsion may well have been the praetorian edict.

In his second essay Bruwaene examines the praetorian power and edict and the tradition of jurisprudence which was their basis. He contrasts the misuse of the praetorian power by Verres in two cases concerning wills with Cicero's judicious application of that power in the case of the Cypriote Salaminians. Cicero does, to be sure, emerge from his own account of this episode in his career as governor of Cilicia in a much more favorable light than did Verres in the earlier cases. In the end, however, Cicero was unwilling to antagonize Brutus by making a final ruling in favor of the provincials; and, by leaving the case for his successor to settle, he compromised in some measure the principles which he had insisted should guide Verres or the praetor generally. To argue, as Bruwaene does, that Cicero had found a subtle means of reconciling the demands of his conscience and the interests of Brutus is assuredly no defense.

Bruwaene's essay on Cicero's idea of the *princeps* does not provide any very fresh insight on this familiar problem. Cicero's well-known dependence upon Polybius receives too much emphasis. When Cicero acted, it was not merely because of what he found in a book but because he had actual experience and was feeling his way to the logical conclusion of his observations.

In the final essay, which in its original lecture form was evidently intended for the edification of the author's lycée pupils, a comparison is made of the careers and the qualities of Demosthenes and Cicero. Such a comparison was, of course, already drawn in antiquity by Plutarch. More original is an elaborate quantitative analysis of parallel passages in Demosthenes and Cicero to show the coincidence of rhythm. The author seeks, finally, to prove that, while the two orators have much in common, Cicero was a profound student of philosophy and a cultivated man, in contrast to Demosthenes, who was ignorant of philosophy and a rougher diamond.

In these essays Bruwaene has demonstrated those admirable virtues of industry and diligence which he commends in Demosthenes and Cicero. He has sought to illumine several of the facets of the versatile Cicero; but the light does not, despite the author's industry and intention, always burn brightly.

SOLOMON KATZ

University of Washington

The Hymn to Demeter and Her Sanctuary at Eleusis. By GEORGE EMMANUEL MYLONAS. ("Washington University Studies, New Series, Language and Literature," No. 13.) Pp. xii+99+5 figs. in text. St. Louis: Washington University, 1942. Paper, $1.00.

Few scholars could be as well qualified as Mylonas, a noted expert on prehistoric Greece and on Eleusis in particular, to write on the subject of this study. In it he presents the fruits of a comparison between the late Mycenaean remains at Eleusis and the topographical passages in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter, with evident gains to both archeology and literary criticism.

The author's conclusions (in part anticipated by his earlier publications) are summarized at the ends of chapters iii, iv, and v. They rest on two primary assumptions: that the Hymn was written by a poet who had a first-hand knowledge of Eleusinian landmarks, among them certain Mycenaean buildings; and

that the poem, since its language reflects Mycenaean political and architectural conditions, "can be used with confidence as a guide to the remote architectural history of Eleusis" (p. 92). The late Helladic foundations on the Acropolis, west of the Roman building, are identified as a part of Keleos' palace. "Megaron B," found beneath the classical Telesterion (and beneath a late geometric apsidal structure), is the temple ordered by Demeter. The well found at the northeast corner of the portico of Philon is the Kallichoron, above which the goddess wished her temple to be built; but its name was later transferred to the well beside the greater Propylaea, identified as the Parthenion of the Homeric Hymn. The "Mirthless Rock," not mentioned in the Hymn but known from later sources, is placed in front of the rock-cut platform just below the spur of Panaghitsa.

Proof of these identifications is unfortunately hindered by the nature of the evidence. The remains of palace and temple seem poor and small beside our expectations. May those structures not have vanished altogether in the frequent razing and rebuilding that went on at Eleusis? Similarly, the architectural passages in the poem appear to reflect stock Homeric formulas (cf. esp. l. 186 with *Od.* i. 333, etc.) and must therefore be used with great caution as descriptions of actual buildings. As one reviewer has already suggested (Welles, *AJA*, XLVI [1942], 468), they seem to argue the poet's knowledge of Homer more forcibly than they show his acquaintance with the bronze-age topography of Eleusis (see also Fontenrose, *AJP*, LXV [1944], 293 f.; H. J. Rose, *CR*, LVII [1943], 36 f.; Carpenter, *CW*, XXXVI [1942–43], 117 f.). The chronological gap is most formidable. Would the foundations of "Megaron B" (cf. *AJA*, XL [1936], 275, Fig. 4) in fact have *supported* a building for five centuries? But Mylonas presents his arguments ingeniously and as effectively as his materials allow. Much, too, that is of value in the book does not depend on its main thesis.

The text is accompanied by five figures showing topography and ground plans; and the book is well indexed. The writing, though easy to follow, seems diffuse and uneven, and there are some strangely transliterated Greek proper names. "Deme-trip" veterans will regret the mutilation of modern Attic place-names in the map, Figure 5 (prepared by a student). It is ungrateful, however, to dwell on these superficial flaws in a creditable and unpretentiously useful piece of research. An apology is due also for the lateness of this notice. The review copy of the book, mislaid and forgotten during the war, was only recently recovered from its hiding-place.

D. A. AMYX

University of California

An Introduction to Linguistic Science. By EDGAR H. STURTEVANT. New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Geoffrey Cumberlege (Oxford University Press), 1947. Pp. x+173. $3.00.

The book is a statement for the benefit of nonlinguists of the basic principles of the science of language. It presents in the simplest and the clearest terms both the opinions held by all linguists, and (with due warning) some of the questions about which the opinions of competent scholars are divided.

The chapter headings will indicate sufficiently the topics treated: i, "Introductory" (pp. 1–8); ii, "Phonetics and Phonemics" (pp. 9–18); iii, "The Relation of Writing to Speech" (pp. 19–29); iv, "Records of Speech" (pp. 30–39); v, "The Origin of Language" (pp. 40–50); vi, "Descriptive Linguistics" (pp. 51–64); vii, "The Empirical Basis of Phonetic Laws" (pp. 65–73); viii, "Why Are Phonetic Laws Regular?" (pp. 74–84); ix, "Assimilation and Dissimilation" (pp. 85–96); x, "Analogic Creation" (pp. 96–109); xi, "Processes Sometimes Confused with Analogic Creation" (pp. 110–22); xii, "Change of Vocabulary" (pp. 123–32); xiii, "Change of Meaning" (pp. 133–41); xiv, "Borrowing" (pp. 142–53); xv, "The Comparative Method" (pp. 154–67); Index (pp. 169–73).

My general opinion of the book can be expressed best by a quotation:

> Thine is the charm of calm, good sense,
> Of steadfast views.

The layman can rely confidently on the information given him. The linguist—too wise to expect a revelation—will find some new examples of processes familiar to him but will be still more interested to observe how neatly a most important service both to linguistics and to the community has been rendered.

The attitude of the general public to linguistics is bad for both on two counts.

Among the laity ignorance is almost universal and to an extent that does not hold for other sciences. About 1890 there was still in Baltimore a man who repeatedly sought an opportunity to maintain the flatness of the earth in a debate with Daniel C. Gilman. His pre-Magellan views were hopelessly outmoded and merely caused merriment tinged with pity. Today it is doubtful that even one individual of that sort could be found in a community as enlightened as (say) Princeton. The schools take such views out of the children at a very early age; but pre-Waterloo views about language are still inculcated by the schools, and the highest academic honors can be obtained without their elimination. They can be heard throughout the country at every turn.

In the face of the other sciences the laity maintains a becoming reticence; but about language the less they know the more blatant they are: "Jeder Mensch, weil er spricht, glaubt über die Sprache sprechen zu können."

A defense-mechanism—linguistics is *so* esoteric—was long available to those whose conscience felt the need of salving. For its existence linguists were themselves in part to blame. They saw their shortcomings, regretted them, but did nothing to make amends. The present book changes the situation entirely. The scientific standpoint is now available to all, and there is no longer any excuse for allowing a child to go as far as high school with pre-Waterloo ideas about language.

George Melville Bolling

Ohio State University

The Hellenistic Civilization and East Rome: The James Bryce Memorial Lecture, 1945. By N. H. Baynes. London: Oxford University Press, 1946. Pp. 48. 1*s*. 6*d*.

Professor Baynes presents this lecture as a "marginal note" to Lord Bryce's chapter on the East Roman Empire in the last edition of his *Holy Roman Empire*. It is, in fact, a keen analysis of significant aspects of Byzantine civilization by a champion of the strength of the Hellenic tradition in East Rome as opposed to so-called "orientalizing" influences. In spite of the lack of interest which the Greeks displayed in their own Hellenistic period, Baynes regards the East Romans as the "intellectual heirs" of that neglected period.

This heritage, he feels, is revealed particularly in certain characteristic intellectual and spiritual attitudes which mark the Byzantine way of life. One of these was the acceptance of the Hellenistic veneration of classical Greek literature, coupled with exaggerated respect for rhetoric, with a consequent deadening of intellectual initiative. In rejecting paganism the Christian Greeks did not give up the literary heritage of the pagan past but made it a basic element in their Christian culture. The feeling of individual insecurity, which in the Hellenistic age led men to seek hope and salvation in Stoicism or the mystery religions, was also characteristic of the Late Roman Empire, where Christianity now provided a more effective spiritual refuge. Byzantine Christianity had also a concrete inheritance in the Septuagint translation of the Old Testament in the Hellenistic *koinē*, and the New Testament written in that tongue.

Politically, the Late Roman Empire accepted the Hellenistic concept of autocratic monarchy. It also inherited a political problem arising from the failure of the Hellenistic Greeks to Hellenize the rural populations of the Syrian and Egyptian hinterlands. Significant also is the survival of the idea of contrast between Hellene and barbarian, although in a modified form. For the Hellenistic age, this contrast was purely cultural, based upon the Greek possession of a common civilization involving a common pagan religion and pagan outlook on life. The East Romans retained this idea of cultural contrast based upon a religion and a view of life, but now both of these were Christian instead of pagan, and the term

"Hellene" had given place to that of "Rhomaios."

Altogether, a learned and stimulating essay, both readable and well worth reading.

A. E. R. BOAK

University of Michigan

The Epistles of St. Clement of Rome and St. Ignatius of Antioch, Newly Translated and Annotated. By JAMES A. KLEIST. ("Ancient Christian Writers: The Works of the Fathers in Translation," No. 1.) Westminster, Md.: Newman Bookshop, 1946. Pp. x+162. $2.50.

This volume initiates a new series of translations of early Christian literature edited by Professors Quasten and Plumpe, of the Catholic University of America. It will include not only Greek and Latin texts but oriental writings as well. Collaborators from America and various parts of Great Britain will assist in the plan. The editors write:

> That there is need of such a collection of translations should be evident. On the Catholic side we have been without one for much too long. So far back as 1941 the editors on their walks through the Maryland fields and woods discussed this situation and determined to devote every effort to its correction.

Father Kleist, who has translated the First Epistle of St. Clement and the seven Ignatian letters, is known to New Testament critics for his excellent work on Mark. He has followed the text of Funk-Bihlmeyer and has produced a thoroughly readable and reliable translation, with brief critical introductions and useful philological and historical notes. His remarks on the problem of translating Ignatius' laconic style are so admirable that I venture to quote them as a model for all translators of patristic Greek:

> A word remains to be said about the tone of the subjoined English translation. The style of Ignatius is so compact, so succinct, and so highly individual, that the reader of this translation who wishes to enjoy the additional luxury of tasting *all the Ignatian flavor* must of necessity go to the original. Translations are not made for the benefit of the scholar, but address themselves in the first place to a reader not conversant with the intricacies of Greek diction. What he looks for in taking up a translation is not merely accuracy, or fidelity to thought, but also readableness. He wants to know—of course in as few words as possible—what the Greek writer meant to say; he is anxious to grasp the sense without being compelled to turn to a footnote explaining it. A translation is, therefore, not deficient just because the number of its words exceeds that of the Greek. To give one illustration: In *Trallians* 4. 1, Ignatius says: πολλὰ φρονῶ ἐν θεῷ. This is an extreme case of the general Greek, and the special Ignatian, penchant for brachylogy. To cling to the Greek wording and render: "I think many things in God," is to tax the reader with a puzzle. What Ignatius *means* to say is: "If I take God's view of things (for that sense of φρονῶ, see Mark 8. 33: 'You do not take God's view of things, but man's'), many thoughts pass through my mind." This is at once intelligible and smoothes the way for the next statement: "yet, I restrain myself" ("I do not allow myself to be puffed up," etc.). Note, also, in the sentence just quoted, Ignatius's passion for what seems to us an excessive straining of certain Greek prepositions; as, for example, ἐν. There is here, no doubt, an echo of Paul's favorite expression ἐν Χριστῷ: "in Christ"; that is, "in union with Christ"; "acting as a member of Christ's mystical body." Unfortunately for the translator, ἐν was capable also of several other pregnant uses. On the whole, it will be found, I trust, that while I have emulated the Ignatian *brevitas*, I have avoided his *obscuritas*.

ROBERT P. CASEY

Brown University

BOOKS RECEIVED

[Not all works submitted can be reviewed, but those that are sent to the editorial office for notice are regularly listed under "Books Received." Offprints from periodicals and parts of books will not be listed unless they are published (sold) separately. Books submitted are not returnable.]

American Numismatic Society. *Museum Notes*, Vol. II. New York: American Numismatic Society, 1947. Pp. vi+118+19 pls. $1.50.

Anti, Carlo. *Teatri greci arcaici da Minosse a Pericle.* ("Monografie di archeologia," ed. Carlo Anti, No. 1.) Padova: Le Tre Venezie, 1947. Pp. 337+8 pls. L. 3000.

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